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Abstract of Thesis
Social Learning and Multimedia Innovation
in a Corporate Environment
Corporate expectations for information servicing possibilities offered by
Multimedia Technologies have been high. Hopes for fast adoption, encouraged by
advances in networking technology and hardware processing ability, have met with
frustration.
Rapid technological progress within multimedia systems development
coupled with the absence of established models to guide innovation has created great
uncertainty. As a result organisations have made costly mistakes when selecting
technological direction and engaging innovative development.
This study investigates the innovation process for multimedia within an
organisation to gain insight into its operation and factors that impact on its trajectory.
The isolated case study method, commonly used in this study area, was
abandoned. Instead, a participant observer with access to a series of linked projects
including the pre-project phases was used. The case studies follow an organisation
navigating complex technological choices requiring readjustment of the application
of expertise and reconsideration of the technology supply model. The first case study
covers the successful testing of a bank's network capability to evaluate its potential
to handle rich multimedia applications. This is followed by involvement in the
assessment of the technology group's pilot intranet prior to its rollout to the wider
organisation. The third case study sees both initiatives combined to provide a
distributed Training and Communications Network for the corporation.
Interdisciplinary consideration of multimedia innovation was required due to
the range of social, political and economic factors that combined to impact
technological decisions. The use of Actor Network theory enabled the mapping of
relations between the variety of actors aligned around shared agendas for multimedia
innovation. Technological convergence resulted in actors from previously disparate
groups being drawn into a new relationship model. Organisational theory aided the
assessment of the emerging tensions and dynamics. The revised relationship model
extended across intra-organisational units, lines of responsibility in addition to
interactions with external suppliers. Here the model of technology supply was
reconsidered in light of the componentised standards based aspects of multimedia,
which allowed technologies to be 'mixed and matched'.
During the study we are presented with evidence that social and technical
factors are intertwined and require joint consideration throughout the innovation
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process. The pre-project phase plays a crucial role in the alignment and initiation of
innovative activity, an operation strongly dependent on the activities of the project
leaders. Through appreciation of the process across projects, we are able to define
areas of focus for the successful management of multimedia innovation and offer
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"There will be times during your study that you will feel no one else cares
about your work": I was advised by my CASE studentship interviewer. Thankfully,
this fear proved to be unfounded. It cannot be said that my study was without stress
and difficulty, but these have been overshadowed by both the value I've gained from
doing it and the satisfaction of having completed it. During my study I was also
fortunate in having the opportunity of meeting and working with many people from
whom I gained much intellectually and socially.
My greatest debt remains to my father and mother who have been supportive
above and beyond levels normally demonstrated by parents. Indeed, the thesis is
more of a family achievement than an individual one, with an equal billing for them
completely appropriate. The fourth member of our family, our dog, Kirky cannot go
unmentioned as in her own special way she maintained spirits even during the most
stressful periods.
I owe a special debt to Dana Pressman, whose advice, insight and assistance
were immeasurably appreciated. Her ability to comprehend and develop my, often
addled, thoughts and provide motivation was vital to my successful completion.
I would like to thank the creator(s) of the CASE studentship program for
providing the framework which attracted me to the possibility of studying for a Ph.D.
Jointly funded by the study organisation and the Economic and Social Research
Council, I was provided with the opportunity to mix academic study and industry
application. Given the benefit I've gained, I hope the opportunity to study in this
manner will be extended to many others. Not only was my study richer for it but the
benefits have extended well into my subsequent professional life.
As with every journey there is a beginning and an end. I feel indebted to the
casts in the rooms that set me on my way and then drew it to an end.
I am grateful to Dr. Wendy Faulkner, Dr. Rob Proctor and Les Cashin for
taking a leap of faith and initiating me on this journey of study. By selecting me for
the studentship they provided me with an opportunity and experience that few people
receive.
To Professor Donald MacKenzie and Professor Elisabeth Davenport, my
internal and external examiners, I am especially grateful for their thoughtful
appreciation of the output ofmy study. Their validation ofmy work has made all of
the effort worthwhile.
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En route, my supervisors, Professor Robin Williams and Dr. Rob Proctor
provided constant support and advice. Their knowledge, perspective and patience
were unfailing and always appreciated.
My time within the studied organisation would have been greatly diminished,
both academically and personally, without Peter Dalziel. Peter's advice and guidance
were invaluable in helping me navigate through the organisation, allowing access
and insight during my time there. His input and generously committed support
provided a foundation for the study to flourish. Melanie Thomson's aid during the
Praxis case study was also very much appreciated.
Lastly, I would like to thank anyone reading this dissertation. Its creation was
a rewarding experience which provides value each day in my working life. I hope
that whatever your reason for interest you find something relevant to you within
these pages. For those currently engaged in study of any sort, I wish you the best of
luck. If you find yourself in the situation described by my opening quote, please
persevere. It really is worth it.
6
1. Introduction
Social Learning and Multimedia Innovation in a Corporate Environment
This study investigates the innovation process for multimedia within an
organisation in order to gain insight into the operations and factors which impact on
its trajectory. The objective was to provide indicators of success in order to assist
organisations in selecting and supporting innovations in a more predictable manner.
Effective performance of this task required consideration of the existing
theoretical perspectives in order to identify and understand theoretical constructs of
potential benefit to my study. The implementation of technological systems has
become increasingly complex as they have evolved from automating simple
processes and record keeping to supporting information rich user activity.
This thesis has been drawn into three broad areas. Within Section I, the
existing state of understanding of multimedia innovation and technology
implementation is considered, covering what issues existed and how the study was
designed to assist answering areas of uncertainty. Section II contains the case studies
covering three linked multimedia projects within a BigBank. Section III applies the
theoretical lens of Section I against the case data of Section II to draw common
themes and findings which contribute to our understanding of the process of
multimedia innovation within a corporate environment.
Section I: Literature Review and Research Design
Literature
In this section, we consider how to approach the issues set by our study. The
expanding range of knowledge required by technology studies presents a daunting
task for comprehensive consideration. In order to focus our consideration I pose two
simple questions:
1 - What innovation theories are applicable to multimedia?
2- How is technology affected by a corporate setting?
Consideration of these two areas will produce a range of theories and hypotheses that
can guide research design and form a lens through which to view the data gathered.
Technology Innovation theory uses a macro social studies perspective to view
existing models of innovation. The applicability of these models to multimedia
technology is considered given its specific characteristics. Market characteristics and
elements ofpast study are also discussed.
The consideration of organisational theory focuses on the specific theatre of
multimedia development for this study, the corporate environment. Technology's
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role within this setting is considered as are impacts of organisational dynamics upon
its operation. The manner in which organisations have attempted to manage these
impacts through development methodologies and techniques is examined in order to
understand how they attempt to gain an accurate match between user needs and
technology functions.
The disciplines of human computer interaction and contemporary technology
development (RAD1, RUP2) share a common critique of traditional models with
social shaping proponents. They both contest that previous theories such as waterfall
development and technological determinism, respectively, allow only limited
consideration of the users and settings.
Although newer theories such as social shaping of technology and iterative,
incremental development methodologies acknowledge the importance of the user and
the complexity in predicting the trajectory of technology development, no cohesive
model has emerged. Observations and guidance offered remain on a broad, macro
level.
Where theory has been applied to real life settings, it has often been through
isolated case studies, with post-project interviews. This is not to say that this
technique is not valuable but, in order to gain a more rounded perspective and
understanding of such a complex area, alternative study approaches should also be
attempted.
Research Design
The isolated case study method, popular within this area of study, was
abandoned. Instead, a participant observer with access to a series of linked projects,
including the pre-project phases was used. A participant observer was placed within
a bank research group which assisted the acquisition of credibility and entry into
projects. This approach was designed to enable deep insight into all aspects of the
innovation process across various bank settings and connected technologies. Whilst
this approach required subjective prediction of the evolution of cases, the resultant
series of innovations provided a well linked picture of development.
Section II: Case Studies
The case studies follow an organisation navigating complex technological
choices requiring readjustment of the application of expertise and reconsideration of
the technology supply model. Due to the sensitivity of the information contained
1
Rapid Application Development
2 Rational Unified Process
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within this thesis, the organisation is referred to as 'BigBank' to conceal its identity.
A background to the organisation is contained in appendix Chapter 12.2 although
with anonymity. The case studies, titled Networked Multimedia (NMM), Praxis and
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Networked Multimedia (NMM) Case Study3
This case is about the bank Technology Department's testing and assessment
of their technical infrastructure's capability to handle rich multimedia applications. It
shows enrolment of external expertise to supplement gaps within BigBank's
expertise, formation of innovation networks between suppliers and users and the
impact of alterations of perceived 'reality' of technology. The positive findings from
this case alerted actors to a wider range of technical possibilities. Appreciation and
exploration of these possibilities drove the use of multimedia broadcast within the
subsequent Training and Communications Network (TCN) project.
Praxis Case Study4
BigBank's intranet pilot was given the title 'Praxis'. Its first evolution
consisted of a pilot system limited to the Technology Department. This case study
covers the second evolution of 'Praxis', the Technology Department's intranet
system and corporate pilot. The case shows organisational efforts to apply formal
process and governance to the technical operations and content requirements of the
system. We witness actors employing socio-political strategies to legitimise power
and the navigation ofpower structures surrounding information ownership.
Training and Communications Network (TCN) Case Study
This case details the development of a corporate-wide distributed learning
system delivered over the bank network. The system is created through a
combination of innovations and social learning of the NMM and Praxis projects.
Complex social, technical, economic and political factors are displayed as the project
is presented to the Board for approval. Intensive socio-political activity is evident as
3
Findings from this case study are also featured in PROCTOR, R, A. McKINLAY, S.
GALLACHER, (2001), "The Influence of Network Quality of service factors on the Usability
and effectiveness of multimedia internet broadcasting', in: A. Sloane, and D. Lawrence,
(Editors), Multimedia Internet Broadcasting, 35-52, (Springer).
And
PROCTOR, R., A. McKINLAY, S. GALLACHER, M. HARTSWOOD 'An Investigation of
the influence of variable network load on the effectiveness ofmultimedia presentations', in: C.
Simone, and S. Weisband, (Editors), Proceedings of Group '99, the International Conference
on supporting group work, 160-168, [Phoenix, AZ:](Arizona: Phoenix: ACM Press).
4
Findings from this case study are also featured in GALLACHER, S., R. PROCTOR, R.
WILLIAMS, (2001), 'The Politics of Intranet usability: can one size fit all?', in: J. Bawa; P.
Dorazio; L. Trenner; (Editors), 'The Usability Business: Making the Web work', (Springer).
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actors seek to establish positions of power and marginalise competitors,
demonstrated by internal and external parties challenging the Technology
Department's orchestrating role.
Section III Analysis and Conclusions
Section III extracts themes and important factors from the study with the aim
of drawing attention to important areas of consideration for corporations engaging in
multimedia innovation. 'Analysis' considers the drivers for innovation and the
impacts multimedia systems have had upon the bank. Attention is drawn to the
enrolment and operation of the innovation networks or 'communities of interest'
composed of actors and artefacts that provide the framework for innovations to
develop.
Consideration of these aspects allows us to detail some key findings within
the 'Conclusions' chapter. Use of participant observation across linked projects
allowed valuable insight into the pre-project environment and the operations of
actors to align innovation networks. We reflect upon the impact on organisations of
multimedia innovations evolving into integrated, networked systems. Revised
considerations surrounding delivery methods, content requirements and corporate
standards are necessitated. Appreciation of these aspects suggests areas of focus for
the successful management of multimedia innovation and insight into how the
technology department's role has altered to meet this set of challenges.
Study Chronology
My study commenced in October 1996. The Network Multimedia (NMM)
project had been in existence since January of that year but development work began
in December. The project ran until May 1997, at which point I moved onto the Praxis
intranet project which I worked on until June 1998. In January 1998 I began to divide
my time between Praxis and the Training and Communications network (TCN)
project, transitioning to the latter full time in June 1998. This project ran until March
1999, although due to illness, I was only involved until December 1998.
My illness required a break of 8 months, although during this time I was able
to gather data on the culmination of the TCN project by phone and e-mail. I moved
to London in September 1999 for employment and remained there, working full
time, while completing the dissertation document. My thesis was finally submitted
on 1st January 2003.
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Definition of Multimedia
As multimedia is the focus of study, I feel it is important to define my
perception of it for this study. For clear definition I draw upon Williams'
elucidation: "Multimedia refers literally and most generically to the facility to
present information in a variety of media" (Williams, 1997: 31). Multimedia
technologies define themselves from other information technologies through their
convergence ofmedia or 'multimedia-ness' (Williams, 1997) and opportunity for the
user to interact with the system which Schmutzer (1999) suggests should be seen in
two dimensions of user control in terms of content of communication and flow of
communication. Indeed, it has been proposed that increased control and choices
offered to process information are key aspects ofmultimedia (Williams, 1997: 32).
The technologies accepted as multimedia within this study allow users
control and options concerning the type and timing of the information provided via a
range of channels. This includes stand-alone systems, e.g. CD ROM based, and
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Chapter 2 Social Shaping of Technology
This chapter offers a macro overview of innovation theoiy relating to
multimedia and associated technologies.
Technology innovation is discussed broadly and the applicability of various
models to multimedia technology is considered. Frameworks for organising the
various aspects of innovation are considered along with a review of studies within
the multimedia market and aspects relevant to the innovation process.
Chapter 3 Organisational Theory
This chapter considers the environmental setting of our studies within
corporate organisations. Organisational structure and dynamics and technology's role
within that setting are examined, focusing on the various strategies and tactics by
which organisations have attempted to maximise their relationship with technology.
These strategies and tactics include the adoption and application of standards,
management of expertise, a range of development methodologies and techniques to
understand user needs.
These are consolidated to provide a number of considerations and questions
to pose against our case study findings.
2 SOCIAL SHAPING OF TECHNOLOGY
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Investigation of the innovation process for multimedia within an organisation
requires multi-disciplinary considerations. The uncertainty surrounding multimedia
innovations suggests a complex problem necessitating rounded consideration. A
range of literature sources were consulted and insights collected relating to the core
issues of investigation, what model of innovation exists, how does it operate and
what factors impact its trajectory.
Technology innovation theory offered two models for innovation: linear and
interactive. The interactive model produced by social shaping theorists opposes the
linear model of innovation of technological determinism. In attempting to answer
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widely acknowledged defects within the 'linear model' (Newby, 1992; Fairclough,
1992), the interactive model argues that social and technical aspects interact to shape
each other and must be jointly considered within the innovation. Social Shaping of
Technology (SST) calls for consideration of economic, policy and social factors.
Applicability of each model to multimedia technology was considered.
Technology determinism's linear model of innovation appears inappropriate
for Multimedia innovation. Multimedia technologies feature componentised
offerings requiring local configuration necessitating environmental consideration and
supplier-user interaction. This interaction implies the existence of choices and
therefore unpredictability within the technical trajectoiy. This is in opposition to the
pre-determined trajectory proposed by determinism, but compatible with the
interactive model of social shaping.
Information Technology was also considered as a useful point of reference
due to technological similarities to multimedia, greater market maturity providing
evidence of its adherence to the interactive model of innovation.
Application to real world scenarios is necessary in order to properly assess
technology innovation's opposing claims and assist investigation of multimedia
innovation. SST has offered some frameworks to map and assess the creation of
innovation networks. Frameworks allow a homogeneous appreciation of how and
why actors become involved in innovation networks.
Multimedia is an emergent technology, consequently studies are limited and
focused on societal adoption and policy. As a result of the need for supplier-user
interactions, Multimedia innovation study often features suppliers attempting to
include users within the innovation process. Debate exists around how achievable
this is and the best method to achieve it.
Elements which have emerged through this review, that appear relevant to
our investigation, are that technology is a complex process requiring appreciation of
both technical and social factors. This creates an interactive model of innovation
which is evident in the markets of Information Technology and Multimedia where
components are configured into solutions tailored to their specific setting, a task
requiring user involvement. Interactive innovation is conducted through the creation
and operation of networks. A number of frameworks have been presented to assist in
the analysis of this process. We also gained an understanding of the studies
conducted for multimedia innovation and the means by which the interactive process
has been enabled. With these insights, it is clear that we need to gain a clearer
understanding of the organisational setting and the users within.
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Organisational theory provides insights into various social, political and
economic factors at play within this setting. In particular the ongoing struggle,
identified by Burns and Stalker (1961), between the formal and informal structures
resulting in internal political activity. Within this struggle, actors and groups
leverage power resources to assist their activities and technology artefacts serve as
power resources. The formal organisation has to establish mechanisms to mediate
conflict between groups to ensure its benefit to the organisation. The operation of
standards is a core tool in this activity. Additionally, organisations need to consider
how best to accommodate the existence and application of expertise within their
structure.
The tactics used by the organisation are focused on maximizing economic
benefit and minimizing risk from technology activities. In addition to deployment of
standards and application of expertise, management organisations also employ
processes to manage technology development.
Management of technology development has received considerable attention
due to the frequent and costly failures experienced by corporations. Studies by
writers including Tidd, Bessant and Pavitt (1997), have sought to identify the roles
that should be present within successful projects. In parallel a number of possible
methodologies (RAD, DSDM) have emerged to minimize risk and tactics to capture
user requirements effectively.
The team roles identified appreciate the hybrid nature of technology
innovation and the need for consideration of aspects beyond the purely technical.
Parallels can be drawn between the evolution of innovation theory and development
methodologies. As technology theorists have developed an interactive model to
oppose the traditional linear development, methodologies have moved to iterative,
incremental models accommodating increased user input departing from the classic
linear waterfall model. Iterative models have increased the frequency and
opportunity for user input during development. In order for this input to be
effectively captured and applied, techniques including user observation, and
cognitive modelling (Preece, 1994), from the discipline of Human Computer
Interaction (HCI) have been enlisted. These techniques are driven by the objective of
system usability which ties back to the importance of local tailoring for multimedia
systems.
The combined learning from this literature review provides us with an
understanding of the theoretical terrain surrounding this study. It arms us with
perspectives and insights through which to consider the phenomena we will
encounter within the case studies. The existing understanding of multimedia
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innovation provided by Williams et al. (2000) is that it is a complex process
requiring consideration of both social and technical aspects and seemingly compliant
with the interactive model of innovation. It requires the configuration of various
components to meet localised needs effectively, a process requiring the creation and
operation of a network. Offerings within this market have sought to empower the
user and enable user-led innovation. The organisational environment we will address
is considered to feature both a formal and informal structure. The formal structure
attempts to create and enforce methods to moderate the political conflict within the
informal organisation. As a result of the importance of technology, these methods
have included the use of technology standards and related expertise management.
We also considered aspects of the management of technology to aid success and
minimise risk. Broadly, aspects considered are team structure, development
methodology and user understanding techniques.
2.2 TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION THEORY
Technology affects society. On this point technology theorists are agreed.
Debate arises on how it affects society and whether it, in turn, is affected by society.
The traditional concept of technology development presented a linear process
dictated by an inner logic. It was believed that technological change caused
necessary and determinant impacts producing social and organisational change.
Technology was perceived as a 'black box' offering a stabilised design to be
deployed in a consistent manner unaffected by the nuances of the specific setting.
Academic observers kept the technological 'black box' intact considering only the
effects of the technology and not the causes.
Opponents of this 'black box' approach argued that understanding of the
inner workings of the development cycle was obscured through treatment of various
categories of technology such as Computer Aided Design (CAD) as a homogeneous
class of objects, uniform in characteristics and stable over time (Fleck et al., 1988).
Cursory observations of the technology industry cast doubt over this assertion. When
we consider, for example, the software product and service market, the range of
organisations and their differing offerings within these categories combined with
organisations such as IBM Global Services, Accenture, Cap Gemini, Ernst & Young
whose technology consulting business model is reliant on implementing technology
to suit individual technology purchasers' requirements, a 'plug and play' technology
scenario appears unlikely.
The impact of the implementation environment was encountered during
implementation of packaged systems which were promoted as a 'technical fix' to the
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problems of UK manufacturing organisations. Initial supplier offerings to these
organisations were often rooted in large US corporations manufacturing complex
assemblies with formalised information and decision procedures. Requirements of
this software were far removed from the haphazard data collection and idiosyncratic
planning practices present in many of the UK firms who tried to adopt them. This
misalignment between the technology requirements and the organisational setting
caused frequent failure during initial implementations (Clark and Newell, 1993;
Fleck, 1993; Webster and Williams, 1993).
This study demonstrates the impact of the implementation environment on
the performance of the technology. As such, it questions the premise that the
technology will arrive and a set of outcomes will occur, suggesting a possible bi¬
directional relationship between the environment and the technology.
The SST perspective supported the existence of this bi-directional
relationship. Developed as a critique of the technological determinism viewpoint,
social shaping argued that the trajectory of technical development is not only
influenced by technical considerations but is subject to social, economic, cultural
and political factors (Williams, 1997; Edge, 1988). The field of study sought to
assess the manner in which these elements affected the trajectory of the
development, the constitution of the technology and the manner in which various
societal groups are affected by it (MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1985). This opposed the
various flavours of determinism. SST rejected deterministic views instead proposing
a process impacted by a combination of factors.
Social Shaping proponents argue that a variety of environmental factors
impact the development process. SST suggests that social settings shape the
technology as much as the technology shapes the setting (MacKenzie and Wajcman,
1985; Edge 1988). As Williams proposes; "SST studies show that technology is a
social product, patterned by the conditions of its creation and use" (Williams, 1997:
2).
SST sought to open the 'black box' to examine the science and technology
required (Latour, 1986; Latour, 1988), in order to look beyond what the technology
was and what it did. Interest was focused around the content of technology and the
processes that created that content. In viewing this aspect, SST offered one of the
core concepts that form its basis: within the development of technology choices
exist. In addition, these choices each provide the opportunity for the technology to
develop in a different direction. As Vergragt notes:
The fundamental point here is that, in the early stages of the innovation processes,
choices can still be made between alternatives. These choices are influenced by economic
and political interests of the actors involved (Vergragt, 1988: 484).
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Analysis of these choices is concerned with understanding how social,
economic, organisational and political factors affect:
i) the direction as well as the rate of innovation,
ii) the form of technology: the content of technological artefacts and practices,
iii) the outcomes of technological change for different groups in society (Williams and
Edge, 1996: 868).
Through appreciation of the roles of these various factors within the existence
of choices during innovation, SST accepts that technology is negotiable (Cronberg,
1992) impacted by this interaction between social, economic, organisational and
political factors. As such, technology is open to multiple outcomes. The
irreversibility (Collingridge, 1992; Callon, 1994) of these outcomes and resulting
impacts on the possible direction of subsequent choices and technical trajectory
(Rosenberg, 1994) are considered. The outcome of choices can become entrenched
creating closure around a choice and trajectory stabilising elements of the innovation
(Pinch and Bijiker, 1984) although the possibility of decisions being reversed is also
acknowledged (Latour, 1988).
In considering the process of technology innovation, SST acts a 'broad church'
drawing from a range of disciplines to provide rounded consideration of the area.
This amalgamation does not seek to create a united theory or even construct a
permanent relationship instead facilitating a cross-pollination of theoretical
perspectives providing opportunity for further evolution within the field.
Common interests are evident across the academic disciplines when examining
the process for gaining and applying power within technological innovation and the
role of knowledge in these endeavours. The disciplines enlisted are Sociology of
Scientific Knowledge (SSK), Sociology of Industrial Organisation, Technology
Policy Studies and aspects of the Economics of Technological Change.
SSK employs perspectives found within history and the Sociology of Science
(Shapin, 1982) where the development is assessed to identify points where
contingency or 'interpretative flexibility' occurs. At these stages, they attempt to
understand why particular choices were made in preference to others. This field of
study observed that the reasons were never solely technical but instead contained a
strong social aspect shaped by the environment surrounding the development.
This questions the existence of closure around choices and has been an area of
debate between the other areas that feel that tangible technical impacts from
decisions exist and the factors influencing choice cannot be divorced from them.
SSK originally established the theory around the social construction of scientific
truths, expanding this to artefacts presented under the phrase Social Construction of
Technology (SCOT) (Pinch and Bijker, 1984). Whilst the heavy leaning to the social
19
aspect of decision making is open to debate, this theory does provide a useful
appreciation of social factors within the development assisting consideration of
elements such as reputation and status amongst actors. The theory surrounding social
negotiation process advances the SSK view that technological facts are in part a
matter of perception as opposed to technological reality. Schmutzer (1997) argues
this subjective aspect:
Studying the social shaping of technology makes us aware of the two 'realities' of a
technology: on the one hand, there is the reality of the technical features and on the other
hand, there is the reality of how people interpret a technology. The social shaping
perspective emphasises the ideas evolving from the interpretation of a technology which
are shaping its actual development and therefore its technical reality (Schmutzer 1997:
1).
The perception of the technology by various actors, which is both a product of
and factor within the negotiation process, is therefore important. This draws on
Latour and Woolgar's (1979) argument that scientific 'facts' are constructed and
negotiated by scientists. As a result of the breadth of actors and range of
backgrounds they possess, the communication setting and manner in which the
technology is presented are arguably important factors influencing the success and
direction of the innovation. Vergragt notes "In the industrial firm, scientific
knowledge is generated which is biased by various interests towards certain
solutions" (Vergragt, 1988: 485).
While these 'facts' are constructed and negotiated by scientists there is also a
strong contextual character to them (Collins, 1981). This contextual nature has
influences beyond the traditional limit of arguments between scientists, affecting the
feasibility of tackling these problems. "'Doable problems' are the result of alignment
of experiment, laboratoiy and social world by coordinated efforts of various actors"
(Vergragt, 1988: 500).
While SSK and SCOT argue the importance of the micro social relations of
actors, the Sociology of Industrial Organisations adopts a reverse approach. The
social processes, agendas and objectives impacted by technical change are identified
in order to trace these impacts to the influence of the changing technology. This area
of study was principally driven by Braverman's (1974) application of Marx's
analysis of the labour process. Marx ([1867] 1976) presents an adversarial scenario
where technological development is focused on labour force marginalisation in order
to enforce the desires of management. Initial studies, such as that of Noble (1979)
noted study of the innovation of numerically controlled machines tools echoed
Marx's view with technology decisions influenced by management desire to reduce
workers' influence. Later work drew attention to the complexity of interests across
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the diverse range of organisational units affected and the rich array ofmanagement
strategies that could be applied (Wood and Kelly, 1982). Sociology of Industrial
Organisations provides an important appreciation of the organisational environment
in which technology can be applied. While this theory supports the presentation of
the importance of this area, the organisational literature within the next literature
chapter will attend to discussion around the drivers and actors that affect its
implementation at meso and micro levels.
Technology Policy Studies (Molina, 1989) are understandably focused on the
macro environment but do provide some aspects that relate to the meso and micro
environments. The sociology of industrial organisations focuses on the
organisational setting while technology policy studies expands beyond this
restriction encompassing institutional and societal aspects such as markets,
legislation, culture and politics. This serves to provide a macro perspective of the
environment against which technology is developed. The principal source of tension
between this and the other theories exists around the implicit absence of choice
presented. Technology Policy focuses on the absence of choice contained within a
particular selection ignoring the possible alternatives. Features of the macro social
environment are the recurrent reason for this restriction of alternative avenues. While
this theory offers useful insights into the macro environment, appreciation of the
existence of alternatives is crucial ifwe are to really understand the dynamics of the
technological 'black box'.
As technology studies have sought richer explanation than offered by
technological determinism so has economic study investigated beyond the neo¬
classical approach. In studying the economics of technological change, approaches
have focused attention on supply side issues and technical development. Historical
observation has identified unevenness of the process and qualitative shifts. This
wider view has led to accusations of generalisation with focus upon long-term
patterns.
Writers such as Dosi (1982) have sought to identify stable periods within
techno-economic paradigms which generate innovative advances in an attempt to
understand why some periods generate rapid advance whilst others show little
growth. As the other disciplines assist in assessing a breadth of inputs, this method
adds a dimension over time although at a macro level.
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2.3 SOCIAL SHAPING OF TECHNOLOGY: A CONGREGATION OF
PERSPECTIVES
While each theory within the 'broad church' of SST provides distinct
approaches and presumptions, they all approach the same fundamental issue: the
creation of stable networks (MacKenzie, 1992). While SSK believes in dominant
influence of individual actors contrasting with social policy's emphasis on macro-
structures, they are merely different starting points for investigation of the dynamics
ofnetwork creation.
When we consider the wide complex of factors involved, the benefit of these
various approaches becomes clearer. The complex of factors requiring consideration
from the various theoretical approaches accommodated by SST constitutes an
innovative model contrasting with the traditional uni-directional, linear approach
(Lundwall, 1993). The alternate model argues that innovation is a complex social
activity created through a bi-directional relationship between technology and
environment. The interactions between the various actors and institutions present,
fuel an iterative, spiral evolution of technology. The evolutionary aspect draws on
Hard's (1993) depiction of innovation as a struggle engaged in technical problem
solving with various interests articulated and learning outcomes processed. The
information capture and knowledge application implied plays to the importance of
actor's expertise and the manner of communication during the innovation process
(Fincham et al., 1995).
2.4 THE INTERACTIVE MODEL OF MULTIMEDIA AND INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY MARKETS
Without the application of innovation theories to real-world examples these
theories serve merely as interesting counter-arguments (MacKenzie, 1999). The
existence and operation of this interactive innovation process can be observed within
markets: indeed some are critically reliant upon the existence of this interaction.
Markets can be viewed as social constructs impacted by a variety of legal,
political, cultural and knowledge processes (Green, 1992). In short, they are a
particular network of various actors.
Classic economic theory depicts the market as a sterile environment fuelled
by complete knowledge and operating perfect competition. The multimedia market
displays characteristics that break these assumptions and can be modelled more
appropriately. Consideration of Information Technology is also valuable due to its
close technical similarities to multimedia and greater market maturity providing
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richer material. Multimedia and Information Technology are markets supplied with
technological artefacts that are unfinished commodities. A collaborative
development and implementation process between supplier and user is required to
complete these commodities. This represents a hybrid between the classic ideal
market relationship and social, inter-organisational interaction (Brady et al., 1992;
Lundwall, 1993).
The collaborative, interactive process required rejects the applicability of the
traditional linear model. The Information Technology market displays the use of
component offerings and interactive innovation process when we consider the
assertion that, "The very structure and architecture of contemporary information
technology is itself a product ofhistorical processes of social and economic shaping"
(Williams and Edge, 1996).
This appears a strong indicator that the environment might exist to support
the interactive model. The historical processes referred to stem from the
segmentation of the Information Technology market not through technical need but
due to regulatory intervention. In order to prevent IBM from bundling their hardware
and software sales, these products were separated by regulation creating an
independent software supply sector (Pelaez, 1990).
The market underwent further hierarchical division (OECD, 1985) with
companies specialising in certain areas such as Sun Microsystems focus on systems
& utilities with Solaris and Java. The segments created initially were:
Systems/Utilities: Including operating systems, programming languages.
Application Tools: Generic data management systems & tools.
Application Solutions: Catering to specific uses such as accounting and payroll.
Markets of component offerings were created requiring purchasers to combine
elements from each segment in order to create an overall solution. The rationale
would be that through specialism a number of 'best of breed' components would
exist to be combined. To enable these configurations, common interfaces were
created for suppliers to adhere to if they wished whilst retaining autonomy for their
offerings development.
This allowed organisations to configure a variety of components into a
system to meet specific business requirements whilst leveraging standard elements.
The existence of integration possibilities was viewed in some cases as a competitive
advantage. Lotus Corporation positioned the compatibility of its development suites
as its key feature providing significant corporate value. This feature contributed to
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the higher price commanded by Lotus product suites relative to competitors'
products that did not offer this compatibility (Swann and Lamaison, 1989).
The types of IT applications created can be drawn into three broad categories:
discrete, integrated and inter-organisational networks. Early IT productised
applications were discrete, client-based applications applied to specific or tightly
associated functions. They served to automate well-defined operations lending
themselves to standardisation and wide market distribution. Market relationships
typically existed between single suppliers selling to a single operational unit within
an organisation. In contrast, integrated applications link together complex, wide
ranging activities often requiring the networked configuration of various supplier
offerings. Customisation of the various components may be necessary to tailor
networks to the specific organisational setting (Fleck, 1988b). Inter-organisational
networks require this operation to extend across a number of organisations.
Configurations developed are adapted to the needs of the specific
organisation, a process requiring both breadth and depth of expertise. This body of
knowledge requires inputs from a range of groups, external and internal to the
organisation. While the suppliers may offer a range of roughly generic components,
the knowledge of the individual organisation's business and operational practices is
at a premium (Fleck, 1993). These engagements may provide insight which can
beneficially be applied to suppliers' future offerings, a practice which has assisted
the evolution of technology markets (Fleck, 1988a).
Configuration of componentised technology to form solutions positions
Information Technology as a 'configurational technology'. Configurational
technologies conform to the interactive model of innovation and emerged as part of
the criticism surrounding the linear model of innovation with technologies. The
concept refers to:
Situations similar to system technologies in that the whole complex works together and
is made up of component technologies Configurations of component technologies
may be made up of a very wide (if not arbitrary) range of patterns; the mutually
interacting (but not necessarily mutually constraining) components may be deployed in a
very wide, possibly arbitrary, range ofways in order to match externally set requirements
(Fleck, 1988: 20).
This allows the system to adapt to particular user requirements and the social setting
of the technology, a feature present within Information Technology. The concept of
configurational technologies implies the relevance and importance of the user and
setting to the innovative process.
It would therefore appear that the theoretical perspectives of SST provide
benefit in assessing Information Technology innovation. Indeed, Fleck (1988b; 1993;
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1994) identifies IT systems as examples of configurational technology. Since our
study is concerned with Multimedia innovation, are there sufficient similarities to
presume similar analytical benefit? Williams' definition ofmultimedia provides this
clear linkage. "Multimedia refers literally and most generically to the facility to
present information in a variety ofmedia" (Williams, 1997: 31).
Multimedia technologies define themselves from other Information
Technology through their convergence of media or 'multimedia-ness' (Williams,
1997) and opportunity for the user to interact with the system which Schmutzer
(1999) suggests should be seen in two dimensions of user control in terms of content
of communication and flow of communication. Indeed it has been proposed that
increased control and choices offered over medium and timing for processing
information are key aspects of multimedia (Williams, 1997: 32). The information
processing capability forms the core commonality between IT and Multimedia.
The facility to transfer information is core but the presence of component
offerings is also shared with interactivity being achievable through a number of
different technical configurations (Curry, 2000; Schmutzer, 1999). Collinson (1996)
identified a three-layer model of innovation within multimedia, expanding upon the
hierarchical segmentation for Information Technology outlined previously, which
consisted of:
Applications: Specific configurations, services, applications and products,
within particular sectors and contexts.
Delivery Systems: Combinations of technologies for storage, display,
delivery, distribution.
Components: Basic building blocks that can be combined to enable product
and system development.
This model shows the complexity within the development of these systems and the
degree of modularity that exists between the various components. The possible
combinations allow a range of various systems to be created. As such we see
multimedia's configurational nature requiring user input and environmental
considerations (Williams and Proctor, 1996). The concept of configurational
technologies further supports the existence of the hybrid market of user-supplier
interaction proposed (Brady et al., 1992; Lundwall, 1993) as Fleck asserts "for
configurational technologies, in a very real sense, industry is the laboratory" (Fleck,
1988: 52).
Within this process, interaction between user and supplier is crucially
important and is seen as a primary influencer for the future direction of multimedia
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(Williams, 1997: 33). The emergent nature of the multimedia market heightens the
importance of this interaction. In markets where the market and offerings are
undergoing rapid developments, in the face of great uncertainty, close forms of user-
supplier 'coupling' are likely (Freeman, 1984). This can occur horizontally to share
risk between players or in the case of IT systems in financial services (Fincham et
al., 1995) vertically between user and supplier. The latter format allows the sharing
of technical opportunities and user needs to identify matches thus creating markets
for particular solutions.
It therefore seems logical that in order to consider multimedia innovation
effectively, account of both social and technical factors should be taken. In this
regard, the theories we have discussed under the SST banner offer useful insights but
difficulty remains around how best to organise and assess the various actors and
artefacts operating within the innovation process. This would at least assist in
creation of a framework to understand and minimise the uncertainty and risk
currently present within these undertakings. These aspects align to enable 'doable
problems' defined by Vergragt (1988), a process which requires structured
examination ofnetwork construction.
2.5 NETWORK CONSTRUCTION
Across the disciplines encompassed by the broad church of SST, a number of
frameworks have been presented. They tackle the alignment of resources and
application of knowledge aroimd innovation from differing perspectives. Included
are 'sociotechnical systems' (Hughes, 1983), 'sociotechnical constituencies'
(Molina, 1990) and the operation of Actor Networks (Law and Callon, 1992). They
each carry a degree of theoretical baggage from sociotechnical constituencies
grounding in technology policy to actor networks links to SSK. Each framework
attempts to tackle the issues concerning the initiation and operation of innovation by
studying the enrolment of actors within a network (Law and Callon, 1992) and
Molina's (1989) investigation of expectation alignment around realisable objectives.
This investigation is conducted with an appreciation that the 'inner technical logic'
of determinist theories can be replaced by restricted information and Whipp and
Clark's (1986) 'bounded rationality'. This produces decisions not grounded solely in
technical purity but linked instead to economic considerations and social relations.
Molina's concept of sociotechnical constituencies was born from study of
technology policy. The 'constituencies' approach starts from the realisation that all
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processes of innovation and technology development imply the creation of
'sociotechnical constituencies.'
These are dynamic ensembles of technical constituents (for example machines,
instruments) and social constituents (for example organisations, interest groups), which
interact and shape each other in the course of the creation, production and






























Diagram 2.1: 'Diamond of alignment' (PACE Case Study 1 - Project Centuri21 (2001))
These constituencies are created through the process of 'sociotechnical
alignment' captured in the 'diamond of alignment' as shown in Diagram 2.1 above.
This process of alignment is conducted by social constituents (however consciously,
successfully, partially or imperfectly) when they are promoting the development of a
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specific technology either intra-organisationally, inter-organisationally or even as an
industrial standard. 'Sociotechnical alignment' maybe seen as:
the process of creation, adoption, accommodation (adaptation) and close or loose
interaction (interrelation) of technical and social factors and actors which underlies the
emergence and development of an identifiable constituency (Molina, 1990)
The alignment should neither be seen as an ad hoc accommodation of several
static available pieces nor as complete and permanent, once achieved (Molina,
1997). Instead, the 'diamond of alignment' accommodates the rich picture of
competing influences and trends, across institutional settings and governance
systems. As such, the 'diamond of alignment' is the conceptual tool developed to
provide a structured framework with which to analyse processes of alignment. The
concept of sociotechnical constituencies has been applied (Molina, 1990) largely
within macro environments leveraging its inherited appreciation ofpolicy issues.
By contrast, Actor-Network theory's early application possessed scepticism for
the influence of broader social and economic structures. Actor-Network Theory
evolved during the mid-1980s as a theoretical concept concerning the constituent
parts (actors) and their relations and methods of interaction. Actor-Network Theory
attempts to understand the process of enrolment for actors within the networks and
the translation of each actor's agenda to achieve the shared objective of the network.
ANT attempts to place a fabric or structure combined with social theory around the
arena of science and technology within society attempting to place an order around
seemingly unordered elements (Latour, 1997: 1).
The 'actors' are not limited to individuals or social groups: they may also be
technological artefacts themselves or other non-human elements. In common with
the interactive market theory, Actor Network acknowledges the existence of
imperfect knowledge and bounded rationality. These postulate that the organisation
and decision-making processes during technological innovation and development are
based on a limited or 'bounded' understanding of the full environment. Inherited
from its association with SSK the practice of actors making decisions based on their
perceptions is incorporated. It is considered that they become enrolled in networks
based on their existing understanding of the benefits they may gain.
Actor network theory appreciates that while each actor may perceive different
benefits from the project their interests can align for collaborative development
based on decisions from the bounded rationality they operate within. Interpretative
flexibility, also drawn from SSK, complements Schmutzer's (1997) theory of
different realities of a technology resultant from this flexibility. It remains crucial
that the perception of actors creates a shared interest in the project linking the global
and local networks, as
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it is the degree and form of mobilisation of the two networks and the way in which they
are connected that determines both the trajectory and success of the project (Law and
Callon, 1992: 47).
This process for obtaining resources for innovation creates negotiation space. It
is within this negotiation space that local networks appear to develop the project.
Pinch and Bijker's work examines how interpretative flexibility allows different
actors to perceive the shared agenda differently dependent on their own agenda and
knowledge. As a result, management of this perception is a key enrolment tactic.
Interpretative flexibility allowing each actor to consider the project from their individual
perspective (Pinch and Bijker, 1984: 24).
Actors become enrolled within the network forming nodes on the network linked to
each other. The links and the nodes on the network are fluid and require
maintenance as they alter and change dependent on various environmental impacts
and the management of relations between nodes. As such the networks are processes
or achievements as opposed to relations or structures established by a given order.
Network alignment requires a 'community of interest' to be created around a
shared agenda. This relates to the discussion within organisational theory around the
informal organisation and how groups within it may seek to exert power over
technical resources to advance their own positions. This complements the discussion
around the politics of technology (Winner 1977; 1980) where the neutrality of
technology is contested by the view that it is engaged by groups to maintain or alter
their social setting (Hard, 1993) applied as 'politics by another means' (Latour,
1988).
One of the critiques of Actor Network theory is the assumption that the
networks and the technologies they create are built lfom a clean slate as purported by
some authors (Latour, 1983; Latour, 1986; Latour, 1988). In addition, actors at a
local level are afforded large amounts of influence over technology. The focus of
early work on emerging innovations in Research and Development facilities has
been accredited with fostering this perspective. This led to difficulty in accounting
for the influence of other networks within the macro environment. As a result, efforts
were made to appreciate the stability of larger structures, one of these being the use
of the concept of obligatory points of contact.
The concept of 'obligatory point of passage' has been presented by Law and
Callon (1992) and relates to the node that provides a link between a local network
and external networks. The existence of this contact aids analysis concerning the
marshalling of actors and resources within the innovative process, discussing actors'
roles and effects upon the operation and placement of other actors within the
process.
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The theory considers the linkage between micro developments and a global
network constructed from relations between actors created during resource
acquisition. This theoretical addition has helped in accounting for macro themes
within Actor Network studies. The concept of the 'obligatory point of passage' is
described as such:
The concept implied centralised control. It suggested that a single locus should shape
and mobilise the local network and that this locus should have control over all
transactions between the local and global networks. It should, in short, become an
obligatory point of passage between the two networks (Law and Callon, 1992: 48).
Law and Callon's paper provides an anecdotal case study of how this position was
established as a result of official designation and subsequently failed. The concept
remains of interest as it provides an initial tactic to link the micro considerations
held within SSK to the macro factors of policy and economic theory. By this we see
how nodes can act to enlist and manage the timing and deployment of resources. The
tools of this include management of expertise, knowledge and perceptions. The
importance of these intangible knowledge-based resources within multimedia
development is emphasised by Miles,
One key factor shaping technologies is the distribution of technological and other
knowledge among different actors. Knowledge is power: different knowledges have a
distinct power in shaping ofmultimedia technologies (Miles, 1997: 1).
The role of expertise within technological development is discussed more fully in the
literature discussion on organisational theory.
The concept of obligatory point of passage is of particular use within analysis
of multimedia innovation as it presents the concept of a group acting as a
marshalling force for the various actors and knowledge within an innovative process.
The group acts as the 'obligatory point of passage' in a style similar to the system
integrators discussed in the sections on Organisational Theory (Chapter 3) and the
Management of Technology (Chapter 3).
These frameworks are broadly homogeneous and require application to a
particular situation to be useful. In this instance, the situation is multimedia
innovation within a corporate environment. In order to do this we will explore
organisational theory and the way in which technology is applied within it. Before
doing this it is useful to consider multimedia innovation studies generally.
2.6 EMERGENT STUDY OF MULTIMEDIA
Multimedia market maturity has been an area of debate. The influential
Bangemann Report (European Commission COM (96) 607 1996) purported that 'off
the shelf multimedia offerings existed that provide cost-effective solutions to the
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consumer. This represented a considerable advance as suppliers have traditionally
struggled to produce offerings with appeal across a wide base of users. Initially
offerings consisted of replicas of existing products and services (Collinson et al.,
1995). While this has evolved, the market is still searching for a killer application
(Dutton et al., 1995) to drive growth and Bangemann's market scenario has been
contested. While Bangemann presents product diffusion and market growth as key
activities, other studies (SLIM report, 2000) have presented a more challenging
environment. The SLIM initiative was a major EU supported project to investigate
the process of innovation in multimedia: the convergence of information,
communication and broadcasting technologies, highlighting the role of social
learning, the widely dispersed interactions between producers, intermediate and final
users and policy-makers which are critical to the future evolution and success of
multimedia.
The SLIM report questions Bangemann's stabilised 'black box' perception.
Instead echoes of the interactive market scenario are heard, with unstable offerings
requiring careful implementation present rather than finished commodities. Indeed
this situation seems distant. Williams et al. (2000) foresee the requirement for
considerable innovation activity within all market actors to identify relevant and
useful applications for consumers.
The interactive nature ofmultimedia technology has provided channels, such
as email, Internet, user groups, to facilitate this interaction. These provided timely
bi-directional communication allowing suppliers and users to share experiences
regarding application of multimedia offerings (Williams and Proctor, 1996). An
effective method of communication between supplier and user is vital if the benefits
of feedback from innovation are to be realised. The electronically enabled feedback
systems mentioned previously assisted the communication within communities of
interest in multimedia technologies.
The electronic channels assisted both the speed and access within the
communities allowing faster and richer interaction than traditional channels, such as
traditional mail and phone, between geographically distant groups. Feedback was
quicker and users were provided with the opportunity to test prototype 'beta'
versions of applications, simply by downloading them. This dynamic improved the
speed of the feedback loop and assisted the use of iterative, incremental development
style as described in the design literature. This is supported by the now standard use
of 'interim'; version n.l, etc. patches and upgrade releases. This increased
involvement in the design process has acted as a catalyst for many users to increase
their involvement and actually become designers themselves. This role is further
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aided by the increase in the number and standard of development tools available.
These enabled users to adapt and/or develop multimedia applications suited to their
needs.
The capability to adapt multimedia applications to users' individual settings
aligns with the interactive model and attempts to avoid difficulties due to lack of fit
and inapplicability to social situation as noted by Webster and Williams (1993).
Multimedia projects have been noted for their experimental nature featuring
numerous pilots, feasibility studies and commercial trails. While these have attended
to different configurations and questions of multimedia, the possibilities they offer
for social learning are consistent. Social learning seeks to provide an inclusive
framework for analysis expanding on Fleck's conjecture that for configurational
technologies, industry is the laboratory (Fleck, 1988) to consider the whole of society
(Herbold, 1995). Sorenson (1996) states:
Social Learning can be characterized as combined act of discovery and analysis, of
understanding and giving meaning, and of tinkering and the development of routines. In
order to make an artefact work, it has to be placed, spatially, temporally, and
conceptually. It has to be fitted into the existing, heterogeneous networks of machines,
systems, routines and culture.
Social learning involves two related processes, Innofusion and Domestication.
Innofusion is discussed further with our consideration of the organisational
environment but in principle is concerned with innovation that occurs as
technologies are implemented and used in a particular setting. Domestication
concerns how end-users incorporate artefacts within their local operations. The
configurational aspect of multimedia makes both these aspects important.
Unfortunately, focus on unique application has obscured common lessons that can be
drawn. Current literature's focus on analysis of isolated case studies has arguably
promoted this habit. A snapshot makes it difficult to fully understand where
knowledge has been gained and where it will be applied.
The recognition and capture of social learning can provide benefits in three
modes: learning by doing, learning by interacting and learning by regulating
(Williams, Slack and Stewart, 2000). Knowledge gained by application has been a
consistent aspect of technological development from Hughes' engineers to
Fincham's hybrid experts. Learning by interacting attends to the process whereby
locally acquired knowledge may be transferred and applied to other contexts.
Transportation of social learning is complex requiring translation, cross-pollination
with other knowledge and transformation. This dynamic is core to effective supplier-
user interaction aiding product advancement.
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Development tools incorporating these insights have been designed for use by
technically unsophisticated users offered at low cost (Williams and Proctor, 1996)
and combined with these channels of information, assisted in neutralising skill
barriers thereby aiding wider adoption (Mackay, 1992). The adoption of user-
friendly multimedia development tools has been observed during multimedia
developments within organisations (Proctor, Williams and Cashin, 1996).
These technical offerings and communication channels are considered to have
aided the possibility of user-led innovation. The question remains as to whether the
negation of skill barriers can allow end-users to become truly empowered to master
these tools and increase the possibility of user-led innovation. Since we have agreed
upon the applicability of SST theory to this area of innovation, we must then
concede that a wider set of environmental aspects must be aligned to enable this
scenario.
The third element of social learning: learning by regulating draws attention to
wider social aspects. Broader circumstances are needed for technology to establish
and operate technology. Formal state regulatory activities which include private and
public players attempt to create technological infrastructure and standards required
for technology operation. More general application is the enrolment and organisation
of actors around particular technology agendas, polices and strategies.
In order to examine this aspect and how multimedia innovation is shaped by the various
factors outlined we must consider the specific aspects of the corporate environment.
Following the theory examined, 'technology' and 'organisation' cannot be considered in
isolation. Instead they share a mutual relationship (Edge, 1988; MacKenzie and
Wajcman, 1985).
It is therefore logical that technologies definition incorporates the social
relations within which it emerges and becomes embedded (Hill, 1981; Clark et al.,
1989). It is with this understanding that we direct our attention to theory of the
organisations, the environment for our study ofmultimedia innovation.
Social learning theory has implications for the enrolment and alignment of
networks. "Social learning takes place where it is in the interest of players to
collaborate and exchange information" (Williams, Slack and Stewart, 2000). Social
learning groupings are markets of sorts with actors accepting a level of investment to
partake. Continued value must be experienced by parties involved for ongoing
commitment. The perception of value can differ from actor to actor, and can alter
from the publicly stated to privately held. Williams et al. offer an example of this as:
The various players involved tended to have a wide range of commitments and interests
in a project at a number of different levels. For example a technology supplier might have
several goals: to forestall and warn-off competitors, to align expectations of potential
customers, to signal competences and establish a reputation as a future player in this and
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related markets which could be more or less closely geared to what they might expect to
learn from taking part in an experiment (Williams, Slack and Stewart, 2000).
Goals and interests driving multimedia projects have been observed as
complex and occurring on a number of levels and dealing with a variety of issues.
Projects can be concerned with operational assessment, application experimentation
and developing alliances. Each can have equal importance overall and varying
priority to actors simultaneously. This leads to confusion and multiple perspectives
on the success of projects. For each actor, a large component of this judgement
relates to the future opportunities it provides them. If there are no subsequent
opportunities to apply the knowledge gained then it would be difficult for the actors
to argue the success of the project in terms of their benefit. The time frame for
consideration is an important factor and, while immediate opportunities may not
arise, possibilities may emerge over a longer period causing perceptions of success to
alter.
Social learning theory also identifies the need for 'key intermediaries'
(Williams, Slack and Stewart, 2000) to help steer the process of creating 'learning
communities'. This role may also require them to enrol required actors and
resources, drawing parallels with sociotechnical constituencies and actor network
theory. Intermediaries exist to mobilise, formal and informal, sociotechnical
constellations of players. These sociotechnical constellations link players to advance
technology development and enable knowledge flows and social learning.
Sociotechnical constellations serve as means of acquiring, generating, enhancing,
and exchanging information. Two distinct types of sociotechnical constellations have
been identified: application development and appropriation. The former involves
suppliers and intermediate users while the latter, and more common, is concerned
with technology consumption and use.
The intermediary role may be shared amongst various actors who emerge
through the course of multimedia developments instead of gaining formal
appointment. This role is most evident at the intersection between organisations,
indeed the ability to mobilise knowledge and resources internally or externally to the
intermediary's organisation is a crucially important capability. The boundaries that
intermediaries intersect may be between corporations, internal departments, or
expert groups and may occur in parallel across a number of different levels within
innovation.
Studies, contained within the SLIM project (Williams, Slack and Stewart,
2000), of multimedia offerings for consumers have highlighted the importance of
'appropriation intermediaries' who play an essential role in configuring multimedia
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systems to particular user groups. This task requires a hybrid knowledge of technical
possibilities and the local environment.
Appreciation of differing agendas and motivations of actors holds an important
role within innovation. Understanding of the factors at work within the innovation
environment is therefore important. In order to gain an understanding of these,
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The area of organisational theory provides us with an understanding of this
particular social context in which multimedia are being applied. Theory as discussed
in this section attends to the organisation's characteristics created as a result of it
being a co-operative of individuals. This creates internal politics forming informal
structures often at odds with the formal recognised structure. The role technology
plays in assisting or impeding actors' political activities is then discussed. This role
affects power and political relations, often creating specialist groups around the
technology. These groups trade on perceptions of the technology's importance and
their expertise in its operation. These aspects create social-political interplay as in¬
fighting occurs with groups trying to legitimise their status and expertise. Formal
structures need to impose measures to ensure that in-fighting serves the core
organisational objectives and is not destructive.
3.2 ORGANISATIONAL LITERATURE
The interactive model proposed for multimedia technology requires careful
consideration of the innovation environment. Organisational theory provides insight
into the social, political and economic factors at work within the environment
relevant to our study. Some theorists have focused on the formal aspect of placing
organisations as adjuncts to society formulated around charts and structure while
driven by a solely economic agenda. The social aspect of organisation cannot be
ignored and there has been considerable study of the role that these forces play.
Organisations are products of society offering forums and stages on which
societal forces operate surrounding a common goal. As Burns and Stalker state,
"Organisations are co-operative instrumental systems assembled out of the usable
attributes of people. They are also places in which people compete for advancement"
(Burns and Stalker, 1961: p.xii). It is this element of competition which is of
particular interest as it drives the shaping forces within the company with each
individual operating with a personal agenda.
As Burns and Stalker note, in addition to the organisational structure of the
concern itself, other organisational structures are present through which individuals
attempt to realise personal agendas. This private organisation is referred to as the
'informal structure', to distinguish it from the 'formal structure' of the management
system (Burns and Stalker, 1961: 98).
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These personal agendas are usually shielded from other organisational
individuals and activities to advance them are pursued under the guise of actions
promoting the formal organisational agenda. As such, it is important to attempt to
comprehend these motives in order to understand how their existence affects
interaction within the organisation. This interaction represents 'internal polities', the
operation of which results in the formation of factions and groups within the
organisation. These groups are themselves created from individuals united under a
common banner with each perceiving an individual benefit from their alliance, much
like the networks depicted by social shaping theory. Burns and Stalker additionally
note: "The individual may be, and usually is, concerned to extend the control he has
over his own situation and prospects to increase the value of the resource he
represents within the organisation" (Burns and Stalker, 1968: xiii).
An informal organisation results from these 'internal politics' within the
publicly recognised structure. This informal organisation exerts influence upon this
formal structure but is also conversely affected by it. This interaction creates a
'league of influence' for groups and individuals within the organisation, an informal
'pecking order'. Therefore each firm contains not only a working organisation but a
political system and status structure (Burns and Stalker, 1961: 6). The manner in
which internal political decisions are made has been the subject ofmuch discussion
and draws on theories common to social shaping theory. Pettigrew (1975) attests that
these decisions are blindly political, solely concerned with advancing each actor's
own agenda. Whipp and Clark (1986) agree with the political aspect of these
decisions but argue that they are affected by a 'bounded rationality'. The boundaries
are set by the actors' knowledge and understanding of their environment with actors'
decisions based on this. As these boundaries alter, their choices and reactions will be
impacted. Whipp and Clark (1986) state and maintain that actors operate a structured
repertoire of responses which they apply to given situations forming a de facto way
of doing things. As their boundary of understanding alters, the content and/or range
of repertoire can change based on the new understanding. These new ranges of
solutions are then applied to the organisation.
The environment within which this political activity occurs is influenced by
the formal structure surrounding it. Awareness of the formal structure is a
consideration factor for the actors.
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3.3 MECHANISTIC AND ORGANIC ORGANISATION STRUCTURES
The recognised formal structures of organisations exist in infinite variety, but
in an attempt to improve understanding, Burns and Stalker (1961) attempted to draw
two 'ideal' types:
Mechanistic organisations divide tasks between sections of the organisations.
These sections are defined by individual methods, responsibilities and powers with
boundaries established as a result. In mechanistic systems, the problems and tasks
facing the concern as a whole are broken down into specialisms. Each individual
pursues his task as something distinct from the real tasks of the concern as a whole as
if it were the subject of a sub-contract (Burns and Stalker, 1961: 5).
A hierarchical system, allocating power and position within the organisation,
exists with those at the top of the hierarchy passing instructions to those beneath
them. This system operates under the assumption that the possession of the greatest
knowledge of the organisation rests with the most senior management. Interaction
with the management tends to be vertical, i.e. between superior and subordinate
(Burns and Stalker, 1961: 5).
Organic organisations avoid boundaries, instead tasks are undertaken in
accordance with the individuals' own skills and knowledge in relation to the task as a
whole. Organic systems are adapted to unstable conditions when problems and
requirements for action arise which cannot be broken down and distributed among
specialist roles within a clearly defined hierarchy. Individuals have to perform their
special tasks in the light of their knowledge of the tasks of the firm as a whole (Burns
and Stalker, 1961: 6).
The BigBank studied did, in fact, conform to a hierarchical model. Our
discussion will, therefore, focus on the factors applicable to this framework.
The structure of hierarchical organisations has a pronounced effect upon the
internal politics at work. Individuals in attempting to advance their own ends often
cause conflict among individuals of differing status within the organisation. Often in
an attempt to gain political leverage versus hierarchical superiors, subordinates will
seek to band together under a common banner utilising possession of some quality or
resource that is or will be of value to the organisation.
3.4 RESOURCE POWER
Access to, and control over 'structurally endowed resources' (Burns and
Stalker, 1961: 262) also requires the application of exploitative skill to benefit the
group. Power gained by this means allowed groups to gain status and position above
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those with restricted access. Groups can attain legitimacy through establishing
themselves as 'points of passage' for resources with perceived organisational
importance. This dynamic serves as a considerable motivation for individuals
seeking advancement within the organisation. As a result, opportunities to gain this
role will be actively sought out and aggressively pursued. Technology is a common
arena in which these opportunities occur.
The introduction of new technology causes fundamental changes to the ways
in which organisations function. Technology has been perceived as the answer to
economic challenges with many industries attempting to replicate the success of
others (Kaplinsky, 1984). The improvement potential for organisations is vast but the
process is complex. As a result, these radical changes in organisational performance
have only occurred on a small number of occasions (Senker, 1987). This is
frequently because problems in applying IT have occurred due to underestimation of
the complexity required by organisational members to make this work within the
organisation (Quintas, 1993). Organisations must seek to manage both technology
artefacts and associated expertise coherently.
The factions within the informal organisation constantly seek to possess the
technological device of ultimate importance to the organisation to assist their pursuit
ofpersonal aims. Latour (1997) discusses actors using a number of ploys and tactics
to enforce their importance to the organisation. Establishing knowledge claims and
expertise is an important strategic aspect to gaining control over technology power
resources.
The enhanced strategic role of technology for many organisations has led to
conflict between existing hierarchical power structures and technology experts. The
value of experts' knowledge has afforded them unofficial status within the
organisation. This status allows them considerable influence on strategic
technological choices for organisations as they can vet and present information to
official decision makers in a manner benefiting their personal agendas. Expertise
owners and influencers of technology resources possess formidable tools to assist
their own agendas via the operation of 'internal polities'. The formal organisation
also faces structural challenges due to the pace of technological change. Re¬
organisation of resources is often necessary, altering existing relations and fuelling
the political atmosphere as groups act to maintain or enhance their situation.
The perceived value of technological knowledge has radically changed
relations within hierarchical organisations by challenging the premise on which they
are structured - ascending knowledge. Formerly older, experienced and usually
senior employees were assumed to possess the greatest and most useful knowledge
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of the enterprise accumulated through years of experience. The growing importance
of new technological knowledge has invalidated this assumption. The expertise
required to engage technical artefacts has been the possession of the young
specialists who are equipped with up-to-date knowledge of the latest developments.
They view experience as merely outmoded and of limited value. Fincham's study
(Fincham et al., 1995: 2) reaffirmed Bums and Stalker's observation of this trend.
Changing occupational structures creates contradictory pressures on management.
Power tends to gravitate away from hierarchical management and towards possessors
of specialist knowledge, as myriad specialist knowledge groups seek to control
different functional areas.
Owners of specialist knowledge band together, if successful their role and
status is validated and they evolve into formal sections within the organisation.
Informal knowledge groups are thereby transformed into specialist occupations. By
this means, the informal structure impacts the formal with these actors gaining
official influence and power. This also provides the opportunity to impact the
formalisation of organisational standards which are an important tool for the formal
organisation to control the informal. Before we consider the role of standards
formation, we will consider theory around the evolution of specialisms.
3.5 SOCIALLY SHAPED SPECIALTIES
The perception of specialisms as ideal-type professions in comparison with
executives has been challenged by the growing belief that specialisms develop
through an emergent process. This process occurs over a period of time as a result of
social establishment. Pettigrew (1975) usefully identifies some of the key processes
of establishing specialism. An important process is the creation of interdependencies
within the specialty and across other specialisms sharing a common task
environment. Linked to this is the manner in which a specialist group defines its task.
The methods by which the group protects its identity by the development of a system
of values and linkage with the activities of interdependent specialties will be
determinant factors (Pettigrew, 1975: 260).
Establishing legitimacy often creates conflict and emerging occupational
groups are often accused of encroachment and charlatanism with existing groups. As
a result, existing groups often apply power maintenance strategies. Tactics include
the placement and employment of key personnel, influence over recruitment of new
personnel and control over the training conducted within the organisation. The
circulation of 'fictions' or rumours about the rival groups have also proved a popular
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power maintenance tactic. These 'fictions' would concern the competence and
perceived expertise of the group with the aim of undermining their status. These
practices suggest that possessing knowledge is not sufficient. In order to achieve
legitimacy, the holder must be able to articulate and gain recognition for knowledge
claims.
Some commentators (Wood and Kelly, 1982; Cockburn 1985) have viewed
skill and skilled status as a result of broader political processes, as credited by Burns
and Stalker (1961). The validity of knowledge is affected by membership of
'reputational networks' (Whitley, 1988). Expertise as a social construct, therefore,
may be defined as the capability to authoritatively apply special knowledge or skill
which has been tried and proven by experience (Fincham et al., 1995: 19). Linking
this to the discussion of bounded rationality (Whipp and Clark 1986), we see how
expertise is a valuable asset. The input of new knowledge can expand actors'
understanding and perspective of the organisation allowing them to apply new sets of
solutions. The discussion on these changes also involves assessing the
appropriateness of different models and tools for local circumstances (Clark and
Staunton, 1989). This adds a grounded aspect to the interpretative flexibility of SSK
with perception altered by actual technical changes. SSK can cross-fertilise this view
through its understanding of the importance of social articulation of knowledge.
The validation and legitimisation of expertise are further complicated by the
nature of expertise required by organisations implementing configurational
technologies. Expertise requires an increasingly social element which evades
quantification.
Implementation requires successful change processes and systems patterned
by the structures of expertise and the continuous interplay between technical and
non-technical knowledge (Fincham et al., 1995: 308). This complexity of forces
requires technology to be perceived from different levels of social action, from
specialist know-how through to architecture of generic designs, to the crystallisation
of knowledge of specific applications (Scarborough and Corbett, 1992: 3).
Technology's rapid pace of development has driven an expansion of
knowledge requirements, creating demands beyond many organisations' existing
resources. Friedman (1989) contends that organisations should direct their labour
policy to address the principal area where this gap occurs, user relations. Friedman
proposes that this obstacle is comprised of two elements: technologists understanding
users and users understanding technological possibilities.
In order for the organisation to select and adopt new technologies effectively,
it must apply knowledge of its environment in terms of standards used, business
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objectives, departmental and end users to the technological opportunities it identifies.
In enabling this process, organisations have facilitated or experienced the creation of
groups displaying hybrid expertise. Hybrid expertise contains understanding of both
business requirements and technical possibilities. This has been evident in studies
concerning multimedia applications (Proctor et al., 1996: 74) as well as wider IT
innovations (Fincham et al., 1995).
Hybrid groups arise to answer the fresh challenges posed by emergent
technologies. Configurational technologies necessitate supplier-user interaction,
generating additional expertise demands. These groups appear to act as a
consolidating force for the firm's knowledge and expertise base (Fleck, 1988: 50)
and possess information often crucial to the successful innovation and application of
technology. This creates a form of hybrid expertise drawing from the different
knowledge bases required for the technology in question.
Requirements for hybrid expertise arise where new problem areas do not match the
scope of the existing division of labour ... Hybrid groups may then emerge as
intermediaries between existing functional specialisms where well defined occupational
groups draw on distinct bodies of knowledge and techniques (Fincham et al., 1995: 23).
This adds another dimension to the supplier-user aspect as hybrid groups must act as
a consolidating conduit between disparate internal sections and external parties. The
recognition of this gap within the division of labour and the emergence of so-called
'hybrid expertise' have caused a re-appraisal of the role of technology departments
within organisations. As opposed to the traditional roles of technology departments,
either building items in-house or buying in standardised solutions, they must now
seek to provide a means of developing solutions through a collaborative network
with actors both within and outwith the organisation. The key appears to be sourcing
the most useful knowledge required whether developed internally or brought in
'consultant' style from outwith the group.
The actors assembled will each offer to provide their own knowledge and
expertise to the process which may be system design or the knowledge of user
requirements. Technology departments marshal these networks to link both expert
and user groups providing a mechanism for deploying expertise (Fincham, 1995: 22)
and as a result hybrid groups are required to interface between the rest of the IT
function and the organisation (Simpson, 1990). The concentration on broad and all
inclusive sourcing of expertise appeared to suit organisations involved in the
development of information technology as detailed within the studies of Fincham et
al.
The expertise focus, by addressing the particular kinds of knowledge which groups
mobilise in the innovation process, and the role of occupational and inter-firm linkages
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in the transfer and validation of knowledge, was better placed to integrate local action
within its broader context (Fincham et al., 1994: 298).
Fincham positioned technology departments as key mediators of technical
change for organisations and facilitators of organisational learning. In occupying this
role, technology departments act to identify new technologies which will have
relevance to the organisation and facilitate their uptake (Proctor et al., 1996: 74).
This role was witnessed across a range of organisations in studies conducted by
Fincham et al. where:
IS functions continued to act as the gatekeepers of external sources of knowledge, they
largely determined the timing and scope of recourse to suppliers (which constrained
interaction between in-house and external supply (Fincham et al., 1995: 307).
The IS functions utilised user involvement initiatives where they sought to
elicit 'commitment' of user groups while retaining control of the system's
development (Fincham et al., 1995: 307). This presents a challenge to the role of
end-user led innovation. While the tools exist technically, organisations may wish to
limit autonomy in order to maintain a unified technology policy. Within their revised
development role, the technology department provided a bridging link between user
and supplier, acting as system integrators. This role is apparent within the creation of
configurational technologies and as such is particularly relevant to multimedia
developments.
At present system integrators are only just emerging, as a sort of generalist specialist,
who tries to co-ordinate all the other parties involved in the development of new
configurations (Fleck, 1988: 51).
As a result, technology departments bore the responsibility for effective
execution to meet user needs, business objectives and economic restrictions. This
required risk minimisation through careful consideration of the organisational setting
and the technology opportunity.
Implementation creates uncertainties around the technology, its development and its
outcomes. We saw that uncertainties, though endemic to implementation, were relative;
their degree and form depended on the organisational distribution of knowledge. The
existing knowledge base, the availability of different kinds of expertise (i.e. together the
structure of expertise) as well as the strategies of different groups, all bore on the extent
to which uncertainties could be circumscribed (Fincham et al., 1995: 306).
The complexity of technological innovation presents the organisation with a
number of challenges. The importance of technological artefacts and their role as
power resources make them coveted by specialist groups. Combined with perceived
expertise they allow 'power' to be operationalised. This competition can lead to
groups constantly trying to influence the balance of power in their favour with each
new technological development fuelling the search for a successor. The formal
organisation must seek to ensure that this competition still serves the ends of the
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entity instead of becoming self-destructive in-fighting as there is an increasing
necessity for a unified approach given the vast potential for IT and the range of
concerns and skills required to optimise utilisation. The formation and application of
standards are important aspects in producing this united direction. In establishing
standards, organisations will frequently look to the macro environment to leverage
industry-wide agreements and select those which best fit their local environment.
3.6 FORMAL DIRECTION THROUGH STANDARDS
The use of standards within industry has been commonplace such as with
transport networks and telecommunications. The establishment of standards has been
employed to provide a guideline to assist coherent and beneficial development by
society and organisation. This practice has been followed within IT necessitated by a
number of factors: the increasing cross-fertilisation between IT and communications,
the major importance of individual PCs and the resulting need to link them within
networks, the increasing diversity of 'satellite' equipment and software plus rising
demands of users for compatibility and inter-operability (OECD, 1991). The
selection of particular standards also assists the organisation's focus on training
investments and maintenance strategies. This produces obvious economic benefits as
well as assisting the unification of technological efforts. The speed of the
development, range of interests involved in IT development and the high cost of IT
infrastructures have amplified these concerns.
The creation of standards within IT has been catered for at both global and
national levels. In the UK, the drive to establish standards has been led at an industry
wide level by the British Computing Society (BCS) which established a working
group to tackle the issues.
The working group identified a number of needs which would be fulfilled by
the introduction of standards. These were identified as:
• The need for a basis for communication and interchangeability.
• The need for economic production and inter-working of standardised products and
services.
• The need for adequate and consistent quality and fitness for purpose of goods and
services.
• The promotion of trade through international agreement.
(Ruggles, 1990: 6).
While the needs identified relate here to trading benefits, the initial three hold
relevance for corporations. As stated, the benefit is due to greater focus within their
technology policy. This focus assists effective centralisation of technology training
as well as support and sourcing strengthened by hannonisation within organisational
culture and mission. These potential benefits are facilitated due to the standards
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creating a formalised documentation of what was previously fragmented, local
technological knowledge. It is one thing to identify the need for and benefits of
standards, but it is another to establish how they should be constructed. The BCS
working group sought to lay down principles on which standardisation should be
built:
The principles of standardisation are consensus, usability, feasibility, and
harmonisation. It must be agreed that the standard is wanted. Its intended application
should be clearly understood at the start and borne in mind throughout its preparation.
The decision to standardise must be based on the user community's agreed needs but
must not inhibit technical innovation. The process of standardisation should embrace
existing standards in order to achieve harmonisation (Ruggles, 1990:6).
This statement reinforces the view that standards seek to create a common
dialogue and forum between users and suppliers (Cargill, 1989). This facilitates a
formalisation of particular features and needs which have to be accounted for when
implementing technologies and allows design feedback regarding how systems
should be tailored to that setting. This echoes the interactive innovation model
evident within the IT and Multimedia markets and supports the configurational
aspects of these technologies. The need for users capable of comprehending local
needs and translating them into technical possibilities is an aspect that we shall return
to when discussing expertise.
While the theory of embracing existing standards is accepted, in practice
considerable complications may exist. These complications do not arise in finding
standards as they are plentiful in number but in identifying which ones will persist
effectively. Organisations are understandably keen to avoid selecting standards that
are subsequently abandoned, often heralding the costly obsolescence of technology
constructed under their guidance. In assessing this element, it is important to remain
aware of the socio-political environment surrounding the establishment of standards
and also the importance they can hold.
In a competition between standards, it is not necessarily the best solution which
triumphs but rather that which has made the better start and managed to build up
quickly a critical mass of users which will attract ever more new users (OECD, 1991:
8).
This consideration demonstrates the importance of external factors to the
choice and implementation of standards. Another of these factors is the advice and
opinions of experts within the field, standard setters, technical specialists and
decision makers within user organisations. These individuals possess a considerable
level of influence and power.
The strategic implications of IT standardisation are now broadly recognised to be
enormous because they will determine the future of individual firms, affect the
competitive advantage of countries and even influence the development of whole
46
technologies and their diffusion. Market mechanisms do not provide, as noted above,
sufficient assurance that the best technology will prevail or that an obsolete one will be
replaced in good time (OECD, 1991: 9).
This implication further illustrates the need for attention to the selection of
standards with their political nature and increasingly important role within
technological innovation. The importance of standards has not been solely
recognised by the users. Suppliers have been quick to acknowledge the competitive
advantages to be gained from products being viewed as an 'industry standard'
(Porter, 1990). In order to attain this position, user support is crucial both for utilising
the product and providing guidelines for requirements. This has caused suppliers and
users to engage in greater dialogue and collaboration. This involvement has led to the
establishment of joint projects and facilities catering for technological innovation.
These relationships are likely to have an important impact upon the innovation
process as a whole and are another area of important consideration within my
research.
An added complexity in setting standards and selecting technology arises
through addition of an expanding range of 'experts' to the innovation process
producing new interest groups each with their own agenda. Decisions concerning
standard adoption offer the possibility of conflict between interest groups operating
separate agendas. This expanding range of interest groups has largely been a result of
the increasing range of knowledge which is required for the successful innovation,
implementation and utilisation of technology.
While standards provide a useful technology boundary setting method, the
department still has to successfully execute technologies that fall within these
boundaries. In order to allow for innovation they will also have to cater for
technologies that stretch resources and standards. The execution of technology
development has been a long-term source of difficulty for organisations. Throughout
our literature review, it has been accepted that the development of technology is a
complicated process.
3.7 INNOVATION IMPLEMENTATION DIFFICULTIES AND APPROACHES
The impact of innovation complexity has been especially evident within the
business world which has been littered with large and costly failures. In 1994, failed
information systems projects in the USA cost $81bn annually which accounted for
almost a third of total information systems development expenditure (Standish
Group, 1995). In 2001, it was reported that only 28% of projects were delivered on
time and on budget and of those completed, they contained only 67% of the
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capability required (Standish Group, 2001). While these figures are not 'like for
like', they translate to an unsatisfactory level of success and support the belief that
the process ofdevelopment is complex and problematic.
Some commentators have used the metaphor of a journey to describe the
process of information systems development, highlighting that the main concern in
any project is to avoid wrong turns on the way to the destination (Connor, 1985).
There has been a great deal of activity directed towards creating an approach capable
of, at least, minimising the likelihood of such failures by tackling the common
causes.
Research by Flynn (1998) found that projects can fail either through
unacceptable quality or poor productivity. In examining these areas further, the main
issues appear to be due to a mix of poor understanding of requirements,
environmental changes and inadequate project management. That these areas create
problems is unsurprising. Given the emergence of hybrid expertise within
organisations to accommodate skill gaps, it is logical for corporations to have
experienced difficulty in capturing and matching user requirements to technical
opportunities. If we accept the existence of informal organisations and factions
within them acting to advance their own agendas, a state of flux within the
environment is understandable. Therefore it would be difficult to operate a project
management methodology which accommodates aspects which organisations
themselves are still attempting to address. The inherent complexity in approaching
these tasks is proposed by Rothwell as:
Technological innovation is a complex technological/socio/economic process which
involves an extremely intricate web of interactions, both intra-firm and between the firm
and its economic, technical, competitive and social environment. It might not, therefore,
be expected that success or failure will often be satisfactorily explained in terms of one
or two factors alone, and indeed,... innovation studies very strongly underline the
pluralistic nature of explanations for successful and unsuccessful innovation (Rothwell,
1977: 203).
Despite the daunting nature of this task, organisations have experimented with
various approaches to address the key issues affecting development. These
approaches include organisational considerations to create environments conducive
for innovation, establishing appropriate team structures to navigate developmental
changes, selection of an appropriate methodology to accommodate changes within
the process and provision of an agreed structure for project management. The Human
Computer Interaction discipline has also been enlisted to provide techniques to
provide rich and effective understanding ofuser requirements.
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Rothwell's (1977) commentary on the complexity of technological innovation
in organisations was made over 20 years ago but in the intervening period, its
ongoing validity has been supported by commentators including Tidd et al. (1997).
Further research (e.g. Tornatzky et al., 1983; Frost & Egri, 1991; Wolfe, 1994 and
Tidd et al., 1997) has given us a greater understanding of the key organisational
features which aid the effective management of technological innovation. These
features can be broken into two parts: the organisational environment and team roles.
In order for these individuals to operate effectively, the organisation must
possess a number of environmental features. Recognition of these aspects represents
an important shift within Management of Technology commentaiy. Writers such as
Bessant (1985), Tidd (1997) and Pavitt (1997) had previously focused on the formal
aspects of technology management. There has been a subsequent move to appreciate
the 'softer' social aspects drawn from Social Shaping Theory and present within the
work of Fleck et al. (1990). This appreciation has provided useful expansion of the
elements considered in their analysis. An important environmental feature is that of
alignment with the organisation's overall leadership and the will to innovate:
There must be an acceptance of innovation as a benefit within the company to restrict
different cognitive, behavioural and structural ways of reinforcing the status quo; the
'not invented here" problem; and the core rigidities (Tidd et al., 1997: 307-8).
To support the organisation's innovative vision, its managers must fight for the
creation and maintenance of that kind of climate. These efforts include their
involvement in the systematic development of appropriate organisational structures,
communication policies and procedures, reward and recognition systems, training
policy, accounting and measurement systems and deployment of strategy (Tidd et al.,
1997: 326). In addition, it is considered vital that managers are able to effectively
decide the most appropriate team size, structure, process, and how to achieve
effective team leadership as well as to clearly define the team's tasks and objectives
(Tidd et al., 1997). These elements within the organisational environment are felt
necessary to support the operation of the team deployed for the technological
developments.
The key role within the organisational team as identified by Bessant (1985) is
that of the product champion. The product champion is a person prepared to
champion a new or improved product, service or process by providing much energy
and enthusiasm to help it to progress through the organisational system. Bessant,
working with Tidd and Pavitt (1997) also built on Rothwell's (1973) concept of the
technical innovator which represented the person responsible for an invention. The
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technical innovator possesses a deep understanding of the technology behind the
innovation, as well as the inspiration to solve any development problems.
Rothwell's (1973) business innovator role is now perceived by Tidd et al.
(1997) to comprise three components often represented by different individuals:
organisational sponsor, project team leader and a more narrowly defined business
innovator. The organisational sponsors are bought into the potential of the innovation
but do not require to possess detailed technical knowledge of the innovation. Their
role consists of attending to resource requirements along with placating sceptics and
hostile critics of the project. They require the power and influence to 'pull the
various strings of the organisation (often from a seat on the Board)' (Tidd et al.,
1997: 316). The project team leaders meanwhile are deeply involved in the project
and have the organisational power to make sure things come together (Tidd et al.,
1997: 316). The final component is the redefined business innovator who is
considered to represent the broader market or user perspective (Tidd et al., 1997:
317).
These roles represent a more granular consideration of the hybrid expertise
which has been observed in organisations. Another role observed in management of
technology is that of the gatekeeper noted by Tidd et al. (1997) but identified by
various authors (Allen, 1991) and Rothwell & Robertson (1973) among others. The
gatekeeper is the key individual in the organisation's informal structure 'collecting
information from various sources and passing it on to the relevant people who will be
best able or most interested to use it' (Tidd et al., 1997: 317).
In addition to efforts to improve understanding of the roles involved in
managing technological innovation, there has been development ofmethodologies to
structure the innovative effort. Development teams have a number of possible
methodologies which they can enlist to manage the process.
The classic approach is the Traditional Life Cycle (TLC) or the waterfall life
cycle. This consists of a number of sequential steps through which the project
progresses. The waterfall aspect is used to liken the difficulty of returning to a
previous phase to swimming up a waterfall. This provided a useful model for
distinguishing the different stages of a project and suggesting how they could be
ordered.




Diagram 3.1: Traditional Waterfall Lifecycle Model
The Systems Engineering phase is concerned with the architectural
specification defining the interaction between the major parts of the system. In the
Requirements Analysis stage, a number of fact-finding techniques are employed to
aid thorough identification, definition, documentation and analysis of requirements.
Defined requirements can be used to form the basis of user acceptance testing. The
Design phase creates a plan to construct a system to meet the requirements which is
converted into code during the Construction phase. Testing follows to ensure the
system has met the requirements set. This occurs on a number of levels. Individual
components are tested as sub-systems before then being tested together as a complete
system. User acceptance testing must be performed before the system can be
validated as complete. Once testing has been successfully completed, it is delivered
to the customer and installed for use. The installation of any system requires careful
handling in order to minimise disruption to the business. Ongoing operation of the
system is then handled during the Maintenance stage. User involvement is usually
restricted to interviews during the requirements analysis phases and the user
acceptance stage by which latter point, however, changes would be very costly.
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Variations of the waterfall model exist (Pressman, 1997; Sommerville, 1992).
Key differences are the number and title of phases and activities performed in each
phase. Proponents of the waterfall model and its variations argue that it provides a
structure with explicit deliverables from each phase. Critics argue the sequential
approach is not representative of real life where real projects seldom follow a simple
sequential life cycle with phases often overlapping and activities repeated.
Additionally, system functionality iterations are frequently due to deficiencies
in requirements analysis that become apparent throughout the project. This is
because business needs change between the project initiation and completion and
these changing factors need to be accommodated by the new system. Waterfall
approaches are not designed to be responsive to these changes. In order for the
Waterfall approach to succeed, the requirements phase should capture all needs
adequately. These specifications must remain true until delivery given the project
success statistics outlined earlier and fluctuating environments due to the formal-
informal structural dynamic of organisations.
Subsequent methodological evolutions have sought to accommodate
environmental fluctuations while engaging in an ongoing struggle to successfully
build systems to meet business requirements. Methodologies have experimented with
methods to effectively enlist end users in this pursuit.
3.8 METHODOLOGIES WITH USER INVOLVEMENT
The importance of user involvement in technology innovation has been noted
across multiple disciplines. Technology innovation theory, management of
technology (Fleck, 1988) and human computer interaction (Hartmanis and Lin, 1992)
have acknowledged users' importance and sought to accommodate their insight
effectively into the innovative process. The difficulties faced are noted by Williams:
We still do not know how best to match user requirements to new technical possibilities
whether the biggest contribution will come from building more societal knowledge into
the design of new applications or whether to design generic offerings and let final users
learn how to adapt supplier offerings to their purposes (Williams, 1997: 37).
In this pursuit, user insight has been considered in two ways: when to apply it
and how to capture user input? In considering the first question, a variety of user
roles have been proposed, including the limited 'end-customer' role of the waterfall
approach to direct involvement with the development team in Dynamic Systems
Development Method (DSDM) and Extreme Programming (XP) methodologies. The
later methods promote a blurring in distinction between the positions of designer and
user. User integration within the development process requires additional
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considerations. Users participating within development are required to be cognisant
of the needs and requirements of the wider organisation and user group. As users are
further integrated into the process the team must act to ensure they maintain this user
perspective and objectivity. User involvement across the full project lifecycle, lfom
analysis to implementation, has also been acknowledged as important. Involvement
assists buy-in, aiding effective adoption but also establishes implementation
feedback recognising that innovation continues during technological diffusion.
They (organizational commentators) ignore the important processes of social and
technical innovation that arise when technologies are implemented, the struggle to get
technologies to work and to adapt them to the social and technical exigencies of use
(Williams and Proctor, 1996: 7).
Fleck's (1988) innofiision theory — a component of social learning — sought
to capture this aspect and understand its place, and effect, over the innovation
process as a whole. This represented a considerable perceptual leap as the
implementation stage had previously been viewed as almost an afterthought to the
process of innovation and design. The new theory called for a fundamental review of
the weighting of the importance of the stages within the process adding benefit to the
implementation stage.
The concept of innofusion or 'social learning' theory argues that innovation
contains highly distributed processes of innovation in which a wide number of actors
operate, as we established via the social shaping perspective, during the
implementation and use of technologies. Innofusion is especially applicable for
configurational technologies which by their nature require consideration of the
implementation phase. Innofusion was originally presented by Fleck (1988) who
stated that:
Innofusion is a Lamarckian form of evolution, in that new characteristics may be
explicitly developed in response to environmental requirements, and then directly
transmitted to succeeding generations of technology (through straightforward
replication, or incorporation as components in new configurations, for example) (Fleck,
1988: 24).
The need for consideration of this aspect further questions the suitability of the
waterfall model for configurational technologies as it fails to account for the
importance of the implementation and adoption of the technology. Instead it
conforms to the conventional beliefs of linear innovation where technologies emerge
as stable solutions to be merely plugged in and switched on in the diffusion stage.
This ignores the existence of experimentation and innovation that occurs within the
user domain, aligning instead with traditional supply driven concepts that place
principal importance upon the design phase within which a Darwinian model of
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evolution occurs with the most efficient technical solution emerging. Subsequent
techniques moved away from this perspective eroding the perceived boundaries
between the stages of design and construction, which even some of the proponents of
the Waterfall model admitted were merely recognition of actual practice.
In practice the development stages overlap and feed information to each other. The
software process is not a simple linear model but involves a sequence of iterations of the
development activities (Sommerville, 1992, p. 7).
The use of prototyping was an approach introduced to allow for rapid iteration
within the projects allowing gauging of user reactions and functionality prior to final
delivery. This represented a departure from the waterfall approach but was not
always suitable for applications which deliver rich functionality as the limited
functionality included creates a focus on interface issues.
The prototyping approach introduced the aspect of significant user involvement
to better alignment of technology goals with those of the business. In an effort to
allow for iterative assessment of functionality, methodologies combined this with
incremental releases. This policy draws upon Gilb's (1988) belief that successful
large systems start out as successful small systems then grow incrementally. Smaller
increments are completed, used successfully, and then supplemented. This process
conforms to Fleck's Innofusion theory with the technological trajectory impacted by
the manner in which users adapt to and use technology.
A range of frameworks have been proposed for iterative, incremental
development methodologies. The most widely recognised of these is Rapid
Application Development (RAD). During the early 1990s, RAD gained popularity as
a way to match systems development with the rapidly changing business
environment noted as a common problem in technological development. The concept
of RAD can be executed in a number of styles dependent upon situation. In fact an
issue around its early adoption was that there was no industry standard of how that
should occur.
The Dynamic Systems Development Method (DSDM) consortium formed in
1994 sought to answer this by defining structure and controls for RAD projects.
DSDM is an approach that is employed in projects where time and resources
available are the primary considerations. It sets these considerations and then
operates to establish what is possible within these constraints. This approach
contrasts with other methodologies where requirements are fixed and then time and
resources are matched against them.
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Diagram 3.2: Simplified DSDM life cycle (Stapleton, 1997)
DSDM set the project management controls but did not define development
methodology. This allowed selection from the range of incremental, iterative
methodologies that exist. Instead of exhaustively considering each and every
variation, such as Unified Software Development Process (USDP) (Jacobson et al.,
1992) and Extreme Programming (XP) (Beck, 2000), it is more useful to discuss the
common themes as they all extend the RAD approach, overlapping and cross-
pollinating, creating many similarities in approaches. The selection of the approach
to be used is often based upon the previous experience of the team members
involved.
The key aim is to provide a useable system which requires matching to the user
environment. In order to do this, the process must keep track of the existing state.
Methodologies incorporate rapid iterations to gain user feedback which can, if
required, call for a complete reworking of the iteration. The critical focus on the
system meeting user needs is exhibited by 'courage' as part of XP's core tenets. This
captures the need clinically to discard anything that prevents achieving the objective.
The parallelisation of activities was another departure from the waterfall model
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which focused each phase on a specific activity. This is to appreciate the need for
ongoing assessment and consideration of environmental aspects with respect to
system users.
The desire to understand and track user requirements is a principal driver of
these methods. Iterative, incremental methodologies allow for periods of user input
to be leveraged during development but this is only beneficial if the insight is
accurate and sufficient. In order to enable effective insight, techniques from the study
of Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) have been increasingly utilised. The
applicability of this area of study is obvious when we consider its objectives.
Human computer interaction is a discipline concerned with the design, evaluation and
implementation of interactive computing systems for human use and with the study of
major phenomena surrounding them (ACM SIGCHI, 1992: 6).
Human-Computer Interaction advocates a user-centred approach integrating
multidisciplinary knowledge in a highly iterative methodology involving testing of
the design fit to users' requirements (Preece et al, 1995). This corresponds with the
beliefs we have seen across the theories we have considered. Within HCI, the need
for user-centred design of these technologies is essential as the most crucial property
for an interactive system is its support for human activity (Newman and Lamming,
1995: 6). In providing this support, HCI draws on Usability (Preece, 1995: 14), one
of its key concepts is concerned with ease of use and learning essential for systems
adoption. In realizing these objectives, four central components have been identified
(Bennet, 1984) and applied (Shackel, 1990). These requirements are learnability,
throughput, flexibility and the creation of a positive attitude to the system by the
users.
These objectives are common throughout the technological development but
the key value of HCI is the toolkit of tactics it possesses to assist their realization.
With these aspects in mind, designers have a number of techniques available from
which to select the most appropriate dependent upon their situation and objectives.
Questionnaires, work observation and conceptual modelling of the users' situation all
possess their own strengths, weaknesses and cost implications. Questionnaires
require the user to communicate what functions the system needs to perform. Many
of the tasks they carry out may be due to tacit knowledge which they are unaware
they are using. Such things may be picked up by observation or ethnography which
has been accepted as a potentially valuable approach (Suchman, 1987; Randall et al.,
1993; Cooper et al., 1995). It is posited that this would provide a rich and rounded
view of'the users' and how they operate and interact within their social setting.
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3.9 SUMMARY
Throughout the literature that I have studied on innovation, we see a variety
of approaches to tackle the same issue: so how do we understand and plan innovation
effectively? The sheer volume and variety of perspectives support the consistent
belief that this process is complex. Across the theories, a progressive appreciation of
a wider range of factors is evident. Foremost of these is the need to understand the
innovation environment and most specifically the user. No model has emerged that
provides a comprehensive method of providing this understanding. While broad,
high-level theory has been offered, it has failed to move from generalisation to
practice and many studies made have focused on isolated scenarios. This offers a
number of areas to consider during our investigation. Principally, do Interactive
models of innovation operate in practice? If this is the case, how do they network
and what factors affect them and thereby the technology trajectory? It is also
important to consider how the organisation manages this process over time in terms
of resource and expertise, aspects which may be accommodated via formal
methodologies and social learning. Analysis of these areas should assist in
identifying a model of innovation, or at least consistent themes, and guiding
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4. RESEARCH DESIGN
4.1 INTRODUCTION - CASE STUDIES DEVELOPMENT
Due to the pace and early state ofmultimedia development, it was difficult to
pre-plan a set of studies that would provide a useful overall picture. Fortunately the
cases that did arise in this study ended up providing a useful evolution ofmultimedia
development with the technologies of both Networked Multimedia (NMM) and
Corporate Intranet (Praxis) combining to create the Training and Communications
Network (TCN).
NMM: Networked Multimedia is described in Chapter 5. This project was an
opportunity to develop sponsor confidence through my role within the technical
development of the project, demonstrating relevant technical skills plus the
economic benefits of a postgraduate student resource. The writer was involved in a
core role from inception to implementation within the development team.
Praxis: This case study, described in Chapter 6 on the Corporate Intranet had
been an ongoing project but needed to be re-assessed and upgraded before a wider
corporate rollout. Personally conducting the interviews and survey enabled me to
spend time with key players in the project and end-users, to gauge opinions and to
obtain history through a participative role.
TCN: The Training and Communications Network described in Section 7
was the extension of the preceding two projects so I was able to gain access from
inception through being part of the evolution process with inherent knowledge.
However, this was a longer running implementation project and due to illness I did
not have full involvement to complete implementation. The high level profile and
political activity around this project allied to the much larger project team size meant
that I did not have access to all meetings.
4.2 BACKGROUND
My research project was conducted within the framework of a CASE
studentship, involving collaboration between the University of Edinburgh and
BigBank. The University was represented by advisors from the Department of
Computer Science and the Research Centre for Social Sciences. The BigBank had a
representative from the Research Group of their Technology Department.
The title of the study was ' Social Learning and Innovation ofMultimedia in a
Corporate Environment' in order to define the scope. This study analyses, assesses
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and explains this phenomenon as it affected the BigBank. Further details of specific
areas of interest within this research have been covered in the literature section of
this document (Chapters 2 and 3). The study was of a conceptual nature as the
BigBank was at an early stage in its involvement with multimedia and no real formal
structure existed to manage this process. In absence of this central structure,
decentralised groups undertook multimedia development to achieve their individual
objectives. The company obviously wished to correct this process to ensure the
technology was being developed in a manner beneficial to the corporation and as
such, had an interest in research feedback for this purpose.
The research project provided me with an attachment to the aforementioned
Research Group to provide a base of operations within the organisation. In this
position, I was provided with access to company publications, communications and
materials in addition to observation and/or participation in projects and meetings
related to the project. This allowed access to information regarding reasons for
choice of technologies, methods of implementation and assessment, actors involved
therein and networks formed during the implementation. The effects of these issues
could also be evaluated.
The nature of the Research Group meant it would be involved in the new
technology activity within the BigBank. In practice, the level of their involvement
varied by project. For the NMM project they had direct ownership, but in other case
study projects, it was via their relationships with other technology players within the
organisation. The Research Group was able to broker my involvement within these
projects. The key benefit was that because of their role at the inception of new
technology investigation, they were involved in the pre-project initiation stages. My
link to the Research Group allowed this access as well. This was a key difference
from many case studies of multimedia innovation where access to the pre-project
stage of activity is unusual.
This area of research is extremely complex, fluid and dynamic with regards
to both technologies and people. Multimedia itself is a complex area. This
complexity arises from a number of features, principally vagueness of definition,
wide variety of products and customisation of technologies. This can be seen from
the studies themselves with each case study addressing a different variant of
technology from NMM with a multimedia broadcast package, Praxis with the
Intranet and TCN, a combination of the two. This demonstrates the variety of
components within the classification. It was an important aim for the research to
establish a tight definition of multimedia which is an ambiguous title in itself. Hix
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and Hartson illustrate this by stating that "Multimedia itself is a rather confused
word because media is already plural, so why put multi- in front of it" (Hix and
Hartson, 1993: 88). For the sake of clarity within this study, I have adopted the
definition of multimedia provided within the Introduction on page 11 and further
discussed on page 25.
The breadth of this term is evident in definitions by commentators on this
issue and my experience within the cases. Commentators, generally, agree that it is
an interface which consists of more than one medium of input (Hix and Hartson,
1993) and output in combination (Preece, 1994). Clearly this provides a wide range
of technologies although this research will concentrate on those which are
predominantly computer-based. There was a link with the technology used in the
cases which supports this perception, however the main connecting link through the
cases was the people involved.
The above breadth of organisation, subject and technology factors provided a
wide and diverse area of study which the research design needed to accommodate.
4.3 RESEARCH APPROACH
4.3.1 Case Study Research
The framework of the collaborative study dictated that the research was a
case study of the phenomenon within the BigBank. Because of the splintered nature
of the phenomenon's manifestations within the organisation, it was useful to treat
these instances as sub-case studies of the overall case study, an approach that was
possible due to the flexibility of the case study research. This flexibility occurred due
to the provision for a number ofmethod types to be utilised within its structure, both
quantitative or qualitative as "the case study lies beyond the quantitative-qualitative
debate and can employ the best of both methods" (Stoecker, 1991: 99). In practice,
only qualitative methods were used but given the complexity and immaturity of
multimedia study, the options allowed by case study research appeared a logical
choice. It would allow alteration of research design in response to the phenomena
observed. In Praxis, qualitative methods were used within the surveys. Richer more
valuable information was gleaned from semi-structured interviews. In TCN, the key
gathering information methods were the work journal and unstructured interviews.
Case study flexibility also allowed case study research to draw from a
number of sources such as archive material (Littler, 1982), interviews, fieldwork
results, each of which was required within my research. This was again of
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importance within the thesis as a range of sources from interviews to internal reports
to surveys was used to gain information. The case study approach can be applied
through historical research (Hakim, 1987) or be based entirely on quantitative data
(Yin, 1989). It is this flexibility that creates "the case study's unique strength ... its
ability to deal with a frill variety of evidence — documents, artefacts, interviews, and
observations" (Yin, 1989: 20).
This notion of embedded units of analysis can be used as a design element to
add greater versatility and enable the basic design to be adapted to meet the various
theoretical and practical requirements. The ability to incorporate a number of
sources of information, as mentioned above, was essential in this research as it
required analysis of information drawn from e-mail, internal documents, computer-
based data, meetings, observations, conversations and interviews. This strength
allowed case study research to be utilised as "a way of organising data so as to
preserve the unitary character of the social object being studied" (Goode and Hatt,
1952).
This was important as can be seen across the case studies where NMM places
greater reliance on fieldwork and recording informal interactions with various actors
within the bank. Praxis provided the opportunity for more formal interviews and data
capture. For TCN, some interviews were conducted combined with observation and
journal maintenance. Whereas the themes and areas of interest were common, the
methods of information capture had to be appropriate to the specific circumstances.
The unitary character was further preserved due to the flexibility over the
time period or frame that the research covers. This unitary nature is noted in
Stoecker's definition of case study research as, "those research projects which
attempt to explain holistically the dynamics of a certain historical period of a
particular social unit" (Stoecker, 1991: 97-98).
Stoecker believed that the case study should be regarded as a "frame
determining the boundaries of information-gathering" (Stoecker, 1991: 98). The
frame may be either snapshot, covering the contemporary element only, or
longitudinal which can handle both historical and processual aspects. This flexibility
with regard to the time period allows the overall case study and sub-case studies to
be conducted for the time required for successful observation. Within my studies, the
time aspect of the case study made it an appropriate format as the case studies were
essentially project-based and focused within certain time periods. The actual case
studies focused within certain time periods although some of the information
captured preceded my involvement which required my taking anecdotal evidence on
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the earlier activities. This was certainly the case within Praxis and, to a limited
extent, in NMM.
The use of several sub-case studies may seem excessive to many observers
although an oft-cited critique of case study research is that it does not allow
generalisation due to limitations in the scope of the study. The inability to generalise
case study findings to other settings has been noted by a number of commentators,
such as Smith and Robbins (1982) and Berger (1983). This was due to the inherent
uniqueness of each specific case.
With hindsight it now appears that the basis for this criticism is unstable as it
is born out of methodological confusion, a view supported by Rose et al. (1989),
Mitchell (1983) and Yin (1989). This confusion is a result of quantitative standards
being inappropriately applied to qualitative case study results. Quantitative
proponents like Rose regarded generalisability as "the ability to extrapolate with
statistical confidence from that sample of the population from which it was drawn"
(Rose et al., 1989: 193).
While some common themes were developed, the nuances in each case were
fundamental for a wider understanding and this is where the case study approach
provided real value. However, this is at odds with the view of qualitative
generalisability within case study research, as "the case study approach depends on
the 'cogency of the theoretical reasoning' for the validity of any logical inferences
from a case or cases" (Mitchell, 1983).
In light of this, we realise that the goal of case study generalisability is to
"expand and generalise theories (analytical generalisation) and not to enumerate
frequencies (statistical generalisation)" (Yin, 1989: 21). Therefore, in response to the
critique of generalisability based upon the definition by quantitative advocates we
could answer, "case studies, like experiments, are generalisable to theoretical
propositions and not to populations, or universes" (Yin, 1989: 21).
This feature is essential if the results of the sub-case studies are to provide a
cohesive, overall perspective of the phenomenon as it functions within the whole
organisation. This was true of the cases as finding general theories was more
important than numbers and statistics derived within the work. The quantitative
elements played a role but more for the corporate purpose of the case when, for
example, we look at Praxis where we see evidence of Ties, damned lies and
statistics' as there is an internal corporate pressure to gain a certain set of results.
The greater lessons were from the actions of the people within the project and how
the implementation and direction of the technology were affected by these activities.
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In this research, we are concerned with the theory applied during the
implementation and its effectiveness in contributing to a successful implementation.
The rejection of this critique allows us to conduct a generalisation depending upon
the adequacy of the underlying theory and related knowledge which must be
qualified by the relevant contextual conditions (Mitchell, 1983).
These contextual conditions within my research relate to the technology used
by multimedia and the fact that it is applied within the setting of the BigBank. The
generalisation of the theory applied within individual situations provided an insight
and guidelines as to how the implementation of multimedia technology should be
approached. This was seen through the progressive development of the cases from
which knowledge gained within NMM and Praxis served to provide guidance and
best practice which was originally intended for application in later generations of
these two projects but was more specifically applied within TCN. This generalisation
benefits from the case studies exhibiting representativeness. Case study research
equates representativeness to qualitative logic for the selection of cases of study as
opposed to a quantitative logic of sampling from a population (Rose et al., 1989).
In accordance with this standpoint, Hakim asserts that case studies take their
subject matter from "one or more selected examples of a social entity" (Hakim,
1987: 61). This assertion is enhanced by Mitchell's characterisation of the case study
approach as "a detailed examination of an event (or series of related events) which
the analyst believes exhibits (or exhibit) the operation of some identified theoretical
principle" (Mitchell, 1983: 192). In practice, it was difficult to assess the
representativeness of each case study when selecting and the options in selecting
were limited due to the newness of the field generally and within the BigBank
specifically.
Mitchell's view of case study research as discussed above advocates its
usefulness for aiding our observation and understanding the theoretical principles
within the implementation of innovations in multimedia as it is not a quantitative
factor. It is the need for understanding and explanation that further recommends case
study research as
the essence of a case study, the central tendency among the types of case study, is that it
tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were
implemented, and with what result (Schramm, 1971).
This ability to analyse the total situation allows understanding of the nuances
of each situation, permitting the overall theoretical framework to remain
uncorrupted, thus aiding explanation of that theoretical process. The belief that all
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research requires a creative leap from data to explanation (Mintzberg, 1979) points
to the inadequacy of quantitative methods for this purpose as Mitchell (1983) argues
that the "logical" relationship between two characteristics is based on the plausibility
or logicality of the link between the characteristics. This link can be demonstrated by
analysis of specific instances with attention to the historical causal process. The use
of case study research for this purpose can be justified as "the case study can more
effectively analyse causation than quantitative cross-sectional research" (Stoecker,
1991:93).
In these case studies, the results or themes were difficult to quantify. The
reasons for actions were more attributable to the dynamics between some of the
actors within the initiative. This dynamic was specific to the activities within the
individual case but by comparison with the other case studies it was possible to
detect similar roles and tactics occurring in them. An example of similarity of
occurrences is the existence of project champions within projects and some of the
ploys ofenlistment that they utilised.
The reasoning for this is provided by Scranton (1986) who notes that in
single cases, the operation of certain variables is displayed which can be lost in
cross-sectional quantitative research. This is because during generalisation in
quantitative analysis the existence of idiosyncrasies within each case is marginalised
(Kazdin, 1981). It is the process we are concerned with and, as Becker (1968)
stresses, what the case study does best is study process, whereas " 'Process' is both
historical and idiosyncratic, and statistical analysis is unable to capture either of
those" (Stoecker, 1991: 94). Through the capture of these elements, we attain that
knowledge of individual nuances which allow the formulation of theory towards
assisting informed intervention, which "is crucial for any of us concerned with
sociology as a progressive, useful craft" (Stoecker, 1991: 96).
It was also particularly relevant to this research as the BigBank required an
informed observation of the implementation of these technologies. This observation
was facilitated by the placement within the Research Group. This placement was
also considered within the research design and, due to the use of case study research,
fieldwork presented itself as a convenient method for utilising and holistically
recording this observation.
4.3.2 Fieldwork
Fieldwork is an essential tool for qualitative research and aids the flexibility
and depth of case study research. Fieldwork acts as "an umbrella of activity beneath
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which any technique may be used for gaining the desired information, and for the
processes of thinking about this information" (Schatzman, 1973: 14). This allows a
multi-faceted approach which intrinsically "involves observing and analysing real-
life situations, of studying actions and activities as they occur" (Burgess, 1982: 1).
This was exactly what the research project required due to its contemporary
nature and the close proximity of the researcher to the phenomenon. The attachment
to the BigBank Research Group is further accounted for within fieldwork as:
The main instrument of social investigation is the researcher who has to learn the local
language, live among the people and participate amongst their activities over relatively
long periods of time in order to acquire a detailed understanding of the situation under
study (Burgess, 1982: 1).
This participation was of crucial importance within the study, as all material hinged
on my ability to achieve credibility, gain trust and have effective communication
with the parties involved. I needed to contribute to and be knowledgeable in
technology discussions as well as appreciate and have an understanding of corporate
politics. This can, however, give rise to potential problems as, for the researcher
"field work is his total life. He copes with it by using his whole body and personality
in the same way that he copes with life when he is not in the field" (Gulick, 1977:
90).
It is difficult to preserve an outsider's perspective while gaining an insider's
view (Powdermaker, 1966). This is because "one lives in two different worlds of
thought at the same time, in categories and concepts and values which often cannot
easily be reconciled" (Evans-Pritchard, 1973: 2-3).
During the course of my studies, I did find this role to be complex and
demanding. As a result of the key role I played in some of the cases, it was difficult
to balance my involvement with the role of observer as detailed below. One concern
was to be able to act within the project teams while not overly influencing the
direction. My position was buffeted by the often conflicting forces of academic
principles and the corporate demands, e.g. in completing surveys for Praxis, the
direction of the questioning was influenced by political desires of the sponsors. I feel
my presence had an impact on the development of the projects. This impact is
particularly apparent during the NMM project which had been delayed due to lack of
resource. My inclusion, as a researcher and development resource, within the project
alleviated this issue, allowing the project to progress. The results of the NMM
project altered perception of the multimedia possibilities available aiding the
creation of the TCN project. Arguably my involvement in NMM taking place
impacted the creation of the TCN initiative. While alternative networks and routes
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may have occurred through my involvement the phenomena of social shaping of
multimedia innovation, to my mind would remain true, regardless of my
involvement. Given the drivers, ingenuity and resourcefulness of the Technology
Statespeople observed within the project, alternatives would have been employed.
To provide this view it was important for me to retain objectivity during my study. I
had to develop the ability to step outside interactions with subjects and view from an
academic standpoint. This was aided by being able to return to the university setting
at times to withdraw and reflect away from the BigBank environment. There were
also complicated situations when I would witness the political actions of subjects
who 'let their guard down' and put me in the difficult position of not knowing how
to record and assess in light of relations formed with them as part of the work.
4.3.3 Participant Observation
Participant observation was obviously an extremely difficult task which was
further complicated by its use as a principal method of conducting field research.
However, this was an inevitable feature due to the collaborative nature of my
research project
The participant observer gathers data by participating in the daily life of the group or
organisation he studies. He watches the people he is studying to see what situations they
ordinarily meet and how they behave in them. He enters into conversation with some or
all of the participants in these situations and discovers their interpretations of the events
he has observed (Becker, 1968: 652).
There are a number of roles which the participant observer can occupy
dependent on their level of involvement in the entity being studied and whether their
research motivation is being concealed or not. The position for the overall case study
could be described as 'participant as observer', where both parties are aware that the
relationship exists due to the research as defined in the four 'master roles' (Gold,
1958). The researcher remains a 'stranger' while having an involvement in the
situation under study (Jarvie, 1982) as I was as part of the BigBank Research Group.
The degree of participation in the sub-case studies varied and required judgment in
each individual case with the researcher required to take and use roles as one does in
real-life (Circourel, 1964) with an additional element of evaluation (Burgess, 1982).
The roles within each case did vary to a degree but this was more due to division of
labour as a result of the team size as opposed to a change in role. Through each
project, the team size increased as technology became more important to the
BigBank's operations. NMM's core role in development of the Praxis project came
in later to the project but impacted on the shaping of corporate rollout. A common
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problem with participant observation is gaining entry to the group and establishing
legitimacy with the subjects. Entry is facilitated by the collaborative nature of the
study but gaining legitimacy may be more problematic. As a result of the technical
nature of the research and the corporate environment, I expected to be required to
demonstrate a knowledge and degree of competency within these areas. I anticipated
that my previous academic qualifications would assist me as I hold a BCom in
Business Studies and an MSc in Human-Computer Interaction. These provided me
with a firm grounding in the theory of these fields and I possessed some practical
experience as well. These credentials would aid induction into the fieldwork
environment and continued legitimacy would be dependent upon effective
interaction with the subjects based on observation and reaction to them.
From the outset in working with the BigBank, my previous academic
qualifications and the current status as part of a PhD programme did serve to provide
legitimisation. In fact for many of the projects, the University association and the
inference of academic credibility were seen as attractive factors.
The work I performed within the NMM case study provided me with
legitimacy for the succeeding case studies to the point where my presence was being
sought instead of my trying to secure inclusion. The TCN project's reliance on the
knowledge and experience acquired from NMM made my involvement a very
straightforward process. I also had reflective opportunities through being able to
withdraw from my participant role to discuss my work with my Research Group
colleagues and supervisors.
4.3.4 Interviews
The research structure necessitated a high degree of interaction with subjects
of the study. This interaction was written and oral. The oral element of the
interaction via conversation was a crucial element ofmy data gathering. As Burgess
states "conversation is a crucial element of field research" (Burgess, 1982: 107). This
conversational interaction within social research included interviews where "the
interview is shown to take many forms with structured interviews at one end and
unstructured interviews at the other" (Burgess, 1982: 107).
My research utilised both formal and informal forms of interview to gather
data. However, in practice I did not perform many formal interviews but instead
relied on informal interviews which were recorded in log books and diaries of
interaction. The informal, unstructured interview occurred on a daily basis within my
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placement and provided an important opportunity to probe deeply and uncover new
clues. The unstructured interview
assumes the appearance of a natural interesting conversation. But to the proficient
interviewer it is always a controlled conversation which he guides and bends to the
service of the research interest (Palmer, 1982: 171).
In order to achieve this successfully it is important for the interviewer to "share the
culture of their informants" (Burgess, 1982: 108).
In my particular situation it was important to have not only an understanding
of the organisational environment but also to understand the multimedia technology.
This understanding was essential in order to probe effectively into the particular
idiosyncrasies of the situations that the technologies created.
The extreme form of unstructured interview and one which I used to a large
extent was that of the conversation. This method is strongly advocated by Cottle
(1977) who feels that it aids the researcher's involvement in the subjects' lives and
assists effective research. Burgess (1982) raises questions over ethical considerations
regarding privacy and investigator effects. He wonders whether personal accounts
can be related while maintaining the subject's privacy and how the effect of the
researcher's presence is described. These are questions which must ultimately be
faced by the researcher alone. The researcher may wish to formalise the information
gathering technique and conduct formal, semi-structured interviews. As a result of
the number of unstructured interviews I held and the rich insights I gained from
them, ethical considerations became an important aspect. I received insights into
political activities and personal ambitions of many of the subjects which if shared
widely could have career implications for the subjects. In completing the study I
considered the impact and relevance of this information in order to provide an
accurate stoiy but without detrimental impact to the subjects.
Throughout my research, I organised semi-structured interviews. These
interviews were important as casual conversational probing is not always possible
with important actors within the corporate environment. An advantage of semi-
structured interviews was that the interviewee was aware in advance of the topic to
be discussed and could prepare accordingly which provided better considered,
infonned responses. Within the corporate environment there are, also, very important
political factors to be taken into account. This could give rise to problems due to
ulterior motives, desire to please or other idiosyncratic factors (Whyte, 1982). In
order to minimise this element "the first concern of the interviewer is to build
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rapport, to establish a relationship in which people will feel comfortable and
confident in talking with him" (Whyte, 1982).
The manner in which this rapport is achieved is obviously heavily dependent
on the individual interviewee. As such, it was difficult to precisely pre-plan how best
to achieve this rapport but it had to be taken into consideration when planning each
interview and in any interaction with possible interviewees. The semi-structured
interviews conducted during the Praxis study were presented under the cover of the
Intranet survey which created an environment in which the subjects were
comfortable to talk about that subject while affording them the opportunity to talk
about wider issues as they viewed this as a forum in which to expand their views.
4.3.5 Data Analysis
Analysis of case study data generated can be extremely difficult due to the
diversity and depth it provides. As a result of the research aims of theoretical
explanation and understanding, I felt it was important to set a framework for
organising the data collection and retrieval. The use of the case study approach
would allow the prevailing phenomenon to be assessed in manageable parts while
retaining relevancy to the overall theoretical analysis.
4.4 RESEARCH DESIGN SUMMARY
As witnessed within this study, my research involved a highly social, corporate
environment. The phenomenon being analysed, namely the implementation of
innovations in multimedia, was concerned with a very fluid, contemporary, fast
moving technological situation. The research design framework that I planned took
the above factors into consideration while retaining an awareness of the need to
adapt should changes be deemed necessary in the light of experience. The case study
approach allows a flexible, combination of data gathering techniques which allow
depth and aid explanation of complex situations such as those which faced me. The
suitability of case studies to this type of research was noted by Yin who states that
the case study is an empirical inquiry that: investigates a contemporary phenomenon
within its real life context when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not
clearly evident (Yin, 1989: 23).
The ability to compare case studies through consideration of patterns and
theories was important to this study. Comparison of theory between the sub-case
studies within the research allowed identification of themes across the cases whilst
allowing individual assessment of the idiosyncrasies of each case.
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The ability to incorporate fieldwork, an intrinsic feature of this research, into
the case study approach also favours this technique. This method also allows
participation to occur, an element desired by the research sponsors, in a manner
which does not discredit the findings. The issue of involvement has always been of
concern to researchers but more so now as
the research methods we often employ in contemporary case study research provide a
moral obligation to focus enough of our attention on the case to inform those who are
living it. The moral obligation results from the nuisance we make of ourselves and the
time we take up asking questions and interviewing. We should be able to provide
something in return (Stoecker, 1991: 100).
Providing value is of particular relevance within my case study as the
collaborative title implies mutual benefit. The benefit was delivered to the subjects
as they gained a low cost and proficient resource for their projects. The additional
resource had a positive impact upon the progress of the initiatives, e.g. the fact that
NMM had languished without resource before my involvement and its resulting
eventual impact on the TCN project. The organisation also derived proven economic
as well as technology delivered benefits. While commentators disagree on whether
this exchange should take place, from my research, I side with Stoecker who argues
the role of the case study in informing active intervention has always existed. But too
many researchers have been hesitant to risk their reputations, and have too often
confused advocacy with bias (Stoecker, 1991: 100).
In participating in this exchange, I had to ensure my contribution was
effectively recorded and analysed. Information was captured within the work journal.
Although this was helpful, ultimately judgment was required on my part to design
and conduct the research in an effective, responsible and beneficial manner. This
judgment responsibly applied should positively affect the "methodological issues
associated with the case-study approach" (Stoecker, 1991: 107) which "are as much
matters of conduct as they are matters of principle. It is therefore left to the
researcher who adopts the case-study approach to do so in a spirit of self-critical
endeavour" (Stoecker, 1991: 107).
Through adherence to this principle during my research and utilising the design
framework that I have outlined, I believe beneficial results were achieved. In
actuality the real value was from drawing understanding from the theory within the
case studies. Mindful of these principles, I shall now attend to the practical




The research design section has focused mainly upon theoretical
considerations pertaining to the organisation of the research and methods used. At
this point, I feel it is important to discuss the practical considerations relevant to the
implementation of the theory within my research.
The recording of information gained during fieldwork was obviously of great
importance. It was important to ensure the recording of the information in a
comprehensive, organised and accessible manner. In order to achieve this I recorded
my research information using a number of methods. A general 'study journal' was
maintained for recording general actions, events and observations which occurred
during the course of the fieldwork, maintained on a daily basis. A similar journal was
maintained for the purposes of recording relevant literature and academic sources. I
identified a number of publications which were monitored and identified literary
sources. This was a very useful process and was the key method for capturing and
analysing the data within my study.
My fieldwork journal was used to record informal interviews which occurred
as part of everyday interaction within my study area. An accompanying file was
maintained containing copies of relevant e-mails and documents which were collated
on file with an index being created.
As I have noted within the theoretical aspects of this section, interviews
served as a critical source of information for my research. Individual subject
interviews were recorded using a hand-held tape recorder with notes taken as
necessary. These interviews revolved around set question areas, detailed below, but
remained open-ended with scope to expand to any areas of particular interest which
emerged.
Subjects were chosen according to relevance to the particular projects I
studied within my research. Interviews were conducted at the initiation and
termination of the projects allowing observation of any attitudinal shifts towards
multimedia that had occurred during the course of that particular project. Informal
interviews during the course of the project were used to add richness to the
information gained from these interviews and identify particular areas of questioning
for more formal interviews. It should be observed that the structured interviews were
more difficult to organise and by their very nature created a setting where the
BigBank subjects felt more guarded. The insight gained from the unstructured
informal interviews proved to be ofmuch greater value.
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4.6 CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The questions providing the backbone for formal semi-structured interviews
are listed in Appendices Chapter 12.1. Additional questions were added and others
altered as necessary with regard to the particular subjects. In addition, flexibility in
interviewing approach catered for other topics of interest to be pursued arising
during the interviews.
These practical considerations combined with research theory provided me
with a base and structure from which to pursue the investigation of my research
topics. These were, however, not designed to provide a static mindset and continued
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CASE STUDIES OVERVIEW
The choice of Case Studies was more a consequence of opportunistic timing
of investigation rather than strategic creation. My involvement was arranged through
a few key contacts linked to the Research Group who appreciated the suitability of
my capabilities and experience to the projects.
Despite the opportunistic nature of case selection, the cases which will be
described in this chapter and Chapters 6 and 7 were remarkably connected and inter¬
related. This inter-connectedness is epitomised through the Training and
Communications Network (TCN) in Chapter 7 preceded by project evolution from
the Networked Multimedia Network (NMM) in this chapter and the Corporate
Intranet (Praxis) cases in Chapter 6.
The NMM project tested and assessed the capability of the bank network
infrastructure to handle rich multimedia. The Praxis case dealt with the usability
assessment for a static html intranet system. These two systems were then combined
for the TCN system which combines rich media broadcast with web-based content.
We were also able to view the various stages of technology adoption within
the BigBank organisation. With NMM we witnessed the initial exploratory tests of a
technology for BigBank. In Praxis we saw the initial rollout of the Intranet
technology within one section of BigBank, the Technology Department. Finally in
TCN we were involved in a project to implement a Training and Communication
system across the whole organisation.
So the case studies combined to provide an evolution path in terms of both




A Change Planning Executive, who was a senior figure within the retail bank
operations, had branded himself as being a technically savvy banker. He had come to
BigBank from another bank where he had served as a senior technology executive.
He moved into a role as a senior executive within BigBank retail banking. While the
Change Planning Executive felt he was branded as being 'technically savvy', to
many others he was actually branded as 'Microsoft savvy'. During both his previous
bank and BigBank tenures, he had established a record of delivering Microsoft
technology solutions. He followed Microsoft's activities and offerings by avidly
scouring their web site daily for the latest news. In addition, his interest and
relationships with Microsoft extended to the highest levels of the organisation. He
was even invited to Bill Gates' wedding.
The Change Planning Executive, therefore, understandably took an active
interest in Microsoft progress and new product developments. This interest had to be
balanced with Iris day-to-day commitments within BigBank but his position within
BigBank enabled him to call on sections of the Technology Department to
investigate his designated topics. His interest prior to the emergence of this first case
study was focused upon Microsoft NetShow.
Microsoft NetShow was a package which allowed the production and
transmission of Multimedia content over the Internet. This content included text,
slides, video and sound allowing a rich expression of information which at the time
was revolutionary. The potential of this latest technology fascinated the Change
Planning Executive although admittedly NetShow being a Microsoft product
initiated that interest.
5.2 PROJECT INITIATION
In order to indulge his curiosity, the Change Planning Executive approached
a department within the Technology Division with which he had close relations,
namely the Research Group. The Research Group had the remit of investigating new
technologies and avenues of advancement that could be linked to business drivers
and needs.
This business needs qualification made the Change Planning Executive's
initial request unfeasible. The Change Planning Executive initially requested that
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they simply investigate the NetShow application assessing what it was capable of
with no indication as to how this could benefit the business.
We advised the Change Planning Executive that we needed a business reason to
investigate the application. Because we had a good relationship with him and he was an
important internal customer, we began to look for potential applications of the product
so we could engage the project (Research Group).
The Research Group identified the possibility of transmitting Multimedia
content over the BigBank's network. This potential of using the Internet for uniform
multimedia content distribution was particularly relevant given the in progress
Intranet project and similar investigations being conducted for the Internet. This
technology could also allow commimication of corporate information in a similar
way that the video-based BigBankTV was used. Through this case, we see the
strategies used by a number of parties to advance their own political agendas. The
Change Planning Executive's interest was born out of an interest in the technology
and a continued ambition to maintain his reputation as a proficient technology
implementer. The 'Groups' within the Technology department each wanted to prove
their value to the department. The Research Group wanted to be viewed at the
forefront of technology discovery and understanding while the Technology Strategy
Group wanted to demonstrate their ability to define how the bank would best utilize
the technology and its implication for the present systems.
The Edinburgh University Computing Services (EUCS) team had interests in
the multimedia area and also had consulting opportunities from which they stood to
gain. Cisco also had a vested interest in that they were trying to sell more
infrastructure equipment to the BigBank so they were interested in any opportunity
to sell in their equipment and prove its capability. We also saw other sections within
the BigBank operating to further their own objectives. By donating content,
Corporate Communications and Learning Technologies wanted to create a link and
influence into an interesting and potentially useful area of technology development.
The project scope and aim were built around the need to investigate the
implications of the transmission of multimedia broadcast over the bank's network.
This was judged a viable business reason. Normally projects such as this would
include a package evaluation selection phase to determine the best fit technology to
the business need. This phase was not done as the decision to use NetShow had
already been made due to the Change Planning Executive's influence on the project.
Microsoft NetShow would be considered the application that was the best for that
task without conducting competitive analysis on other options.
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5.3 RESOURCE PROCUREMENT
With the project aim and scope agreed, it was then necessary to enlist
resources to take the idea through to implementation in order to achieve a specific
business result. Resources would be required from a number of sources to provide
the requisite variety of functional skills to meet the varied knowledge demands of the
project.
5.3.1 Budgetary Considerations
A major stumbling block for the project was that the Change Planning
Executive's department had no budget for the work. The implication of having no
approved financing was that securing resources to carry out the project would be
difficult. Normally the Research Group would not take on a project without an
approved budget. However, due to the Change Planning Executive's position within
the company and as an important internal customer for the Research Group, they
were prepared to make special efforts in order to assist in the furthering of the
project. By assisting him here the Research Group reasoned that they would gain an
ally within the organisation.
5.3.2 Nature of Resources
The Research Group identified four elements that were required for the
project: technology skills, facilities, equipment, and content. The Research Group
then looked to identify from where they could enlist those resources. They




IT Services are responsible for the maintenance of all of BigBank's
Technical systems. The Research Group positioned their approach to pre-empt the
eventual problems that the department would face when they would be responsible
for the maintenance of the multimedia transmissions.
We went to IT Services with the approach of helping them to prepare for multimedia
transmissions over the network. This would allow us to get their buy in and hopefully
use their budget for the testing work. They agreed that it was important but were unsure
how to perform the testing most effectively (Research Group).
IT Services advised that these loads could not be tested directly on the BigBank
network for fear of disruption of crucial systems as the network was the backbone
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for all of the BigBank retail and corporate banking applications. The slightest
disruption to any of these services would not be tolerated. As an alternative and more
feasible suggestion, IT Services suggested using the test lab environment they had
established. This environment was used by a number of projects so the testers would
need to book time to perform the evaluation. This lab was the environment that IT
Services used for acceptance testing prior to transfer of any new system onto the
network.
This provided an ideal solution for providing facilities to perform the testing
of the Microsoft NetShow package, the real reason behind the project. The support
of the IT Services section was also politically important as it supported the Research
Group's view that this was a project useful to the company. A window of time that
the lab would be available was booked and the testing would be performed at that
time.
Once the facilities were obtained, the Research Group needed to resolve the
problem of assigning labour to carry out the work required. This was a significant
problem as no one within the Research Group had the required type of skill set to
execute this work. As a result, the window allotted for the testing passed due to the
Research Group's inability to align the required factors.
Without either resources or facilities for the evaluation, the Research Group
was unable to achieve any progress. The project entered a period of limbo as the
team re-assessed how best to perform the work.
5.4.2 Technical Strategy Section
Functionally, the Research Group has close ties and linked responsibilities
with the Technical Strategy section. The Technical Strategy Group was responsible
for defining how best to handle technologies within BigBank. They would receive
suggestions about new technologies from the Research Group, define the strategy,
and then pass it to the IT Services section for implementation. The relationship
between the Research Group and the Technical Strategy Group was confused at
times as their work often overlapped as no defined boundaries nor interfaces existed.
In an effort to formalise this relationship, meetings had been established
between the sections to discuss ongoing mutual projects and to define their
relationship. During these meetings, the sections would discuss the work they were
doing or attempting to do. As part of these meetings, the Research Group discussed
their plans to look into Multimedia transmission. A member of the Technical
Strategy Group present who specialised in Networks advised them that they were
setting up a test facility in conjunction with EUCS to look at network load testing.
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The Technical Strategy Group brought forward the need for the testing as it was an
aspect that they would need to deal with eventually. One Technical Strategy Group
member commented "When we realised we were exploring similar areas it seemed
an obvious move to collaborate and share the facility". The Research Group now
had labour, skills and facilities to do the project.
5.4.3 Technical Strategy Group / EUCS Links
The Technical Strategy Group had developed a good relationship with EUCS.
Their initial contact had come through a EUCS Network Specialist within the
relevant EUCS department. The Technical Strategy Group had contracted him to do
some work on network configurations and testing for the BigBank facilities. From
this consultancy, the Technical Strategy Group had arranged with EUCS to hire lab
space to build a test network. It was in this lab space that the Multimedia testing
would take place. Securing the space was crucial to the project as a principal barrier
to making progress had been finding the facilities to do the testing. These resources
provided the Technical Strategy Group with a powerful asset.
The Research Group also benefited in resource terms due to the EUCS
Network Specialist's areas of interest. He was involved within the academic world
with a number of committees involved in distance learning and the use of video
conferencing via Multimedia use. The EUCS Network Specialist was personally very
interested in this rapidly developing area of technology. He was involved in
applications being developed in the EUCS for use in the University as a whole. In
addition to the resource benefits from the unpaid time he gave to the project due to
his personal interest, having the EUCS Network Specialist's support provided great
leverage for the project.
5.4.4 Technical Strategy Group Links with Cisco
One of the Technical Strategy Group's functions was to identify and assess
the best suppliers for the company. One key area was the supply of network
equipment: the two suppliers selected were 3Com and Cisco. The decision to use
two suppliers was a strategic choice because network equipment is absolutely crucial
to the day-to-day operation of the bank's operations. The Technology Strategy Group
argued that if BigBank had committed itself to one supplier then they would place
themselves at a disadvantage when dealing with that supplier. The reasoning for this
assertion was that if the supplier was to withdraw support the resulting replacement
and technological redirection of the system would be catastrophic.
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This two-supplier strategy was balanced against the importance of having a
cohesive system with good supplier relations and the ability to order in sufficient
quantity to gain bulk pricing discounts. In order to minimise exposure and attain
these benefits, the Technical Strategy Group had two suppliers for network
equipment so if one did not meet expectations for any reason, operations could be
transferred to the single supplier until an alternative supplier could be found. This
strategy also allowed the bank to play one off against the other during equipment
tenders for which the suppliers had to compete, offering incentives, etc. for
equipment benefiting the bank.
5.4.5 Cisco Facilities Option
This competition between the two suppliers resulted in each hying to gain the
advantage over the other by offering price incentives and additional services. As part
of these additional services, Cisco systems offered the use of their new facilities in
the UK. These facilities were located near Heathrow in London and included a well-
equipped demo lab for their equipment. The lab was also to serve as the focal point
for the Network Multimedia Connection. The demo lab was a result of the
collaboration of Intel, Microsoft, and Cisco for their joint offering of products and
services. The lab would be used to showcase how their offerings could be effectively
combined into a cohesive, functional solution. This solution covered all aspects from
software through to processors and networking. This addressed the issues of
infrastructure requirements raised by Multimedia products.
The relevance of this lab was the inclusion ofMicrosoft, the suppliers of the
NetShow product on which the testing was to be carried out. The labs also provided
an ideal set-up to conduct the testing as in addition they were expected to possess
trained technicians. The level of expertise they in fact possessed was questionable as
the demonstrator from Microsoft admitted:
To be honest I've only been using NetShow for about 3 days. There isn't really an expert
in it in the UK we only have a sales team which goes out to provide demonstrations. If
you need any technical advice you need to contact our labs in the States (Microsoft
Demonstrator).
The abilities and contribution of the Cisco lab supervisor was also in question as he
had no knowledge of the product and was interested only in the more eye-catching
features of the product that were not completely applicable to the work required.
There were, however, a couple of other drawbacks about the situation.
Firstly, the site was geographically distant from the bank's Technology Division
offices which would make it difficult to get contact and access to relevant parties for
demos and consultation. In addition, the Technical Strategy Group was waiy of
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exposing too much information and placing a great deal of reliance on Cisco for this
work. They were constantly concerned about keeping activities with 3Com and
Cisco in balance.
The new UK facilities were designed to mimic facilities in San Jose where
Cisco's headquarters are located. These facilities are used to gain a better
understanding of client needs and produce greater collaboration. The basic aim,
however, was to assist sales and the BigBank Technical Strategy Group's perception
was that use of this facility could place the balance of power too far towards Cisco.
This was an approach that they felt uncomfortable in pursuing in order to maintain
an equitable balance in supplier relationships coupled with concerns over the
objectivity level of the results gained in the lab due to Cisco's commercial interest.
5.4.6 University Facilities Selection
In the end, the Research Group decided that the Edinburgh University
facilities would be a better option for testing. However, Technical Strategy still
leveraged their relationship with Cisco and was able to persuade them to loan
equipment for the lab with an option to use their facilities at a later date. The
University facilities had the benefits of convenience and impartiality. With the
BigBank Technology Division offices in Edinburgh, the costs of transportation
between the two locations were minimised. This geographical convenience was an
added bonus to gaining access to a University network with the capability of
performing the same trials. The University also had staff available experienced in
Network Administration and testing who would be invaluable for this work as well
as the other work that they were performing with BigBank.
5.4.7 Equipment Resourcing
With the testing facilities, labour and some equipment identified, the only
sourcing issue outstanding was the remainder of the equipment required.
Collaboration again provided the means to resolving the issue.
With all the groups involved in the project we were able to pool what were meagre
resources from each section to provide the equipment necessary. Admittedly that pooling
of resources often meant chatting about who knew where a spare piece of kit was lying
but it all helps (Research Group and Technical Strategy Group budget explanation).
As explained earlier, Cisco donated network equipment (routers, hubs, etc.)
as they perceived advantages for themselves in the project. They hoped that the
results of the testing would demonstrate how suitable their equipment would be for
this type ofwork and therefore aid their sale of that equipment while their facilities
remained available for additional testing.
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5.4.8 Network Established
The EUCS team along with the BigBank project team set up a network to
mimic the BigBank HOLI network. In order to increase the validity of the results this
was vital. Also a key concern was whether the network topology was correct as the
tests would only be meaningful if conducted on an identical topology.
The network was set up via equipment acquired using a member of IT
Services attached to the Technical Strategy Group and a EUCS contractor. The
combined team ensured the accuracy and validity of the test network.
5.5 CONTENT RESOURCE
With the test network established, the team was ready to test. However, like a
racetrack with no cars, the only way to fully test the track was to use it as it would be
used in final implementation. The vehicles on this test network would be the
multimedia content each with its own owner and chassis structure which would
require NetShow to supply the wheels and transmission before it got on the grid.
5.5.1 Identifying / Enlisting Content Owners
While it was suggested that the test could consist of generic load types (i.e.
audio, audio with slides), of varying resolutions and duration it was decided that in
order for the test to be representative it must use loads representative of BigBank
business operations. A list ofprospective load types were drawn up and then mapped
to existing situations within the bank. Those that had no match were abandoned
while some new ones were identified.
There were two owners for the content identified: Corporate Affairs,
represented by a Corporate Communications Executive, and Learning Technologies,
represented by the Learning Technologies Manager. These were two very different
departments with very different individuals. The Corporate Communications
Executive was a shrewd political mover within the company, with an air of someone
constantly formulating a plan, while the Learning Technologies Manager was
searching for one. Business cards are said to say a lot about a person and the
Learning Technologies Manager's card said almost everything with every
certification of qualification he possessed displayed on it. As a colleague put it, "If I
put all my qualifications on mine it would be as long, the only thing he's left off are
his swimming proficiency certificates". The Manager's need to impress was much
akin to the need for the Learning Technologies department as a whole to justify its
existence.
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Meetings were arranged with these individuals to discuss the content
required. These meetings had an additional agenda other than the sourcing of content
as a member of the Research Group explained:
It is important to get the buy-in of the other sections. The fact that they get involved and
think it is a good idea supports the relevance of the testing to the business. Also their
input will help us in constructing testing which will provide information which is of use
to the sections making it more valid (Research Group Member).
The other benefit would be that approval from certain groups within the organisation
meant that, should testing prove successful, there would be an obvious route forward
for the result. This would mean the sections enlisted would eventually own these
technologies which for the individual involved would provide good profile, if
successful, for the champions within these departments. This ownership aspect was a
strong benefit for ensuring support. This support also made it easier to argue for
funding for their budgets which could in turn contribute to the funding of a project.
The principal benefit was however the political weight the enlistment of these
sections could provide.
What emerged was an evolving network of interested, supportive individuals
within the organisation all with their own contacts and resources which could be
called upon. One of the key technical contributions these sections would make was
providing an understanding of the real life applicability of these loads. As a result of
meetings it became apparent that some of the load types initially suggested were not
applicable to BigBank activities so the list was adjusted to take this factor into
account.
With these inappropriate load types eliminated as being impractical, the
identifiers of the relevant loads were specified. It was noted that the relevance of
these loads was only on an historical basis, i.e. 'we've used them so they're relevant'
which is not the best method to select for a forward-looking test. This raised
concerns that the political perception of suitable testing being conducted was of
greater importance than the technical validity.
The final list of content types was as follows:
> 10 minutes of real time video broadcast.
> 20 minutes of real time audio broadcast with (up to) four PowerPoint slides.
> 10 minutes of delayed transmission video broadcast.
> 20 minutes of delayed transmission audio broadcast with four PowerPoint slides.
> 12 PowerPoint presentations each containing two minutes of audio, prefaced and
tenninated by slides with one minute of video embedded in each.
> Technical training module.
> Professional Skills training module.
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5.5.2 Acquisition of Content
The content provided by Corporate Affairs was in a number of formats
including videotapes of BigBankTV broadcasts, PowerPoint slides and hardcopy of
slides and audiocassettes. This represented the formats they could immediately
source within the organisation. This content was taken from some recorded
transmissions from BigBankTV on VHS cassettes and some audiotapes with
presentations accompanied by the relevant slides.
Learning Technologies had referred the Research Group NMM project team
to a third party whom they used to supply training material called NETG. NETG
supplied CD-ROM based training material covering topics used within BigBank.
NetShow documentation gave simple, straightforward explanations of what
to do with the content when it was in specific formats. What the documentation
neglected to mention was the complications in creating the content in these formats.
The key issue for creating these formats was the availability of production
facilities. A benefit of the location of the test site at Edinburgh University was that
the site contained a 'Multimedia Lab'. This lab catered specifically for the capturing,
manipulation and production of video, audio and static content possessing a wide
range of tools for this work.
A difficulty of being at the forefront of change is that you are required to solve
problems that have never been solved before solely to sustain progress. At the time
of the project, data capture facilities for multimedia were relatively scarce and
immature. Facilities, where they existed, did not have the power or capacity to
handle the rich file types required.
The files for multimedia content were unavoidably large due to the
complexity of the data required in creating a package. These files created challenges
for storage, capture and processing which few systems had the capability ofmeeting.
Only a few dedicated facilities had the ability to handle this load complexity and
those that did would usually charge a premium for that service and this was a
premium that was beyond the budget of the project.
5.6 PROJECT DEVELOPMENT
5.6.1 Original Content Generation / Quality
A key requirement within this multimedia capture and development process
was minimising any degradation of content quality. Quality degradation was
determined by two factors: generational proximity to the master and the format of
the original content. The closer the generation of the content to the original master
86
copies the better the quality of the recording. The more generations it was put
through, the more the quality would degrade. As a result of this consideration, the
team responsible for converting the content contacted the owners to obtain the
earliest generation of content available.
The Corporate Communications Department had contributed a number of
audiotapes that contained presentations of new company initiatives. These tapes had
been used to disseminate information throughout the organisation prior to the arrival
of BigBankTV. Since then, the medium had become redundant but it was felt that it
still represented a meaningful test for the network.
Despite attempts to obtain the best version, the remaining tapes were at best
second-generation copies. The original and masters of these tapes had long since
disappeared. This caused immediate problems as NetShow recommended the use of
audio direct recording or CD quality.
In order to maintain an acceptable level of audio quality, high quality
capturing techniques needed to be used. Initial attempts using standard methods
resulted in muddied reproductions which were unusable for testing. Conversely, the
PowerPoint slides provided no added complications because, being a Microsoft
Technology, they were in an immediately acceptable format and version.
The Corporate Communications Department also owned the BigBankTV
videos. These formats were more recent and were produced in a studio managed and
run by a third party contractor, Studio Videos. The Research Group project team
was referred to Studio Videos for previous versions of the videos.
5.6.2 Capturing Facilities
The Research Group project team requested the recordings either in the form
of a digital master or if possible delivered in an .avi format immediately compatible
with NetShow. In pursuing these loads, it became apparent that Studio Videos were
not as capable as the Corporate Communications Department believed. The first
concern was over their initial assurances that they could deliver the .avi format but at
a price of £250 for 5 minutes of footage. Unfortunately, the project budget was
effectively zero so even this modest cost did not seem to be a viable solution. As a
result of discussions between the project team and the Change Planning Executive
regarding the requirement for this input material it was agreed that this cost could be
met. A request was made to Studio Videos to provide the file and, at this point,
Studio Videos advised BigBank that they were not actually able to provide this
format.
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Further doubts were raised about the quality of input materials available
when the tapes were passed to Audio Visual specialists within the University. On
viewing the tapes, they advised that the production quality was very poor. They
firstly identified that the recording had been made on equipment which had 'dirty
heads' that degraded the quality of the recording. In addition, they noted that the
studio team had neglected using basic techniques such as backlighting during the
production of the programs. These factors meant the overall quality of the videos
was adversely affected at the earliest stage.
When the best versions available had been gathered together, they needed to
be captured and converted into formats suitable for NetShow. For transmission, the
content needed to be placed in NetShow's proprietary .asf format, for which the
package had a number of conversion tools. The accepted formats were .avi for video,
.wav for audio and images in .jpeg or .gif formats.
NetShow's instruction manual writers had given a great deal of assurance
that these formats were readily available for the target audience of their package.
This was an unrealistic assumption as facilities capable of providing all of these
formats were relatively rare.
The problems centred on finding facilities that allowed the capture, handling
and transfer of large file sizes. Media files are by nature large with size rising in
accordance with the complexity of the data, image files are large but dwarfed by
video formats. A number of facilities had been designed to cater for multimedia but
had focused on the wider need for dealing with graphic files such as .jpeg and .gif
providing hardware capable of handling these files and their manipulation with
resource intensive applications, e.g. Photoshop. Storage requirements for these files
comfortably exceeded floppy disk capacity and required more robust .zip and Jazz
drives which could contain these files on expensive disks.
These facilities were becoming more commonplace as the PC revolution had
been embraced by the graphic design community who had suddenly equipped
themselves with those tools which had previously been the domain of the expensive
studios. Some of these smaller facilities thus extended their services to the handling
of audio but video required such a significant leap in equipment that few catered for
this area.
5,6.3 CD ROM Training Package Conversion Problems
A major problem had been identified when using the training CD-ROMs for
testing. The content of the CD-ROMs was designed to run on a single machine from
the CD as part of an integrated software package. This made the solution very
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proprietary and difficult to re-appropriate for other platforms. As a result it could not
be converted into a format within NetShow. To place it within the package would
require the content to be available in a base format and to be completely rebuilt
within NetShow.
NETG were re-approached about the possibility of Web enabled training
packages being available for the test. The NETG Training Consultant advised:
We are developing some Web enabled training packages, most probably Java based but
they're still in development. For the timelines of the testing we wouldn't be able to
provide anything suitable (NETG Training Consultant).
5.6.4 University Graphics and Multimedia Laboratory
With a limited budget available, the Network Multimedia team had few
options for content capture and conversion. As a result of the inclusion of the writer,
a student, in the project team, there was the possibility of using some of the facilities
available to students free of charge. The most comprehensive of these was not
surprisingly the Edinburgh University Graphics and Multimedia lab located at King's
Buildings campus in the same block as the testing lab.
This was a facility for students and provided ample resources for the capture
and treatment of images. It also allowed some resources for audio and surprisingly
video, although with limited access. This posed a number of advantages for the
project team. It was convenient, had the required facilities and was free. The only
real issues were in obtaining timely access to the equipment and in transferring the
data once captured.
While the labs had .zip and .jaz drives available, it would also be necessary
for the receiving environment to have the equipment capable of reading these
formats. As a result of budgetary constraints, the Networked Multimedia project
could not source these drives and thus eliminated this possibility. This would prove a
show stopping issue for this lab idea.
The project team believed that there was no resolution to this situation but
the EUCS Network Specialist felt he could investigate other possibilities, as he
explained.
I'll have a chat with the people from the lab as I know them quite well. It should be
possible to slip the files across the university LAN. It is not normally allowed but I'm
sure I could get them to agree to it (EUCS Network Specialist).
The EUCS Network Specialist's assurance proved to be reliable and after some
discussions with the team in the lab they agreed to transfer the files to the lab via this
method. In addition the lab would assist in the capture and conversion of the content.
The EUCS Network Specialist, himself, assisted during the process and it became
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obvious that a major reason for that assistance was a personal interest in the area. As
one EUCS Laboratory Engineer commented "It is not often we get to really use this
equipment, so it is a good excuse. I want to do more stuff like this". With the content
captured and transferred to the testing lab in the relevant formats, the next step was
to convert it into .asf format.
5.6.5 Editor Options
The NetShow package had a number of tools to convert content dependent on
media. These tools were titled VidToAsf(Video), WavToAsf(Audio), and
AsfEditor(Audio + Static). The first two editors were DOS environment command
line operations, a spartan text based environment seemingly incongruent with
multimedia creation and transmission.
The command line editors (VidToAsf & WavToAsf) produced favourable
results with the converted formats when played displaying retention of quality. The
converted product of the AsfEditor was not satisfactory. The AsfEditor is a GUI
system that presents a timeline through which items of content (sound, image, etc.)
can be dragged and dropped onto and arranged for presentation. This presentation
can be reviewed as it is built as opposed to the other editors which do a bulk transfer
with no incremental changes.
5.6.6 Degradation Problems
It was during these reviews that the development team identified marked
degradations in the quality of the output. The audio became garbled and muddled
which made it difficult to discern. A number of different conversion codes were
applied but each still produced substandard output. What was even more alarming
was that this degradation in quality also affected the PowerPoint slides which were
in the ideal format for use. The legibility of the slides decreased following
conversion.
A number of different fonnats were used with the slides, .jpeg and .gif, but
there still remained the same inadequacies in the retained quality. This presented a
sizable problem as the substandard content would deeply affect the usability tests
and could potentially make them unusable.
It was at this point that the development team discovered that the NetShow
manuals and marketing information glossed over and in some cases completely
ignored very important issues with the development process. There was no
information which covered any of the issues that were being experienced. The
application came with a number of NetShow broadcasts which provided tutorials on
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the use of the system. These were referred to in an attempt to gain a better
understanding of the system and the ways it could be used to eliminate the problems.
But the tutorials were too simplistic and a number of them did not actually work, so
confidence in the tool was diminished. The recordings would stick at certain points
or jump. This did not provide a good advertisement for the package itself. The next
options were to contact the Microsoft support and to speak to the Network
Multimedia Connection labs in the Cisco offices.
5.6.7 Lack of Microsoft Support
Microsoft support was contacted regarding the difficulties. Unfortunately,
due to the nature of support lines and the work that the project was undertaking, the
results were not as desired. Support lines feature operators who are seldom deeply
versed in the actual products they support although they will have, at least, a cursory
knowledge. The levels of knowledge are graded by Tines' of support and problems
are escalated through the levels as required to find someone with the knowledge to
resolve the problem. The third or fourth line of support will often include members
of the Microsoft R&D team who were involved in the design of the product. Each
line of support will have access to a log containing all the issues that clients have
called them about and the progress made on resolving those issues.
As the application had only just been released, the number of issues that had
been raised on output quality degradation was sparse in both complexity and volume.
The Microsoft support team members advised the BigBank project team that most of
the issues centred on base installation and the product capability of dealing with live
feeds of content as opposed to converting existing content into .asf.
The early levels of support were unable to assist and they advised that they
would have to pass the issue back to their colleagues in the USA to assist with the
problem. This was a positive move but after calling each day for a week there was no
further progress and the development team were unable to speak directly to the
person who was dealing with the issue. The initial Microsoft support contact in the
UK advised that because of the skill sets of those involved in third and fourth line
support, they are often required for fresh development work and have limited time to
support issues.
Finally, Microsoft Support advised that the problem "May be an issue we will
be looking at for later releases". This is a way of saying that it is bug without a
resolution in this version of the software while not admitting that it was a software
fault. This was not a surprise to some people at the BigBank. As one developer said:
Microsoft are famous for doing this, releasing buggy (fault ridden) software and getting
the users to find and correct the issues. It is only by about version 4 or 5 that their
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packages are ok. I mean who do you know that ever used Word 1 or 2? (BigBank
Developer).
This still left the problem of how to produce content usable for the usability
testing. The next avenue of enquiry was with the team at the NMC lab at Cisco's
offices in London.
5.6.8 Unrealistic Guidelines for Corporate Environment (CD quality, etc.)
The manuals for Microsoft NetShow provided guidelines and best practice
for how to produce optimum content for transmission. For video transmissions they
recommend the use of 'talking heads'. This is when the picture only includes the
head and shoulders of the speaker. The aim is to cut down the range ofmotion that
the transmission has to cover because when low frame rates are used, movements
appear 'jerky' and can put the viewer off. The other key recommendation is that the
audio when recorded is done so in a quiet environment with minimal background
noise and a single voice that is clear and at an acceptable level of audibility.
Discussion also centred on the direct recording of the content into the system.
These guidelines were not practical for a corporate environment. Firstly, it
required the existence of a studio that could record and produce the appropriate
formats which was costly. Secondly, corporations would have a lot of content that
was pre-existing and would not want to entertain the cost of having all of that
content developed again. As one of the BigBank team expressed:
We can't justify reproducing ail the content in terms of time or money. The worry would
also be that we produce it all for Microsoft's proprietary standard then we have to redo
it again when we shift in a year when another standard emerges (BigBank Developer).
The limitation of the use of'talking heads' for the videos was unacceptable as it was
inapplicable to the type of content the BigBank would plan to use which required
wider screenshots and activity.
5.6.9 Web Page Alternative
The problem regarding the quality of the converted PowerPoint slides was of
major concern because this represented a problem when the recommended procedure
had been followed. The team acknowledged that alternatives would need to be
sought.
One of the team had discovered that the command line editors allowed the
linking of calls to web pages during the broadcast. In order to do this, the developer
needed to know the timing of the call and the URL of the page. This would mean
that the slides would need to be converted into HTML pages and a web site for them
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set up. The team estimated the level of effort to be a couple of days work and could
be performed by the team already assigned to the project.
This solution also appealed to some of the NMM Project team members
involved in the project particularly those from the Intranet team as it demonstrated
another means of enhancing the value of their project. It was believed that this would
successfully avoid the degradation problems as the results of the audio conversions
by this method had been successful and the pages would undergo no conversion as
they would be called by the package.
Another benefit of this approach was that the content was more easily
updated. With the pages not being part of the compiled package as long as the URL
remained the same, the page content can be updated and still be called within the
package. Possibly the biggest factor was that no other possibility seemed to exist
which retained the use ofNetShow and as a result this method was chosen.
The results from the preliminary work were more than acceptable. One issue
that appeared was the timing of the calls to the pages. Because they had to go across
the network there was a delay for the call to the page appearing which put it out of
sync with the voice. This was because the timings had been worked out under the
belief that the slides would appear immediately. Some experimentation to place the
call prior to when it needed to appear solved this issue. This provided the test with
appropriate content for the audio and static information usability testing.
5.6.10 Construction of Video Loads
The construction of the video loads was the source of some of the greatest
concern and problems within the project. This was the area anticipated from the
outset of the project to hold the greatest complications and consequently certain
avenues of investigation were curtailed on the presumption that they would not be
possible. A key example of this is the choice of frame rate. TV broadcasts are
transmitted at 25 frames per second and the development team did not believe that
broadcasting content at this frequency would be possible on the network. As a result
it was decided to record at rates of 15 and 5 frames per second as these speeds would
create smaller file sizes that the network would be able to handle.
The effect of lower frame rates is that the picture has a 'jerky' quality similar
to a strobe effect as the changes between frames are more perceptible to the human
eye and it sees the changes from one frame to the next. As a result movement is not
as easily tracked since the changes between the frames were quite obvious.
In order to minimise the visibility of this effect, footage was shot in a way to
reduce possible changes between frames as discussed regarding the 'talking heads'
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practice noted previously. However, this was not a model useful for the BigBank
videos which required a wider range of shots. Therefore, it was decided to
experiment with the different frame rates to see how much the user experience was
impacted by the lower frame rates. It was also decided that the screen size should be
explored as a factor in the user assessment of the content.
It was felt that if the full screen size was used the user was more likely to
draw comparisons between the NetShow transmission and TV which would
adversely affect the evaluation of the experience as they would perceive it as a
poorer TV rather than an enhanced computer experience.
Another reason for the use of a smaller screen size was consideration for the
viewing situation. As opposed to full screen TV style viewing where the participant
sits approximately 1 to 2 metres away from the screen, the user in the corporate
environment would be positioned about a foot and a half away from the screen.
Therefore the smaller screen size would be more acceptable. It was thus decided to
use the default size and halfof that as the two viewing sizes.
5.6.11 Audio Construction
The type of audio used also impacted on the content and use. As noted
previously, the recommended practice was the use of a single voice against a quiet
background that was recorded to CD quality. The tapes that the bank supplied which
were deemed representative of the type of audio to be used did not possess these
characteristics. The tapes featured less than CD quality sound but also featured
speakers with a lot of background noise as well as occasional music. It was during
the capturing process that the impact of the lower quality sound was first
experienced.
To ease the burden on the network the team wanted to create files of the
smallest size possible. In order to do this the lowest resolution of recording was used.
On the facilities available this would be 8-bit sampling but the content and sound
quality suffered to such an extent that the result was unsuitable. As a result the
higher resolution 16-bit sampling mode was employed, producing results which
would be usable for the testing.
5.7 DEMONSTRATIONS
With the test environment established and the content complete, a number of
pre tests were completed to check the functionality of the system. The next stage was
to begin the planning of the user tests. Prior to planning user tests the project team
decided that it would be beneficial to provide demonstrations of the test to the
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various project stakeholders. As the BigBank NMM Project Manager explained "It
was a good opportunity to show the various people who had backed and contributed
to the project".
5.7.1 Stakeholder brought in for Demonstration
The audiovisual nature ofmultimedia lends itself to effective demonstration
to an audience which does not possess technical knowledge. One of the political
benefits of the demonstrations was that it allowed the stakeholders in the project to
demonstrate to their superiors and colleagues the value of the work in which they
were involved, adding to their status in their sections. This would also gain
additional support from other individuals in the organisation who now felt part of a
select group having had special access to the project. This early participation of these
selected attendees would lead to greater word of mouth discussion about the project
which would increase interest in the other groups who should benefit from the
testing. This would also ease adoption of any of the findings from the research
following its conclusion.
The BigBank staffwere not the only ones who had demonstrations at the test
site. A number of the University staff who had assisted during the site set-up invited
colleagues to view the work that was being done. This provided some spin off
benefit for the university as the EUCS contact explained.
It was very useful having the site at the university as it gave the opportunity to
demonstrate the site to other departments. Some of the other departments have seen
some opportunities within the application for use in their distance learning programmes.
It sparked olf a lot of ideas which we are now going to look into (EUCS Spokesperson).
While the usability testing was required to validate the work, these
demonstrations allowed an initial qualitative evaluation of the content from the user
group. This allowed some discussions to be initiated regarding future work while
waiting for the report. This was valuable but would be useless without subsequent
testing, a fact acknowledged by the Research Group representative who commented
"If we hadn't done the usability testing there would have been a huge gap in our
credibility".
5.7.2 Addition of Video Conferencing to Demonstration
The University test site had also been used for testing of other technologies
not involved in the main project. One of these was NetShow's sister product,
NetMeeting, an application aimed at video conferencing. This application allowed
the use of audio and video plus content exchanges via a whiteboard function and file
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transfers. The team had done some linking to remote locations to demonstrate this
application.
This was incorporated into the demonstrations of NetShow allowing an
effective example of a related technology which the demonstration audience felt
could have relevance to other operations within BigBank. The stakeholders felt it
added to the value of the project and also provoked some other ideas regarding its
use.
5.7.3 Multimedia Technology Presentation
Because of the nature ofmultimedia technology, the best way of presenting it
is to demonstrate it, as the BigBank NMM Project Manager commented. "The thing
about multimedia is that you can't really describe it with the same impact as a
demonstration. You have to show it to people". The proximity of the test site to the
BigBank offices made it easier to arrange the demonstrations. This meant that it
would require less time out of the office with no cost for travel or accommodation
and little travel time. This meant they could be arranged quickly and made to fit
around the schedules of the executives. With the lab being off BigBank property, the
Research Group were still able to control who had access to the site and the time.
An important political aspect to consider for the demonstrations was
expectation management. The Research Group was aware of the complications that
raised expectations could cause.
The problem is that when some people, especially those without technical understanding,
see something they immediately think 'I want that' and with their expectations ofwhat is
possible raised, their desire and demand increases. They don't consider the effort
required to produce these things. This causes problems for the Technology department
who are then under greater pressure from these expectations (BigBank Research Group).
In order to make the audience appreciate the effort and complexity required to
produce the content, the demonstration walked them through all the stages of
production. This included all the complications such as the degradation issues caused
within the AsfEditor.
In order to further manage the expectations, the relevant section's
relationship manager also attended. Within the BigBank, the Technology Department
assigns a relationship manager to each section it deals with internally. These
managers have the charter to maintain this relationship, a key component ofwhich is
the setting, maintaining and meeting realistic expectations. By attending the
presentations they were able to understand and get context around any expectation
changes that may be caused.
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After each presentation they would hold a debrief between the section
members and the relationship manager, to discuss the impact of the presentation on
the section's technology plans.
5.7.4 Research Group Promotion
For the Research Group these demonstrations served to promote the work
they were doing.
The demonstrations allowed us to show the relevance of the work that we were doing.
Also because of the nature of the work, using multimedia, it was eye-catching and
interesting. This promoted interest in other things we were doing but also prompted
some of the sections to approach us about other spin off projects with them (BigBank
Research Group).
A major advantage for the Research Group was the ownership of the lab facility
which, as discovered at the outset of the project was a very rare commodity. The
ownership of this resource combined with the evidence of the required skill set to
perform the work was viewed as an important value proposition.
5.8 USABILITY TESTING
5.8.1 University Contacts for Labour
In order for the testing of the system usability to be as relevant as possible,
the test sample group needed to comprise as wide and large a number of subjects
who were representative of the end-user group. The acquisition of the number of
these test subjects also had to be cost effective.
The location of the lab on the University campus allowed these requirements
to be met reasonably easily. The campus catered for a large number of students and
administrative staff so sourcing large numbers of subjects was not a problem.
Members of the University staff used their knowledge of the student and staff body
to recruit resources with the benefit of knowing the volunteers well enough to select
ones who best matched the characteristics of the end-user base. Payment for the
testers was reasonable with £15 for participating and no additional transport costs as
they were located in or near the test building.
5.8.2 University Improved Standing
The BigBank Research Group felt that the collaboration with the University
for the project brought additional benefits over and above the cost effectiveness of
the labour. Other parties within the bank perceived the project as having a level of
academic validity due to this involvement. They also felt that the University
provided a more independent standpoint and it was not just another BigBank
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department trying to push its own agenda. As members of the BigBank Research
Group commented "People looked at the project in a different way from other
internal bank projects. Having that academic angle made it appear more valid".
5.8.3 Network Characteristics Affecting Testing Scenarios
The main investigation for the testing was how the bank network would
actually handle the traffic created by the new multimedia applications. The plan was
to test the usability of the multimedia loads under different network load conditions.
The initial aims were to test under perfect, medium and intense loads. The perfect
situation would reflect a scenario with no load present on the network. The medium
condition speaks for itself while the intense condition would reflect the network
under a load that was close to its failure point.
The initial preconception of the test team was that Ethernet would be the
superior framework for the network. Many in the Teclmical Strategy Group felt that
the token ring framework was not robust enough to handle the required load. The
token ring system establishes a ring of network nodes around which a token packet is
passed. This packet needs to reach the master node, having completed a circuit of the
network, within a set time frame. If this does not happen, the network assumes there
is a problem and shuts down and restarts, an activity which understandably causes
mass disruption. Until this point the network treats all nodes fairly and each is
unaware of other traffic on the system, just concentrating on what it receives at that
time.
5.9 REPORTING (BigBank REPORT)
5.9.1 Sponsor Concern with Problems Identification
The project sponsor and the EUCS consultant felt that the testing report had
created a negative slant upon the application by detailing problems which needed to
be remedied in order to use it effectively. While these problems were valid, their
discussion detracted from the positive Public Relations zeal.
The testing and resulting reporting raised awareness and altered perception of
both the BigBank Network and the various parties involved. The perception of the
bank network altered in that it was acknowledged that it could handle richer data
types, a capability which had previously been considered absent.
The Research Group gained credibility in terms of expertise within
Multimedia technology laying the foundations for the opportunities for further
projects and work. The new perception of the network opened possibilities for new
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avenues of development on the Intranet as we shall see explored within the following
Praxis (Chapter 6) and TCN (Chapter 7) cases. The Research Group would be called
on to provide myself as a resource to work on the projects as a result of the expertise
gained within NMM. The Research Group also displayed the results of the project as
one of their key pieces of work at the annual Technology Department exhibition to
further enhance their new reputation.
5.9.2 Pathway to Further Studies
The resultant access to other projects and positive perception of the work
were surprising and welcome to me. Surprising because at the start of my
involvement within the NMM Project, it was of low interest and priority within the
organisation compared with other burgeoning CD ROM based multimedia projects,
intranet and internet projects. It did not seem an enticing project to allow me
credibility and access to the organisation. However, it did create the credibility and
organisational access which provided a privileged vantage point to view a micro
political environment within BigBahk. In addition, the NMM Project gave an
overview and understanding of the technical and organisational infrastructure of
BigBank which would aid my passage into the Praxis Intranet project whose goal
was to create a web technology system to share information amongst the Technology
Department.
Useful insight into the technical systems of the bank was afforded during
these studies as well as into the organisational and personnel aspects of the business.
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6. CORPORATE INTRANET (PRAXIS)
6.1 PROJECT IDEA
Personal advancement and the pursuit of job satisfaction were demonstrated
to be common motivators for the individuals within the Praxis project. Their desires
were often the drivers for innovative ideas especially when they were looking for
ways to enhance their role. The Praxis Intranet began from this situation. A Research
Group Project Manager had completed a project dealing with multimedia producing
some Human Resource related CD-ROMs. From this project, there was no obvious
next step so she was left to identify a new area for investigation.
Around this time, a lot of interest was being raised within the media
concerning Intranets and their potential use by companies. They were being viewed
as a major future growth area. The Research Group Project Manager began to look
into this area and produced some papers on the subject.
The rapidly accelerating interest around the area of Intranets naturally
extended to many technology executives. By way of discussions with executives
from other organisations, the Technology Director in BigBank became aware that a
number of companies had projects dealing with Intranets. He felt that if other
organisations were investigating this new phenomenon then so too should BigBank.
The Research Group Project Manager was aware of the Technology Director's
interest in Company Intranets via her friendship with the Technology Director's
Executive Assistant.
6.2 PROJECT APPROVAL
As with any project, a business case emphasising the benefits to BigBank
would need to be identified. One benefit of Intranets is that they allow for the
organisation of significant and often sensitive business information within an easily
navigated system.
The existing system for holding such information was exactly the opposite in
terms of ease of navigation. The 'J-Drive', as it was known, was a hard disk drive
attached to a central server that was used to hold shared files. This system was
technologically unsuited to the task. While it could store a large volume of data, it
possessed few tools for the effective organisation and maintenance of the information
held there. Consequently, the information recorded there was largely out of date with
the most recent documents difficult to differentiate from earlier, now obsolete,
versions. In addition, a number of 'orphan' documents remained on the system with
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no author or department attached to them.
Searching for documents was very difficult with the file structure confused
and no naming conventions in place for the files. A text search was unlikely to assist
you to find the right document unless you knew the exact name. These problems
were the result of no-one having defined responsibilities for the upkeep of the drive.
No person had assigned responsibility to maintain the 'J Drive', no standards existed
in terms of structure or change procedures if the corporate structure changed and
sections ceased to exist. It was proposed that the Intranet would be used to replace
the J-Drive eliminating these inefficiencies. Another key benefit of Intranets was
their capability to provide an additional communication channel. This was aimed at
eliminating an abundance of global emails which circulated the company taking up a
lot of bandwidth and storage on the system. The Intranet would allow one central
reliable source of information. As the proponents of the system advocated, it would
provide the 'one true word', a concept which included the documents as well.
Despite these valid reasons for developing the project, the project initiators,
themselves, admitted privately that the business reasons were not the primary drivers
for the project being approved. As the Research Group Project Manager admitted
It was a leap of faith by the Technology Director. He just thought it was a good thing to
do. I think his industry colleagues were talking about Intranets and how they had one
and BigBank hadn't. So he was quite keen to say "We're doing something in that"
(Research Group Project Manager).
So the project was approved and the team had to begin to investigate and plan the
construction of the system. Two critical risk areas were identified: building the
technical infrastructure and sourcing content.
6.3 INTRANET DEVELOPMENT
6.3.1 Operating System
The new system needed to operate at an effective level and this required an
appropriate technical infrastructure to be put in place to achieve this objective. A
network was needed which would transfer the required data with equipment having
the capability to process and deliver it effectively as well as facilitate input by the
Content Co-ordinators. The Research Group Intranet Praxis project team began by
researching what was possible on the existing system.
The BigBank was in a process of transition regarding the platform on which
they ran their MS client systems. The bank's standard operating system was being
upgraded from Windows 3.1 to NT. This process took several months. The rollout
had to change over the systems in a manner which caused a minimal impact on
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BigBank's operations and would keep any problems raised during the process on a
manageable scale.
Until this rollout change process was completed, the Intranet would need to
accommodate the restrictions of the lowest common denominator system. The
Windows 3.1 system only allowed the use of a limited 16-colour palette as opposed
to the more hospitable 256 colours available on NT. This limitation imposed
restrictions in the design possibilities for the system.
In addition to the colour limitations and the inherent design limitations, a
combination of the limitations of the existing system and the current network
restricted the system's speed which in turn determined the system capacity and how
much data could be processed for each client. This meant that the Praxis project team
had to consider the 'weight' of processing required for each page and the nature and
volume of data contained therein.
The limitations of the system had a knock-on effect which affected the
capability of the system to accommodate multitasking. Some client machines could
not operate other applications whilst using Praxis. This made use of the system more
time-consuming and less appealing. Most users would prefer to have the application
opened in the background so they could refer to it as necessary. Having to close
down applications they were working on and open up the Intranet browser was a
considerable barrier to its use.
The overall network speed was a crucial performance issue since it would
affect the system's capability to handle network traffic and could therefore impact
download speeds. The Praxis project team would need to take into account that the
network speed in some areas was superior to others with the London network
operating faster than the Edinburgh network.
The use of email within the Intranet system was viewed as highly desirable
but the team discovered that some shortcuts had been taken when the email system
was set up. A consequence of these shortcuts was some of the fields, including the
email server details for each employee, were unfilled when the directory was
populated with user information. The information held within these unfilled fields
was crucial for the email system to be applied across both operating systems.
Without these fields being populated, the email could only be set up for either NT or
3.1 — an unsatisfactory solution. The other possibility would be for someone to
populate these fields but that would require a large number ofman hours to perform.
This effort would be a relative waste of time since the company could wait until
everyone was on NT then implement email without this effort.
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The important ramifications of the NT rollout upon the performance of the
Intranet meant the Praxis project team had to have a good understanding of when it
would be rolled out and who would experience it first. The Business sections within
the bank had priority in the rollout to initially receive NT, the closer a section's
proximity to the business units denoted their priority for upgrading. This meant that
the Technology Department were, at best, of secondary importance in the queue for
upgrading to NT.
6.3.2 Content Considerations
Irrespective of the high reliability and processing speed of a system
infrastructure, an Intranet will only be useful if the quality of the information content
is of a high standard. In fact, the system may even go relatively unused as a result of
poor information data content or presentation irrespective of processing capabilities.
The Praxis project team had to define what the value proposition of the Intranet
information would be and how to ensure that the desired quality level would be met.
This required standards to be established and applied.
The core value of the information to be held on the Intranet was that it
represented the repository of 'the one true word'. This value was a direct pitch
against the J-Drive. In contrast to the J-Drive, the Intranet would provide a
centralised, consolidated, reliable source of information in addition to reducing
searching time. In order to draw people to use the system, the content would need to
'add value' to business functions. This information value would determine the usage
of the system: the greater the value, the greater the use.
A key metric for selling the Intranet within the BigBank would be the
system's ability to improve the efficiency of the banking operations and thereby
profitability. To bankers, the bottom line was always the ruler. The importance of
this aspect of the internal 'sale' of the system was as important at the top as the
bottom of the hierarchy. If the value was only apparent to the executives and not
reflected in individual users' day-to-day activities, they would not use and populate
the Intranet with information from their sections. The users populating the system
with their information were crucial to the value proposition of the system. The value
of the system was directly related to the quality of the information held on the system
and this had to be provided by the users. If the users saw the system as being a
valuable channel to share information, they would provide appropriate information
and create a greater bond with the Intranet, heightening its use and increasing the
level of user buy-in.
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Users needed to be convinced initially to appreciate the value of the system
and relate it to their activities. If valuable, they would be encouraged to devise
applications for their area or identify anything which, if added, would further
increase the value of the system. The momentum of the access and populating cycle
was vital for the establishment and development of the system. The system needed to
build to a 'critical mass' of users to both access and input data. This would drive
acceptance of the system and the perception of the 'one true word'. If few people
accessed the system then it would be harder for people to justify the time to input
information. It was vital to reach this 'critical mass' point as quickly as possible
because ifmomentum was lost, use and adoption of the system would drop quickly.
Accelerating the possibilities of adding new information to the system was
important in building value. It was also crucial for the initial system to be capable of
leveraging and enhancing existing information to obviate the time consuming task of
re-entering such data. This would allow for the consolidation and creation of the core
value of the 'one true word'. As a result, the Praxis system could 'hit the ground
running' with an easy conversion path for existing information from previous
systems. Without this capability, the information would remain decentralised on
existing systems. This migration path would need to be built around the J-Drive
information as this was the primary repositoiy to be replaced.
6.3.3 Presentation
With an infrastructure and content positioned, the user still needed to find the
system usable and be able to extract the desired information. In order to do this the
appearance and presentation needed to be right. The options for design began under
the known limitations imposed by the existing operating system and the network
capability. The guiding role in this development was taken by a Contract Web
Developer who had been engaged by BigBank and his decisions were largely a
matter of individual taste. These would then be approved by a steering committee
although this was a rather ad hoc process. As a result of the lack of web skills and
knowledge held by people within the bank, the Contract Web Developer's views met
with little resistance as he was viewed as the expert.
The graphics were certainly done in consultation with the Research Group Project
Manager and JW. I just sat down at Photoshop and produced loads and loads of
different styles and logos and people just said I like that one, I don't like that one and a
graphics style emerged from that and I suppose I slotted it into my minimal page layout
style and it kind of came to be as the standard (Contract Web Developer).
The Contract Web Developer worked under the guideline of a basic design
with few colours to minimise the download time for the resultant pages.
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While working on the Intranet I did develop a minimal style to reduce download times.
You tend to find a lot of HTML designers use tables to layout things in an interesting
way. In my experience that just slowed downloading of the page. So I developed a style
which allowed me to layout a page while keeping the use of tables to an absolute
minimum (Contract Web Developer).
Red and grey were selected as the principal colours for the site and this could be
seen as odd given that these are not the identifiable BigBank colours but this was a
decision taken by the Contract Web Developer which he explained, as follows;
I had to design the system for the lowest common denominator which is Windows 3.1
which only has a 16-colour palette. The red was the colour I thought looked best out of
the palette so I used that (Contract Web Developer).
Each page's design was simple with a 'wallpaper' effect which noted the section the
page belonged to, aiding navigation. Each page would also contain the Pi symbol
which had been adopted as the Praxis logo.
Coupled with the design, the navigation of the page needed to allow effective
location of information. This had been one of the key failings of the J-Drive. The
information on Praxis needed to be readily accessible as well as accurate. A search
engine was proposed but it would only be possible to use one with limited
functionality due to operating system issues and the timescale for development.
Consequently, the organisation of the information was of even greater importance for
aiding information access.
6.3.4 Structure
In order to make the structure easily understandable to BigBank staff users, it
was important to provide them with a familiar structure which would become
intuitive. To achieve this familiarity, the Praxis structure mimicked the
organisational structure giving users a familiar point of reference for navigation. It
was also felt that the users should always have a base point to which they could
quickly return. This is why it was a standard requirement that the Praxis logo be
placed in the top right corner of the page containing a hotlink to the home page so
users could always return there from any point.
In order to provide a familiar structure, the sections were organised in line
with the organisational structure with, in addition, each section being given an
explanatory title, e.g. Tech Strat. = Know the Ropes to describe the function of the
section. This title was then incorporated into the wallpaper feature for each page
belonging to that section to further aid identification.
The Intranet content needed to retain value within the framework of the
system. This value was influenced by how effectively it related to business function.
The extent to which this was possible was heavily reliant upon the capabilities of the
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system. For some sections, the nature of the functions they served could not be
accommodated due to the limitations of the system. An example of this arose with
the IT Services section whose task was to maintain the system, reacting to any faults
as they occur. This function required immediate notice and action when a fault
occurred and real time tracking of progress of its resolution. Praxis was to use a
practice of overnight publishing meaning a delay in information transfer which was
unacceptable to this section's activities. As such, Praxis did not represent a realistic
alternative to their existing methods in the initial launch. The Praxis project team
understood that for the system to expand and grow they would need to identify these




The Praxis project team had to set up a framework within the organisation to
manage the rollout and introduction of the system. They sought user feedback to
enable response to specific needs in order to tailor the system and the contents to fit
the organisation requirements. The Praxis project team decided the best approach to
obtain content from each of the sections and spread the word about the system was to
establish a team ofContent Co-ordinators and get live feedback through them.
Each section would have a Content Co-ordinator acting as a system champion
as well as ensuring the quality standards for content were applied. Setting up the
Content Co-ordinators in each section would provide the first step for decentralised
publishing for the Intranet. As the Research Group Project Manager explained:
It was essential that we made each section handle the publishing of their own content.
We couldn't justify the cost of having one centralised team publishing content and also
it would slow down the publishing process with another person involved in the
process...Also having a section owning their publishing, they get a greater responsibility
and feel more involved in the project. It assists buy-in as well as spreading the word
(BigBank Research Group Project Manager).
The Content Co-ordinators would also be responsible for the content being
published or, alternatively, taking the responsibility to identify and select the person
to act as publisher for the system. Another aspect of their role would be to guide the
potential uses of the Intranet by their section. This was a very attractive aspect of the
role as they experienced increased involvement as was intended by the Research
Group Project Manager responsible for developing the Intranet. As alluded to in the
Research Group Project Manager's comment, a key aspect of their position was to
act as the channel of communication between the sections and the Praxis project
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team. They would be the bridge to allow knowledge transfer from the Intranet Praxis
project team throughout the organisation, transferring skills and expanding the
knowledge base. Getting users familiar with this process was not an instant
happening.
There are quite a lot of people who want to publish but haven't got the hang of the idea
that they have a Content Co-ordinator in their section and end up contacting me directly.
I then refer them to their Content Co-ordinator (Contract Web Developer).
While the value and benefits of the position were clearly understood, the cost
implications were another issue. As a result of the low budget attributed to the
project, the time required and cost incurred for the Content Co-ordinators to fulfil
these pivotal roles could not be funded from the Praxis project. As a result, the
departments would either need to accept that time and costs were being taken from
their budget or the individual would need to perform the work in their own time. This
would require the understanding and acceptance by the departments of the additional
value from performing that role.
One important benefit that the Content Co-ordinators and the Content
Publishers in each section would receive was training. Courses were organised by the
Technical Strategy Group and were designed to create the skill base required for
decentralised publication and effective use of the Intranet. These course costs were
budgeted within the company spend and the cost of individual's training billed to
each section. They covered Web technologies and the use of the designated
publishing tool, Microsoft FrontPage. As a result of the popularity of Web
technology at the time, these were popular courses with a number of people keen to
attend them. However, access to the courses was limited. Employees involved in the
Intranet project received priority.
Some of the courses were further restricted by the Technology Director to
prioritise attendance by members of the Technology Department. The rationale was
that this would benefit in the handling of initial expectation management. If business
users attended the courses prior to the technical staff designated for support, they
were more likely to push the technical staff to provide things they believed could be
done from their perception of the technology derived from the courses. The wider
and fuller implications of these requested actions on the BigBank systems are often
not appreciated, thus creating development at an uncomfortable pace. The
opportunity to attend these courses and learn useful skills was a big sell to employees
but it also allowed the Praxis project team to establish standards at an early stage.
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6.4.2 Standards
People started to build sites before we had these courses for them to go on and receive a
bit of indoctrination. As part of the course we've told them not to use frames. There has
been a couple of instances of sub departments publishing their own sites and what
they've been doing has been utterly different from Praxis. For instance, the use of
frames which is something to which we're very allergic (Contract Web Developer).
Setting standards was further complicated by the loose approach favoured by
the Praxis developers who did not have a formal set of guidelines.
My instinct is to take an informal approach but it could be storing up trouble for later.
There is no prescriptive style guide. Even though it doesn't exist, the way its been
violated by people producing their own sites is quite telling. Perhaps we ought to
publish it and set it in stone (Contract Web Developer).
Despite these issues, the Praxis project team's personal preference was to
maintain this way ofworking.
It is very informal and I hope it stays that way. I sort of prefer that informal way of
working. It has been possible to maintain that way of working (Contract Web
Developer).
The Praxis project team had selected Microsoft FrontPage as the designated
publishing tool and there were a number of reasons for this choice. The actual
developers preferred it due to their familiarity and experience with the software
There are a number of HTML editors available each with their own peculiarities. I
wanted one which we could use as a standard and I'd used FrontPage before and found
it performed most of the things I needed it to do (Contract Web Developer).
There was a more economic reason, however, which the Research Group Project
Manager explained.
Due to the amount of software we get from Microsoft we could get this really cheap and
it was compatible with the Microsoft platform. For decentralised publishing we needed
to have a number of licences available in the company so it needed to be financially
feasible. FrontPage allowed this (Research Group Project Manager).
The motivation behind the Content Co-ordinators was the need to create a
decentralised publishing model. This would require an established and agreed set of
standards across the system. In order to establish these practices a centralised system
was initially implemented with the Intranet development team operating out of the
Communication Group responsible for all content published. The Communication
Group would then assist and train the Content Co-ordinator network and rollout the
decentralised process with established standards across the organisation.
The initial centralised process required each section to submit their content in
a compatible format to the communication section to create the HTML Intranet page.
This was then placed on a Staging server. Staging servers operate as a replica of the
live server but are not available to the main system as they are used to preview data
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before a public release. A URL for the page on the Staging server was supplied to the
section Content Co-ordinator who would view the page and approve it as presented
or request amendments. Once the page had been approved on the Staging server it
would be transferred overnight to the live server for public view on the Intranet.
6.4.3 Currency
New additions to the Intranet were publicised via global emails circulated at
the start of each week advising of the new pages to the Praxis system. It was
important that these pages stayed current maintaining the 'one true word' and
avoiding the information obsolescence that had been experienced on the J-Drive.
In order to maintain the currency of the information, a life expectancy was
placed on the document ranging from 3 months to 1 year maximum. When this
period expired the document owner was contacted, or the relevant person from that
section, and the page was reviewed, updated if necessary, then another life
expectancy was assigned or the page was removed. This process was established
with the Content Co-ordinators who would maintain it in their own sections as the
decentralisation was enabled.
6.5 ORGANISATION STRUCTURE
The Praxis system went live but a place within the organisational structure
was required from where the ongoing use could be monitored and the system
maintained and further developed.
6.5.1 Communications Group
It was decided by the Technology Director that the Communications Group
within Technology would be the most logical place for monitoring, maintenance and
further development responsibility to sit. There were two principal reasons for this
decision. The communicative nature of the Intranet made this a logical location for
this responsibility to sit. Furthermore, this Group sat outside the rest of the
Technology Department with a direct reporting line into the Technology Director via
his Executive Assistant. This provided the Communications Group with important
formal recognition and leverage. The team was placed within that section and the
Research Group Project Manager passed over responsibility for the Intranet to the
newly appointed Head of the Communications Group.
The new Communications Group Head had worked within the Technology
Department but did not have much technical knowledge and his abilities related more
to the communication/marketing aspect of the work. The Communications Group
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Head was excited by his involvement in the Intranet project as he commented "It
gives me the chance to get involved in something that I can use later and is seen as
valuable".
Ownership of the Intranet gave the Communications Group another avenue
for growth beyond their existing printed publications. The longest serving member of
Communications Group commented. "Communications have grown a lot. When I
came here two years ago there was just one person. Now the new Communications
Group Head has taken over and there are four or five people".
The Communications Group had a strong compatibility with the Intranet
which would serve as the key communication device of 'one true word' as that
section had been responsible for raising awareness of technology within the bank. A
primary method for communicating this was the Renaissance program.
The rest of the bank don't think of technology as useful to them but I think that has
changed in the last few years and that was the purpose of the Renaissance program —
changing things about technology but also the way it is perceived. It started about 93-94
and it was a vision about changing the culture, the way they trained staff and making
sure they developed staff in the way they should be. It was making sure that the rest of
the bank saw technology as something which could add value to what they were doing.
It showed the department as really professional and making sure that people who had
contact with the bank developed the right kind of relationships and gave a good image
and impression (Communications team member).
This role placed the Communications Group as a point of contact between the
Technology Department and the rest of the BigBank.
6.5.2 Ownership Transfer
The ownership of the Intranet was transferred to the Communications Group
after the site had been running for 3 months. They wanted to get an understanding of
how it had been received and what improvements could be made. In order to expand
the reaction to the Praxis Intranet system, they decided to undertake a survey of the
departmental users of the system.
6.6 PRE-SURVEY INTERVIEWS
The process of conducting this survey of Intranet use would take a number of
stages. The first preparatory stage was to interview a number of employees relevant
to the system, principally the Content Co-ordinators although other employees were
included.
From the issues raised in these interviews, a survey would be constructed that
would be distributed to the Technology Department as a whole which was
approximately 1200 people. The Communications Group asked the Research Group
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if I would be available to conduct this survey and it was agreed that this would be
possible. Through interviewing, I had access to a number of key persons within the
BigBank on a one-to-one basis in order to gather the general view via the survey.
6.6.1 Factors affecting use of Praxis
The initial interviews yielded a number of factors which were felt to strongly
limit the usability of the Praxis system. While the positive comments related to the
user experience, there were two emerging complaints which were caused by
technical constraints. The lack of colour options and the style was a common
complaint which led into the overall presentation of the information. Specifically, the
layout and style were deemed unsatisfactory. A key negative factor was also the
speed of delivery, processing and access to the system. This was a major area of
frustration.
Beyond the method of delivery, the actual value of the information in relation
to the BigBank's activities was also subject to some reservations. Interviewees
expressed the feeling that much of the information held on the system was ignored
due to its perceived lack of relevance to day-to-day activities. If the system was to
work and gain user 'buy-in', this relevance to users' activities was a key aspect that
had to be addressed.
It was felt that much of the material held on the system was 'Brochureware',
meaning it was simply 'Hello, I'm here' as opposed to 'this information will help
you'. Many felt that the system lacked a 'killer application' an essential 'value add'
not available in another medium. This confusion was baffling, when to interviewees
there were a number of possibilities that would provide this added value. An online
phone book was the option that many advocated. As one interviewee expressed it
I don't know why we don't have the phone book online. Our current procedure is so
inefficient. It costs us £30,000 to print a phone book each six months which by the time
it reaches the first desk is out of date with people moving all the time. Everyone would
use this because we need it all the time and it saves hundreds of calls to the switchboard
to get the most up to date numbers (Technology Manager, London).
The proposal was that this book would be placed on the Intranet and be updated
frequently keeping the information current and readily accessible while saving
printing and production costs of the phone book. The Technology Manager from
London explained that setting this feature up would be a simple task.
I'm surprised it hasn't been done already. The operators have a system that holds all the
information required. All they would need is a feed from that system to the Intranet
which would not be a lot of work (Technology Manager, London).
Inclusion of the company floor plans was another feature that was believed
likely to encourage frequent use. Another interviewee from Human Resources
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expressed "People are always moving and finding out where they sit and what they
look like is not straightforward. If this information was placed on the Intranet it
would be easy to access and veiy useful". The information was readily available but
would need someone to keep it up to date.
The need for an email facility was another area of concern that was
highlighted. Some of the interviewees felt that it was such a fundamental facility that
it should be included on the system.
One of the possibilities which was championed by the Human Resources
department and supported by a number of other sections was online training. This
related to two main aspects of training. One aspect was the booking of training online
with course availability, information, etc. encompassed. The other option would be to
run interactive training on the Intranet instead of providing the CD-ROMs presently
in use for personal study. As a Human Resources representative explained
We have a number of courses on CD-ROM but we always have the problem of the CDs
being sent, then lost or they go out of date and we have to make new ones incurring
more cost. If we could have them on the Intranet we wouldn't have to worry about the
CDs and we could update the training when necessary (Human Resources
Representative).
Discussion groups were also suggested as another key function for the
Intranet. This was generally put forward by those with a greater knowledge of the
Internet. Discussion groups are a common feature on the Internet and are used for
encouraging regular visits from users who post messages on the group. BigBank
employees felt this would be of benefit for the Intranet encouraging participation and
interest from users. This would provide a benefit for the bank as these discussion
boards would help generate suggestions and also offer a substitute for meetings on
the subjects which would have the employees taking time out from other work.
With the Intranet being presented as providing an improved alternative to the
J-Drive, it was not surprising that users would immediately compare and contrast the
two. While it was agreed that the J-Drive was a poor system, there was still a
pressure resting on Praxis to prove itself. Unfortunately, the promise of Praxis to
maintain current information had been harmed by visibly out of date pages remaining
on the system. This caused concern among users as it brought back memories of the
J-drive and raised doubt about the effectiveness of the system overall. As one
interviewee put it, "When you see something that is obviously inaccurate like that
you wonder how reliable the rest of the system is" (BigBank Interviewee).
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6.6.2 Web Technology Awareness
A rather ironic theme which was exposed during the interviews was the lack
of knowledge and experience ofweb technologies which members of the Technology
Department possessed. This situation had surprised the lead web developer for the
Praxis project.
It has been surprising to me how naive some of the IT professionals are about the web. I
suppose even though they've been in the trade for years or decades they won't
necessarily have experience of the Internet or have an Internet connection at home.
Without an Intranet in their place of work why should they have experience of it? But I
have been a bit surprised how naive some of them are. They're very highly qualified,
very professional people but they know next to nothing about the Web and what's
involved and that's the problem explaining what you can and can't do (Praxis Lead Web
Developer).
Some of the more experienced staff members provided insight as to why there was
this lack of knowledge which in part seemed to be due to the nature of their day job
as one explained, "I spend my whole day at work staring at a computer screen, the
last thing I feel like doing in my spare time is doing the same thing" (Technology
Department Member).
Their experience of technology also meant that they did not view the Internet
with the same wonder that others did. This view was expressed by one employee
from the IT Department team who had worked in IT for 20 years. "I've seen all this
stuff before but with different names. People always think it will solve everything
until they try to do something with it" (IT Department Employee).
In contrast it was the younger staff that possessed greater enthusiasm and
knowledge of the technology involved and the potential it allowed. Their exposure
had usually come at college or university. Also many of their peers from these arenas
were involved in web technologies.
Without this broader knowledge and insight into different applications that
the technology had provided in other arenas, the users could only judge its scope by
what they had witnessed without appreciating the wider future possibilities that lay
before them.
What they saw was a system that suffered from a lack of dynamism with
limited interactivity. As discussed before, the delay in publishing time meant its
applicability to a number of business functions was restricted. In the light of these
drawbacks and due to an ignorance of the possibilities the web presented, some users
condemned the system. Those parties that understood the possibilities and had access
to the requisite skill and knowledge embarked on their own projects. This was
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particularly true ofoperations in London.
6.6.3 Informal Communications
Experience of Web technologies in other contexts was not the only means by
which BigBank employees could gain an understanding of the potential of the
system. The proximity of a section to the Communications Group socially and
geographically had a bearing on the perception of the system. Departments with
closer physical proximity to the Communications Group had a greater understanding
of what was going on in the system as they would more regularly come into contact
with members of the section who would relay information on developments and
plans for the system. One of the opportunities for an additional forum for
communication was the location of the drinks vending machine!
Within BigBank, a number of vending machines are available with
approximately one on each floor. People will visit these regularly to get drinks either
for themselves or members of their section. One of these machines is located next to
the Communication Group so everyone on that floor visits it. This provided frequent
contact with the Communications Group as people would stop and chat. A number of
interviewees stated, "I often speak to the Communications Group Head when I go for
a coffee" (Human Resources Representative). Another employee provided a term for
this communication system. "There's a lot of 'coffee chat' that goes on in the bank.
It's the best way to find things out" (Human Resources Interviewee).
Employees' social links with the section were also an effective route of
communication about Praxis. Some of the sections while not having the geographical
proximity had close links with members of staff in communications. As a member of
Human Resources in London admitted, "The Communications Group Head and I get
on really well and when he is down here (London) we normally meet up for a drink
so I get to find out everything that's going on then" (Human Resources Employee,
London).
These informal routes of communication whilst aided by geography and
existing social relationships were often driven by political motives. These motives
were to achieve 'buy-in' from certain influential parties within the bank who were
termed by the system development team as 'friends of Praxis'. This group was privy
to new information but also had input into shaping the system with their plans for
projects receiving assistance first. One example of these concerns was the lack of
dynamism of the site. The resolution proposed by Praxis Lead Web developer was to
use a technology called active server pages (hereafter referred to as ASP). ASP is a
programming language which allows certain functions and interactions to be
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performed within the web pages. By using ASP, it would be possible to provide a
range of applications, such as the room booking system, which could link to and
display information from other data sources. In order to do this, a developer
knowledgeable in this language was required and the Communications Group
managed to find and recruit such a developer who would work on projects for the
system. Only some of the friends of Praxis were initially made aware of the new
resource and presented with the opportunity to propose projects for their sections.
Consequently, one of the first projects progressed was a room booking system for
administration sought by one of the 'friends'. The responsiveness of the
Communications Group and usefulness of the new functionality helped ingrain a
positive future perspective of the system.
This positive future view had to be tempered by realism and some practical
considerations. As a result, this information was best shared with this smaller group
who could then support and advocate the development of the system. The need for
achievable expectations to be set around the system was to ensure that unrealistic
deliverables were not requested and subsequently avoided causing people to lose
interest and faith in the system. This necessitated getting buy-in and maintaining
completely realistic expectations of what the system could deliver. This meant
selecting and working with a restricted group of allies to build proven successes
before gradually moving to meet the needs of the wider group as resources and
capabilities allowed. With a limited number of developers only a limited number of
initiatives could be undertaken. It was important, therefore, to focus available
resources on the ones that could be delivered fastest. The 'friends of Praxis' owned
these 'faster' initiatives.
6.6.4 Edinburgh / London Divide
For Edinburgh to establish itself as the base for the Intranet development, it
had to gain the buy-in of business owners in London as well. Therefore, the Research
Group Project Manager had to go and sell the system to the London business units.
There was a perception that the Research Group Project Manager was guilty of
overselling the system in some instances which caused difficulties for the London
technical teams supporting these business units
A number of trips have been made by the previous Intranet manager 'selling' the system
and technology to the business down here (London) without any contact with us. This
causes a big problem because we're the ones who have to deal with these raised
expectations and supply the systems. The business doesn't care that we have to make
sure it's compatible with existing systems and can be supported. If we don't provide it
then they're educated people and will go and do it themselves but come back and dump
it in our lap when the problems start (London Technology Manager).
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The need identified by the Praxis project team for Edinburgh to establish
ownership was an effort to alter perceptions about the Edinburgh technical
capabilities and those ofLondon. London, in fact, possessed a skill-set more suited to
these technologies due to traditionally handling client-server technologies while
Edinburgh handled the mainframe. In order to counteract this skills imbalance, the
training course was pushed to cater initially for the Edinburgh sections.
While the ability to learn these new skills was an incentive, the fact remained
that the work was not part of the Content Co-ordinators' specified jobs within their
respective departments (HR, IT Services, etc). Their day-to-day tasks meant that they
had limited time to devote to experimenting with Praxis. Through the initial
interviews, a number of themes developed around the system. These revolved around
the manner in which the Praxis project team related to users and content providers
for the system and their perceived attitudes.
A number of interviewees indicated that their section's presence online was
viewed as being a direct indicator of their interest in the system. Those with little
information online were viewed as being uninterested and were consequently given
less attention and assistance. The interviewees used a common term to describe this
situation 'publish or be damned'. This captured the feeling that they had about their
treatment if they had limited content online and underlined the importance of
visibility. If you were not seen to be doing something you were perceived as doing
nothing and therefore uninterested in the system. This was often not the true
situation.
The informal communication network acted to dispel this perception in some
cases, so those with good personal relations with the Communications Group were
able to make their genuine interest apparent and appreciated. The reverse was true
for those with tenuous communication links with the proponents of the system but
strong links to other sections who had limited presence on the system. These
relationships served to reinforce their perceived negative view of the system through
exposure to others with similar experiences.
As a result, the people who felt unsupported tended to have common
geographical and sociological characteristics. The geographical factor was that they
were located in London. The sociological factor was that they belonged to sections
with certain capabilities and histories which were linked to the historical roles of
Edinburgh and London. As a London Technology Manager explained:
It is surprising that Edinburgh is doing work of this type. Traditionally it has been
London who dealt with Client-Server technologies whilst Edinburgh handled the
mainframe systems. Now they're moving into client-server (Technology Manager,
London).
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This move to Praxis Intranet being centred in Edinburgh was contrary to the
North-South divide that existed between the sections.
There's a definite North-South divide. There is a North-South divide in terms of what
the business does with retail in the North and corporate down here that has led to a
difference in systems. We're much more client server versus mainframes (Technology
Manager, London).
This created two issues. Greater competency for web technologies existed in London.
Therefore, Edinburgh taking this role caused friction. On the issue of competency a
London Technology Manager stated.
There's certainly more people in London with the appropriate skill set for this type of
work. The Internet is more PC based so it's logical that it would be handled in London
as we deal in client server tech (Technology Manager, London).
The fact that the Praxis team had focused their communications on the
business units in London as opposed to the Technology ones also increased the
friction.
We've not really had the same presentations the business had. The Praxis team sold
them on how they could use it but didn't really do that with us. Because we're
Technology they maybe assumed we knew but maybe not (Technology Manager,
London).
These presentations to the business units had raised business expectations to high
levels.
Most of the expectation has been created by the Research Group Project Manager going
round and selling to the business. There is huge demand from company business to be
involved.. .To say expectations are strong would be an underestimate. They're all
rushing to be on the system (Technology Manager, London).
This meant that the Technology sections had to meet demands which the Edinburgh
team did not have the resources to support. London had to resource themselves and
initiate their own methods to tackle the demand.
We are getting asked to do stuffwe're not completely geared up to do. For example, the
need for interactivity and use of ASP we had to bring in a contractor who knew about
this area and we've had him working and passing these skills onto our guys
(Technology Manager, London).
These initiatives remained outside Praxis which meant that resources were split often
duplicating work. Instead ofpooling the resource and learning from each other, a lot
of the London activity was not appreciated as evidenced by the Communications
Manager stating, "There's no real web activity in London. This (Edinburgh) is the
centre for it all" (Communications Manager).
The lack of effective methods to communicate the work being done in
different regions may well have been due to the lack of adequate funding for the
project. On discussing the budget in departments for the Praxis work, one manager
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remarked, "It's not that it's being cut. It's just not there. There isn't a budget to cut!"
(Department Manager). When discussing why this was a major issue, another
explained:
To justify my time on this, we have to show what the business is getting out of it and
this is a technology initiative. It would be very difficult for me to justify spending too
much ofmy time on this (Department Manager).
6.7 PROGRESSING IMPLEMENTION
Much of the communication and work was reliant on extra-curricular interest
and informal channels as previously outlined. These informal communication
channels, discussed earlier, are the 'coffee chat' practices linked to geographical
location and the 'friends of Praxis' network. These informal methods extended into
the process of getting political approval for the project, which was evidenced by the
relations among the original Research Group Project Manager, the Executive
Assistant to the Technology Director and the Communications Group Head.
The Research Group Project Manager and the Technology Director's
Executive Assistant had a good social relationship and had engineered approval for
the project. It had seemed logical that the Research Group Project Manager would
then become manager of the system. However, when the post with responsibility for
the Praxis Intranet was created, it was not seen as desirable by the Research Group
Project Manager. A colleague of the Research Group Project Manager explained.
If the Communications Group Head position had been senior enough, the Research
Group Project Manager would have taken it. It wasn't and there was an opportunity to
work on the company rollout in corporate communications so she took that. Then they
needed someone to run the technology Intranet and they recruited the Communications
Group Head to report to the Executive Assistant (Project Manager's Colleague).
The Communications Group Head had limited relevant technology
knowledge so constantly had to refer to the original Research Group Project
Manager, who, via her relationship with the Technology Director's Executive
Assistant held control over the system. Close ties were evident from briefings held
between the Research Group Project Manager and Communications Group Head
prior to any important meetings or decisions.
6.7.1 Survey Issued
The initial interviews were used to identify the key areas for the survey to
contain. These were drafted into a questionnaire. The Market Research department
was consulted for advice on how best to carry out the survey. They advised that a
50% response from the target group was very good but usually within the bank it was
30%. This level of response still required incentives usually with a money prize or
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store vouchers. It was decided that the Praxis survey would offer a prize of a meal at
a restaurant. Also on submission, thank you emails were advised to inform the
respondents that their infonnation had been received and explain to them what would
happen with the results.
An important consideration was about the best method of delivery for the
survey. Whilst paper was the most commonly used format, this was rejected by the
Praxis team as they argued it would be more difficult to collect and compile plus
there was less likelihood of a response from subjects. Their proposal was for a
response via Praxis with a global email advising users of the location of the survey
on the site. An issue with this method was raised regarding ease of access to the
survey by technology staff. Through the interviews, it was known that some people
faced extreme difficulty in accessing the system so the survey being on Praxis meant
it was very possible that they would be unable to respond. As a result, those needing
to raise issues most would not be heard. This was not considered important enough to
change the delivery method. This decision was the first indication of the possibility
of a hidden agenda existing around the survey.
The survey was subjected to a number of iterations around the core Praxis
team and management. Bearing in mind it was supposed to be an impartial academic
survey, a number of alterations were made which would bias the results and affect its
validity. The team felt it unnecessary to get background information on each
respondent even though this would provide an understanding of the audience and
perhaps reasons for certain themes in the results. It was also felt that the
questionnaire should have a "friendly, informal wording style" to engender a positive
reaction to the system, clearly biasing responses. This was further compounded by
the desire that the balance of positive and negative wording used should be
considered with the leaning towards the former "to create a good impression". The
survey was issued with these changes made to the Technology section.
6.7.2 Survey Results
The results of the survey echoed and supported the themes uncovered during
the one-to-one interviews. People were using the sections which required little
dynamic interaction such as Human Resources but were keen to see more dynamic
interactions. The uses they saw for this were again similar with support for ideas
around the phone book and room booking.
The technical issues such as speed and use alongside other applications also
appeared repeatedly. The issue around the colour scheme being inconsistent with the
standard BigBank presentation theme was also highlighted.
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The Praxis team were satisfied with these results as it supported the direction
in which they wished to develop the system. The dynamic applications were also
projects that were underway at that time. It also provided support for the Intranet to
aid the launch of the Corporate Intranet, entitled Orbit. Orbit would feature the
standard bank colour scheme. In launching this application to Corporate, the bank
would use some of the same team to deliver this, namely the Research Group Project
Manager, Communications Group Head, Contract Web Developer and myself. They
would want to combine the benefits of the Praxis system with some added
functionality around distance learning which forms the subject of the Training and
Communications Network case study covered in Chapter 7.
121
7. TRAINING and COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
Section Page
7.1 PROJECT CONCEPTION 123
7.2 FEASIBILITY STUDY 126
7.2.1 Technical Requirements 127
7.2.2 External Parties 129
7.2.3 Internal Parties 134
7.3 PROJECT APPROVAL 137
7.4 RESOURCE RECRUITMENT 138
7.5 PROJECT DEVELOPMENT 140
7.5.1 Technical Issues 140
7.5.2 Organisational Issues 143





7. TRAINING and COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
7.1 PROJECT CONCEPTION
Throughout the projects, we see the desire for personal advancement as a key
motivation for individuals' interest in innovation. Individuals view a potential
development gauging the likelihood of a successful implementation and the benefit to
them personally of being associated with its introduction. The ongoing success
following implementation means sustained and greater benefit for those involved in the
development. The key to ensuring personal advancement, therefore, is to go with the
'smart bets', the initiatives that have been tested and worked well and still have further
potential. It is the ability to identify these opportunities that separate the politically
astute and successful from the rank and file. This ability was something that the
Corporate Communications Executive believed he possessed and caused his colleagues
to describe him as "an extremely political animal". His position within the business
section of the bank allowed him leverage and his location in Corporate Affairs allowed
him to be involved in high profile projects such as the BigBankTV network. While
BigBankTV does have limited appeal in terms of subject matter (new mortgage
packages and financial regulations), it was an important communications device for the
bank. BigBankTV had a high profile with BigBank directors and provided favourable
access to their ears.
The Corporate Communications Executive had an interest in new technology
because he believed that it could provide eye-catching projects. His interest in this
developing area combined with his position within BigBank made him a useful ally for
anyone with aspirations within the Technology division. A benefit of new technology
came from the access it provided to senior members of the business units allowing
valuable exposure and potential support for new initiatives. This was a benefit which the
Research Group Project Manager saw as important in gaining exposure for new
initiatives in which she was involved within the Technology Department.
Following the success of the Technology Intranet (Praxis), it was decided that
this framework and infrastructure would act as a model for a wider Corporate Intranet.
The proposed Corporate Intranet would act as an 'umbrella system', enveloping all the
isolated Intranets within BigBank (such as the Training and Communications Network
(TCN) system) and providing a standard set of guidelines and procedures. While the
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Praxis system had provided a useful practical example of the benefits an Intranet could
offer within the BigBank framework, a separate business case had to be made for a
Corporate Intranet System. This case would need to provide proven financial motivation
for proceeding with the project, noting and justifying the benefits it would provide. The
ownership of the project and the instigators would be the Corporate Affairs Department
responsible for BigBank communications and as such, managers of the existing
BigBankTV system. The Corporate Communications Executive, with the Research
Group Project Manager's assistance, had recognised the Intranet's success within the
smaller arena of Technology Division and felt that it was a sound bet for a larger
application. Of course larger applications require more money and the BigBank senior
management would need to see evidence that the wider Corporate Intranet justified the
investment.
In building a proposal for a Corporate Intranet, the Communications and
Technology Departments were faced with a number of problems as a Corporate Systems
Research Group project member explained: "Justification for Intranet systems is usually
a soft case and this has to be sold to hard-nosed bankers. The cost benefits of the system
are often long-term and difficult to quantify".
The principal benefits of Intranets are the existence of a central store of
information that saves time when searching for information. Identifying the amount of
time saved and expressing that in financial terms or improved productivity are very
subjective. This was hardly likely to prove convincing to bankers who relate to hard
facts and figures. There was a concern that lack of hard quantifiable justification data
would adversely affect the funding of the project and the priority it would receive.
Consequently, members of the Corporate Affairs Department, principally the Corporate
Communications Executive and the Research Group Project Manager (who had been
seconded from Technology) sought to provide additional features which could more
easily be translated into more tangible financial benefits.
It was at this point that the Corporate Communications Executive's capability for
lateral thinking provided an answer. He had attended a demonstration of the Networked
Multimedia project organised by the Technology Research Group and Edinburgh
University (described in Chapter 5.7) which had combined Web technology with the
broadcasting of BigBankTV programmes over the bank network. The Corporate
Communications Executive contacted members of the Research Group and advised
them that this system was now 'mission critical' without fully explaining the reasons.
124
He, along with others at Corporate Affairs, had decided that an Intranet used by
Technology had the potential to provide benefits to the wider organisation and would be
a system of considerable value. The key issue would be how best to sell it into the
corporate organisation which would be primarily focused on hard financial benefits.
This was where the combination of the Intranet with Multimedia broadcast provided
considerable value. As the Corporate Communications Executive explained:
Original benefits were removing the cost of printing the phone book, calls to switchboard,
directory enquiries calls. With the added combination of training, costs would be saved
regarding costs of transport and accommodation incurred sending people for training plus the
time lost through them being away '(Corporate Affairs Executive).
The shape of future banking activities was to be strongly influenced by the effect upon
the financial community of European integration and the arrival of the Euro. As a result
of these Europe-related activities, BigBank would be required to introduce widespread
staff training, another task for Corporate Affairs, which they were keen to make as cost
effective as possible. But traditional training programmes are an extremely costly
investment given that the company must pay for the instructors, the venues for the
training and the transportation and accommodation for the trainee. In addition, BigBank
loses the services of that employee for the period of the training course. Corporate
Affairs envisioned a way of greatly minimising or in some cases eliminating these costs
and at the same time strengthening the case for the Corporate Intranet.
Distance learning was hardly a new concept although its use had not been
relatively widely adopted. However, the advent of the multimedia age created new
possibilities. As discussed in Chapter 5, these possibilities revolved around the
transmission of multimedia training over the network and this research had proved that
this implementing such a programme was feasible. The Corporate Communications
Executive had seen it combined with web technologies in the trial as well as used
interactively with other sites. If this could be done with the Corporate Intranet, they
could solve two problems simultaneously.
Originally it was suggested to carry everything over the network but due to the
sizable investment that had been made in the BigBankTV network, it was decided to
incorporate this into the new system. By doing so, the system became more cost
effective as well as more politically palatable to the Board.
1 At this point, BigBank was operating under the assumption that the UK would join the Euro in the initial
stage.
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When we first looked at TCN we looked at NetShow Theatre as well as NetMeeting. We
came back to the business and said if you want it in its current state as it was being demoed
at the University then it will probably cost an extra £100,000 with servers and management
etc. The business said "No, we would rather maximise our investment in satellite TV".
Undoubtedly at some point in the future we'll look at putting it all on the network as satellite
time is so expensive (Research Group Project Manager).
With the broad business aims established, a feasibility study of the proposed
solution was still required. The feasibility study itself required a budget to enable it to be
undertaken but given the desired level of interest in the project, this budget was
approved.
7.2 FEASIBILITY STUDY
The feasibility study was initiated to evaluate the system's stated aim which was
detailed as follows:
Corporate Affairs Dept. plan to revolutionise the bank's Training & Communication Strategy
through an exciting business vision known as the Training & Communication Network
(TCN). The TCN comprises three main elements: -
• Interactivity with BigBankTV in branches.
• Access to bank documentation (Intranet) from anywhere.
• CD-based multimedia training in branches and collation of trainee records.
In branches this service will be delivered via one or more (depending on the size of the
branch) PCs. These PCs will be powerful multimedia PCs which run a web browser and have
a 'network' connection (yet to be frilly defined). The TCN will support Intranet access &
interactive training and will provide the hardware, software and network framework for
running and managing of (CD-Based) multimedia training & collecting trainee data via the
web browser. All these facilities will be accessed and managed via the web browser on the
PC (Internal BigBank Report: Business System Overview).
The feasibility study itself had three main deliverables: Estimated project cost,
technological and organisational requirements. Once completed, the results would then
be presented to the BigBank Board for approval. In order to complete the study, a small
team was created.
The Research Group Project Manager recruited a contractor currently employed
by the BigBank and myself to form a team to conduct the feasibility study in the
Technology Department. The use of student input was prudent as it would not require
funding and would also add necessary relevant experience and skills. An added benefit
was that I had worked on the Networked Multimedia project (Section 6) from which the
ideas for the current project were being taken. This team would work on the Training
and Communications Network aspect of the system while work on the Corporate
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Intranet remained within Corporate Affairs who had also recruited staff from the Praxis
project (Chapter 6).
The Contractor had a number of years of commercial experience and had been
employed by the bank for another project which required use of an Intranet system for
stress management. He would provide the technical expertise and also possessed the
personality to act as a team leader when the project was approved.
A major factor accompanying the technical feasibility study was the
organisational feasibility. Within an organisation as large as BigBank it was important
that communication was organised and actions coordinated.
There are three components to any project within the bank, the business and technology
which has two sections IT Services and System Development. SYS Development people
manage the relationship, getting the requirements and designing the system while ITS handle
the infrastructure for that technology. In this project there has been a very open dialogue
between these sections (Research Group Project Manager).
An open dialogue between the sections was initiated at this early stage. The
Research Group Project Manager arranged meetings with the members from the relevant
parties and created a network within the company that would support the project. A
major selling point to those involved was the opportunity to participate in a potentially
high profile project which would advance their individual positions. By securing this
early involvement, the Research Group Project Manager sought to circumvent anyone
raising problematic issues at a later stage and arguing against the project. This 'buy-in'
was crucial. This tactic proved to be successful allowing a community of interest to be
created around the initiative, driving it through the stages of approval.
7.2.1 Technical Requirements
The existing technological environment into which the system would be
integrated included a number of technological constraints restricting the innovation.
These constraints were further underpinned by financial and political considerations.
The technological legacy raised two principal areas of consideration for the project
leaders. Primarily due to the fundamental importance of the content for the system, in
this case the training material itself, it was important to use a medium allowing
uncomplicated migration from the previous system presentation materials to the new
approach. Trainers, up until that point, had worked in a classroom environment
operating lecture style delivery with slides in PowerPoint format. It was possible to use
this medium directly within the evolving system but it was not the most effective format.
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HTML pages were preferable as they allowed a greater degree of flexibility and an
easier load on the network. The team had a better understanding of the possibilities and
constraints created by the different formats through the earlier work performed in the
NMM project. This gave an understanding of the effect of different frame rates and
users' reaction to information delivered in a video format.
Following discussions with the Head Trainer, it was decided that opting for the
PowerPoint medium would be the most pragmatic solution at that point. It was reasoned
that because the new system would be a large 'culture shock' for the present trainers, it
was important to ease their entry into the new system as much as possible. The use of
the already familiar PowerPoint system would assist an easier adjustment as well as
eliminating a need for immediate retraining which would add to forecast cost. This
compromise would also provide the system with immediately usable materials and
facilitate the support of the trainers which was vital.
Method of transmission was an area requiring careful consideration. Existing
technical research had established that it would be possible to use the BigBank Network
to broadcast multimedia loads of the type intended. To pursue this method would,
however, "tread on the toes", as one employee put it, of the system used to broadcast
BigBankTV. The BigBankTV network used a leased, very expensive, satellite link to
broadcast to TV sets in each branch from a studio in the Corporate Headquarters run by
Corporate Affairs. The project had been very costly (in the region of £3 million) and was
widely regarded within BigBank as an 'ego trip' on the part of the Board as it was
technologically short term with no perceivable development advances foreseen.
Corporate Affairs realised if they could use this new project to combine with the
BigBankTV, it would make the proposal especially appealing to the BigBank Board by
making the system appear more cost effective. As a result it was decided that the
BigBankTV network and branch TVs would be used as the medium to broadcast the
training classes using the studio. As with PowerPoint, this caused restrictions on the
TCN system. Originally the team had planned to use the NetShow package to build and
broadcast the multimedia loads which would allow the whole system to be conveniently
packaged within the PC environment as well as allowing for future technical advances.
This proposed solution involving BigBankTV required the incorporation of the TV into
the set up causing the writer to have to monitor two outputs and allowing little scope for
future development. While the system was made technically weaker by this amendment,
the immediate economic justification case for it was conversely made much stronger.
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7.2.2 External Parties
The TCN project team would need to deal with parties external to BigBank in
addition to relevant parties within the organisation in order for the project to succeed.
These external actors, British Telecom and JNM are identified and their roles in the
process discussed as follows:
British Telecom (BT)
The BigBank's relations with BT with respect to this specific project provided
an excellent opportunity to examine the changing role of the Technology Department
and the complicated role it now occupies. BT enjoys a significant relationship with
BigBank due to the latter's size and extensive use of facilities including the leasing of
the satellite link for BigBankTV. This relationship is, as bank employees explained,
"complicated and problematic". The official channel of communication between the
organisations is handled via an officially designated 'Relationship Manager' as is
common practice within BigBank. This position is internally considered to be a very
'hot' position with 'revolving door' characteristics as a number of people have held the
position in recent times only to be dismissed in a short period of time. This is a situation
also experienced by the corresponding role within BT itself. According to the bank the
principal cause of the relationship problems is the size of BT and the inadequacy of the
communication channels within that corporation. As the Research Group Project
Manager explains:
With BT their right hand doesn't know what the left hand is doing, too many people in the
account team not speaking to each other. Our Relationship Manager within the bank was
very much in their pocket. They didn't take time to see where they could add value
(Research Group Project Manager).
The official channels of communication between BigBank and BT are not
always observed which in the case of this project led to very serious conflict of interest
and competition. During the feasibility study stage of the project, interested parties in
BT had become aware of the planned project. The consultancy wing of BT decided it
was a project for which they should tender and approached BigBank. In approaching
BigBank they went directly to the part of the organisation with the money and the
decision making power, by-passing the formal channels and the Technology
Department. BT approached the Corporate Affairs Department and requested a meeting
with the stipulation that no member of the Technology Department should be present.
Adding salt to Technology Department's wound, Corporate Affairs agreed to the
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meeting. Certain members of the Technology Department, while angered, understood
this to be a shrewd political move stating:
We've only got the Corporate Communications Executive's word that they didn't want
anyone from Technology at that meeting. This gives Corporate Affairs other options and
more leverage. He's a very political animal and likes to keep his cards close to his chest
(Employee, Technology Division).
By agreeing to the meeting, the Corporate Affairs Department underlined their
position of strength reminding the Technology Department that they were not the
guaranteed provider and would be required to tender along with the potential external
providers. Ironically, Technology Department felt that they were actually disadvantaged
in this situation by being part of the same organisation as the Business section had a high
level ofvisibility of their constraints, structure and resources.
These other companies can come in and claim this, that and the next thing about their skills
and resources and no one will be any the wiser. They could say we've got this many
developers. We've got experience with this in order to get the contract. Then once they've
got it, they go out and recruit the people. They'll probably recruit contractors we have at the
bank that we would have used on the project. Corporate Affairs know about our resources
and that we don't have those skills so we couldn't bluff in the same way (Research Group
Project Manager).
The TCN team also felt the Technology Department's structure and limited
research activity disadvantaged them.
Some of these groups already have developers with them waiting for projects or working on
similar areas so they can react faster to the initial order. For me I have to go out draw up a
budget, have it approved, get the resources, find suitable contractors and recruit them. It can
take me three to six weeks just to get the resources together (Research Group Project
Manager).
In order to counteract this perceived disadvantage, the TCN team attempted to play to
their strengths and enlist allies. Their strategy consisted of two key tactics. The Research
Group Project Manager would attempt to utilise her close relations with the Corporate
Communications Executive, contacting him prior to the BT meeting and attempting to
second guess their pitch by advising him on what they would say in the hope of
discrediting their claims and appear more knowledgeable in the process.
At the same time TCN project team would use their inside knowledge of the
project so far and press on with its development in order to make it more time
consuming to bring in someone else who would need to retrace the progress made. A
key element in this would be enlisting the JNM group whose technology Corporate
Affairs were keen to use within the system. While the TCN feasibility team agreed
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internally that the system would be more successfully developed in-house without
JNM's involvement, it was also acknowledged that to use them might prove beneficial
both for the image of the project and politically.
JNM
JNM were one of the key suppliers for the TCN project although their
contribution was probably more political than technical. JNM are a small software
house based in the south of England. Their principal product was a presentation system
that had the capability to register and poll responses followed by an immediate graphical
representation of the results. This system had been widely used at various conferences
throughout the UK and they were reputedly the leaders in this field. Some Technology
Department staff noted that there was no apparent competition in this field and this must
reflect on the significance of their claim. It was through their conference work that they
had come into contact with representatives from Corporate Affairs who were impressed
by the slick graphical representations and interactivity. When Corporate Affairs decided
to use the Intranet for training, they identified JNM's offering as an avenue well worth
incorporating.
As the team to conduct the feasibility study was assembled, a meeting was
arranged with representatives from JNM and BigBank to discuss their possible
involvement and provide a demonstration of the JNM system. Attending from BigBank
were the Corporate Communications Executive, representatives from the TCN project
team and the Learning Technologies Manager. The JNM representation consisted of
their Technical Director and Managing Director who had recently returned from the
United States. The MD advised us that they had prospective sales valuing £4M in the US
as the distance learning market was large and growing rapidly. Through this lens, he was
keen to demonstrate the scalability of their product. BigBank, he explained, would be an
ideal project for them. At this stage of the meeting, it became apparent that JNM were
not quite as accomplished as the Technology staff had been led to believe.
JNM began by explaining their company structure and how their system
operated. They possessed a small technical team of three people, one of whom was
almost wholly responsible for coding the entire system. As the TCN Project Lead
Programmer would explain later, this raised immediate concerns. JNM being reliant on
that one person to provide effective technical support for the system was a significant
risk. If that person were to leave JNM, an extremely likely possibility due to the market
for IT contractors and the money involved, BigBank would be left with a system that
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they did not know how to operate, leaving the bank without any support for a system in a
£3M project.
JNM moved on to discuss the technical operation in which they further displayed
naivety over the prevailing technical environments within corporate computing. This
was primarily a problem within the operation of the database that managed responses.
JNM had constructed this database using Microsoft Access which was adequate in an
isolated conference capacity in which it had been used but not within a corporate
situation. Oracle databases had long been considered as the standard and BigBank
utilised Oracle for corporate solutions as did most other large corporations. An Access
database would not suffice for the volume throughput and operational dependability
required and thus would need to be reengineered into Oracle. It was questioned whether
JNM would have the skills and expertise to successfully complete this redesign.
The Learning Technologies Manager present identified the use of PowerPoint
slides to deliver the system information as an advantage as this was the standard format
used in the training packages within the bank at present. PowerPoint presentations were
consistent with present classroom training where slides delivered the information and
questions were posed by the trainer.
The JNM system was reliant upon session attendees' use of specifically designed
handsets constructed by JNM. These units would provide the responses for the Access
database. Selling these handsets was the key profit source for JNM, a fact which again
exposed their naivety of large organisations. The central PowerPoint and Access
information display and collation were sold as a loss leader by JNM to entice customers
to purchase the system. In order to use the system, JNM believed that the company
would then have to purchase a handset for each user and as such these were priced at a
premium. BigBank felt this approach was flawed for their organisation. Technologically
and financially the widespread adoption of the handset would be an unwise move.
The use of the handset would 'lock them into' the use of JNM technology
complicating any future developments as it would be a technological dead-end. In
addition, the handsets would require limiting the range of responses of users thus
negatively impacting the effectiveness of the training. Financially, it would prove
disproportionately expensive to purchase these handsets given the hundreds of sites that
would need to be included. This handsets requirement would seriously affect the budget
of the project which at that stage was an important consideration as it still needed to
gain approval. In addition, BigBank were only really interested in the central system and
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the handsets were, therefore, extraneous. The central system would also require
adjustment in order to comply with the existing system within BigBank. On balance, the
TCN project team believed that developers within the bank could replicate the system
being offered by JNM. This internally developed approach would also allow for a better
support situation than that offered by JNM.
Yet, technical considerations had to be balanced with the political situation and
Corporate Affairs were keen to involve JNM. By involving them, they could present a
pre-existing, in-use system that could be visually demonstrated. Relative to suggesting
the alternative of building a custom system, the JNM solution would garnish more
confidence of project delivery by the decision makers. The TCN project team's
reservations to JNM were further reduced as their desire to take the overall project on
themselves was increasing. This increasing desire was heightened by BT's threatened
involvement in the project as detailed previously causing the TCN team to adjust their
strategy. The TCN team took measures to enlist JNM and strengthen their political
situation in relation to the project whilst recognising that JNM were actually gaining
more from the arrangement. This much was admitted later by the project leader:
I think we could have done it all ourselves. We did more for them than they did for us.
We've changed their whole strategy. They now have a full web strategy which they never
would have had without our involvement (TCN Project Leader).
The JNM team did benefit from their involvement with BigBank but their
application was reasonably robust to begin with. This was demonstrated during the
technical meeting in which the Training Technologies Manager drilled the team with
various scenarios and how the system would deal with them. These got progressively
harder with the Training Technologies Manager stopping short of how the site would
deal with nuclear attack.
While the JNM group gained technically from working with BigBank, the TCN
project team gained credibility from working with a group that the corporate body
viewed as having domain expertise. By aligning JNM with them, the TCN project team
were able to fend off the challenge from BT. Firstly it created a perceptually stronger
solution but was also done to demonstrate that greater progress was already underway.
While BT was still explaining to the Corporate Communications group what they could
do, the TCN project team was working onsite with JNM moving along the project
roadmap, a fact the Research Group Project Manager communicated to the Corporate
Communications Executive. In light of the enhanced solution and progress made the
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TCN project team / JNM coalition was a more attractive option for the Corporate
sponsors and BT's offer was declined.
7.2.3 Internal Parties
Learning Technologies Department
The Learning Technologies Department was an anomaly within the bank's
organisational structure. At the time that Learning Technologies was established, the
Technology Department had neither capability in producing training materials nor in
Web technologies. Learning Technologies being chartered with producing Multimedia
CDs, was, therefore, a stopgap solution and given the disparate skill sets, grew
autonomously from the Technology Department.
Learning Technologies Department's primary purpose was to produce and
distribute multimedia training CDs which would be operated on stand-alone client
workstations in the branches. At this point, the capability to perform this function did
not exist within the Technology Department and a respected individual within the
multimedia training industry was brought in to head up the newly formed section.
Learning Technologies Department was located within the Human Resources section of
the bank but carried out a technology function without any formal links to the
Technology Department. Links with Technology were deemed unnecessary since the
Technology Department had no dealings or expertise in the area as Web technologies
had still not been explored at that stage. This lack of contact did, however, mean that
both sections developed along technologically different avenues or as one Technology
Division representative explained: "A lot of the stuff they've done is incompatible with
our infrastructure. At the time that didn't matter as a lot of what they did was stand¬
alone which we didn't look after so it worked quite well".
As multimedia technology moved towards networked systems incorporating web
technologies capable of interactive training, it was inevitable that the interests of these
sections would overlap and conflict. Forewarnings of this situation had occurred during
research into Networked Multimedia carried out by the Research Group, results of
which had fed into the TCN project. This work, discussed in Chapter 5, indicated the
overlap in interests and conflict in standards. As noted by a member of the Technology
Division staff:
Now its gone into enterprise level corporate networked computing and what we've seen is
the stuff they've done. The standards they are using are inappropriate plus they've had to
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make the shift from multimedia CD-ROMs to web development which takes away their
uniqueness (Technology Department StaffMember).
With technological advancement and the convergence of these hitherto separate media,
a situation was created in which a conflict arose between the two sections. This conflict
resolution would have a profound effect upon the development of the TCN system
which required the collaboration of both Human Resources and Technology
Departments. A key factor in the resolution of this situation was the appointment of a
new Head of Training within Human Resources. Keen to make his mark in the
organisation, the Head of Training saw the TCN project as a fast and effective way of
making an impact.
The Corporate Communications Executive and Research Group Project Manager
quickly allied themselves with the Head of Training and achieved his 'buy-in' to their
ideas for the project. This provided them with the lead role for the development of the
project, a point not lost on the key people within Learning Technologies who could
foresee the dissolution of their section. The Research Group NMM Project Manager
commented "Their head has left and their head techie is leaving so the department will
cease to exist with the technical skills catered for by Technology providing standards
and framework". This marked the end for the Learning Technologies Department with
its functions being relocated to other sections, as the Research Group Project Manager
noted: "Learning Technologies has been decimated into near non-existence". This
occurred over an 18 month period.
This result surprised no-one as the Learning Technologies Department's
'fiefdom' of knowledge had been usurped. Their members continued to work on the
project and provided guidance on the look and feel aspects of the system which
remained relevant and were not catered for by the Technology Department.
Trainers
Due to the importance of content within the TCN, the involvement of the
Trainers was vital. In organisational terms, the Trainers were located within the Human
Resource section as was the Learning Technologies Department. As the project gained
approval the Trainers were consulted to provide a more direct input into the system. It
was also important to allay their fears on the effect that it would have on their jobs.
At first they were a bit frightened and didn't understand it. You're moving people who
having spent 20 years of their working lives teaching to people in classrooms then throwing
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all this technology at them and saying this is how we want you to do it now (Research Group
Project Manager).
The TCN project team would need to involve the Learning Technologies
Department as they were the owners of the existing training content and had expertise in
designing learning systems in other technologies. In order to enlist the Learning
Technologies Department full support, the TCN project team sought to involve them in
the process and design but also needed to moderate this process. In order to achieve this
they created close working ties with a Senior Trainer who acted as the chief point of
contact and managed communication between the two groups.
Some of them were a bit scared at first but we had the Senior Trainer who was the Queen
Bee. She would get suggestions from the other trainers then discuss them with us. Then she
would go back, let them know what was feasible and the possibilities and so on. It worked
very well (Research Group Project Manager).
This approach was used for the essential functionality of the system and the TCN project
team viewed this as effective.
The other important aspect of the system was the Graphic User Interface which
did not require the same degree of technological rigour to design. The Research Group
Project Manager decided that a number of benefits would be gained from distributing
this work to other sections of BigBank, principally Human Resource Trainers and
Learning Technologies Department. Doing so would ease the burden on her limited
resources as well as increasing others' involvement especially in an area heavily
influenced by the views of these groups. It also shifted responsibility for the visual
interface which is often the first feature people notice.
We said "Look we're just technologists. We can make it work and you just design the
screens. Tell us what you want it to look like. Paint the picture and we can do it". We backed
off doing any Took and feel' we're not the experts in that (Research Group Project
Manager).
This appealed to the Trainers and especially Learning Technologies who had been very
threatened by the project as discussed previously. The Learning Technologies Chief
Technical Expert carried out the work.
The Learning Technologies Chief Technical Expert did the screen designs based on what the
Senior Trainer had advised, who was representing a whole bunch of trainers, and the Chief
Technical Expert has a good eye for usability anyway as that's his key skill (Research Group
Project Manager).
The high level of co-operation of the trainers for the project was beneficially
affected by the appointment of the new Head of Training in a departmental restructuring
as the Research Group Project Manager explained:
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There was a big shift around and a Head ofUK Training appointed. He brought the whole
training function together. It was useful for him to have a big project to get involved with as
he entered the bank (Research Group Project Manager).
The alliances formed by the TCN project team with the Training Department also
provided 'drivers' for further work.
When Training became involved, it became clear that they felt that: 'Well this is really, really
good but maybe we should have placed this investment into a learning management system
instead of the virtual classroom' which is why we have the budget to go away and do a
learning management system (Research Group Project Manager).
7.3 PROJECT APPROVAL
Officially gaining project approval involved a feasibility study that would
demonstrate the financial viability of the project through quantifiable facts and figures
as well as technical feasibility. The formalities of the official approval process were
satisfactorily negotiated. However, in achieving this formal or final project approval,
other informal communications of information tactics were adopted. As with any
organisation, interpersonal relations and politics form a central dynamic for the
company. The Technology Department had neglected this aspect in the past when
presenting projects, but on this occasion the Research Group Project Manager's
relationships with other colleagues in Corporate Affairs, in particular with a Senior
Corporate Affairs Executive, would prove a deciding factor:
I was lucky because I had business customers who are world class spin doctors and PR
experts. A Senior Corporate Affairs Executive came to me and said 'You guys in technology
you've got some really good ideas and everything but you're really, really shit at presenting
them. You get all your facts and figures perfect and you can reel them off. But you can't rely
on the facts speaking for themselves because you've really got to get round all these people
and go out and sell it' (Research Group Project Manager).
This approach of informal communication of the idea to key people would prove
to be the key factor in gaining project approval. The process of 'selling' the idea was to
be far more than merely chatting to the executives:
For instance to sell the idea to the Chief Executive, the Senior Corporate Affairs Executive
produced a video and before it went to the Board, he went round them all and spin doctored
them so we had no surprises. We knew who would say what and this is the standard way of
doing things (Research Group Project Manager).
This approach was also aided by the multimedia nature of the project that the
Senior Corporate Affairs Executive was presenting which carried an additional edge.
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Multimedia's sexy. It's like BigBankTV; a lot of people on the board were into BigBankTV
because they could be broadcasting and seen on TV in the branches. These guys up there are
guys with big egos and this sort of thing appeals to them (Research Group Project Manager).
The visual nature of multimedia combined with its currency within the business
community would obviously benefit the project. Utilising these aspects in promotion of
the project was something that the Technology Department had neglected. Corporate
Affairs realised that it was a headline-grabbing project and presented it accordingly with
an approach that appeared to work. Prior to the BigBank Board meeting at which the
TCN project was to be submitted for approval, the team was advised by the Chief
Executive that the project would be "rubber stamped at the meeting". This assurance
was reinforced when the Chief Executive also announced in the Press that the BigBank
would create "multimedia virtual classrooms in every branch by 1999". This served to
underline the weight of informal political activity behind gaining project approval. As
can be seen, the level of that activity had been extensive as the Research Group Project
Manager admitted, "The amount of shenanigans that went on to get this project off the
ground doesn't bear thinking about."
Despite the importance of the informal activity, the formal process is admittedly
the seal of approval and, as had been promised, the project was approved at the BigBank
Board meeting with an appropriate budget allocated. Had the official feasibility study
not been performed, no amount of politicking would have made this possible. From this
approval base, however, the Corporate Affairs Department could create a lot of noise.
In terms of press and coverage that this project got they handled all that. That's what they do
for a living. As a Technology Department we could actually learn a lot from how they do that
(Research Group Project Manager).
While this PR and 'noise' about the project was good, it still had to get done
which would require resources or a high profile concept could quickly become a high
profile failure.
7.4 RESOURCE RECRUITMENT
With the project approved and budgets in place, the next important task at hand
was to gather the resources to perform the work. The biggest task that the TCN project
team faced was gathering the skill base necessary to perform the work. As a result of the
multimedia/web technology nature of the project the BigBank's Technology Department
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was not best equipped to provide those skills as this type of work was still relatively
virgin territory.
We're gradually skilling up. These skills are in such demand. There's always the temptation
to go to 3rd party providers but I feel morally we have to keep as much of the work in house
because if we don't start skilling up our people in these technologies we're going to be
stuffed! (Research Group Project Manager).
Admittedly a prime motivation for this 'moral duty' was the Research Group
Project Manager's ownership of the project and her desire to establish the section
permanently as an 'Intranet Centre of Excellence'. As a result of the lack of these skills
within BigBank and the increasing importance of these technologies, this would be a
powerful position to hold. At the outset of this project the idea of this department was no
more than a pipe dream and the TCN project team had to deal with the reality of the
corporate environment which functioned along established channels and routines which
for the TCN project team didn't exist. As a result of this they had to create new channels
and sometimes cross-over existing conventions.
We've ridden roughshod over the organisational side where we think its right. We've ridden
roughshod over what you are supposed to do when kicking off the TCN project. It was all
out of approved budget, similarly for the learning management system. Somebody had some
money but it wasn't part of the approved Technology budget so we rode roughshod over
that with the blessing of the accountants it has to be said. We've talked to people that we're
not supposed to because you know we're meant to develop in these stovepipes and not talk
to each other or share information. We've just gone out and talked to people and done things
that have never been done before. Having said that we've done a lot of the stuff by the book.
Within the Technology Department a lot of the System Development managers have a very
awkward relationship with IT Services. They just concentrate on getting the project done
then leave IT services to clean up the mess. That is why Systems Development gets a bad
reputation and relationships become really strained. We did the opposite, we got the IT
Services guys in right at the beginning and asked 'what do you need?' So in some ways
we've done things by the book and in others we've ridden roughshod over it and we've just
followed our instincts on that. If we'd done everything by the book without any innovation
we'd never have got it done and we'd never have got ourselves established as a department
(Research Group Project Manager).
This view illustrates the conflicts between maintaining an organised structure
and facilitating innovation and change. As is evident, innovators within the company
feel that the formal organisation prevents innovation and in order to create change and
deliver new technologies, the informal structure and social networks must be created
and utilised.
We've had no choice but to operate the work we've done on a very tight shoestring because
we have to prove the case that web development is cheap so we can't say 'oh we need 30
developers'. It has been quite painful but we've done it. We've also proved that unless you
have a wider resource pool, you can't be as responsive as a 3rd party supplier like Sidalien
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where you can go to them with a bit ofwork and they do it for next week. I can't do that and
have to say 'Give me the budget'. That means I can go out and recruit someone and I'll have
them in four to six weeks which is crap but it's part of establishing a new department and we
felt the pain of that this year (Research Group Project Manager).
7.5 PROJECT DEVELOPMENT
With the project approved, the Research Group Project Manager and the
Corporate Communications Executive had to procure the resources necessary to carry
out the work, obtain equipment and co-ordinate the system development with other
relevant departments. This process would be complicated by the fact that it required a
new section which did not possess defined methods of operation, communication or
relations to the other departments whose responsibilities would overlap with those of the
new section. This new section had to manage the often unpredictable process of
innovation of a system which was unproven while coordinating with the other
departments who had concerns with fixing time windows.
7.5.1 Technical Issues
As with the development and implementation of any technical project, there are
inevitably difficulties. The principal difficulty for this project was the proprietary-
product families of computer technology. Products tend to be isolated and are often
unwilling or unable to communicate with other applications. Microsoft applications are
designed to speak to other Microsoft applications as with Java or C++ applications. This
makes the introduction of new ideas difficult and means decisions are often based on
what is technically easiest to implement not what is the best solution. This is a judgment
made by the technical experts who understand how compatible each package is with
others. With the TCN system, these compatibility considerations existed at almost every
level. Firstly the development of the product itself consists of the integration of
divergent technologies with the Intranet, TV, network, etc. This product must then
communicate with the other company systems. The principal need to communicate with
other systems was the need to receive and send information ranging over different
databases.
The two key data sources contrasted markedly from the modern system of
Peoplesoft to the archaic banking mainframe systems. Peoplesoft was the new database
system employed by the Human Resources Department which catalogued employee
details including salary, skills, employment history, etc. The Human Resources
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Department wanted the TCN project team to integrate with this system to allow them to
keep track of and update the courses that the employees were taking on the system.
The involvement of JNM in the development introduced an additional database
due the fact that the system was based on an Access database. Access is only capable of
handling small databases and is not scaleable upwards for larger enterprises. For this
reason it is not used in large companies like BigBank where Oracle is the accepted
standard. To further complicate matters, the Access database structure and language is
incompatible with that of Oracle thus requiring extensive re-engineering to adapt.
BigBank was also concerned about using a company with JNM's limited
resources. Their engineering team consisted of three people. Being a small company
these developers would undoubtedly be on limited wages. With the vibrancy in the IT
employment market it was possible that these developers would get poached leaving
JNM, and BigBank, without the people who had developed the system. Even if they
remained, it would be impossible for them to provide the standard 24 hours-7 day level
of support that BigBank would expect.
Even if the technologies within the system fitted together and lines of
communication could be established with other bank systems, BigBank had to be sure
that these conversions would not be detrimental to the existing BigBank technologies. In
order to avoid the introduction of any detrimental changes, a number of testing
procedures had been put in place. The chief test was the Product Acceptance for Web
Applications by Web Services. This testing was designed to ensure that a new web
system would not adversely affect existing bank technological infrastructure.
Acceptance could prove to be a lengthy process: time would need to be figured into the
project plan otherwise the whole schedule of the project could potentially be
unexpectedly elongated. The other important test was the contemporary bogey monster
of the IT world 'The Y2K bug'. All technology within BigBank, old or new, had to be
tested for Y2K compliance and this testing would also need to be applied to 3rd party
components used such as JNM's system.
Security considerations, not surprisingly, are an all permeating concern within
BigBank and were naturally an issue for the TCN network. The nature of the
information to be held within the system related to employees so the Human Resources
team was keen to make sure this was only available to authorised parties. As a result of
the internal nature of the network, the system would benefit from the firewalls and
external protection procedures which the overall network offered. The TCN project
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team first needed to establish what information was to be regarded as sensitive and what
could be openly available to all bank employees. This information would be organised
into secured and unsecured access areas. The regulations applicable also needed to take
into account the location of the client. In this case the access privileges for a client based
in Head Office would be different from one located in a branch.
The TCN project team agreed that NT authentication would be the best way to
maintain security through linked authentication to the server which was accepted as best
practice within the industry. In order to prevent system problems being caused by the
users it was decided that the browser should be 'dumbed down'. This required certain
functionality being removed that could possibly cause problems if the user altered the
data accidentally or intentionally. It also removed functions which where extraneous to
the operation of the TCN. This 'dumbing down' and functional alteration was also
necessary for Microsoft NetMeeting as it was only to be used 'nested within' the
browser window, therefore, limited interaction was necessary.
To amend this functionality, a contractor was brought in from one of the
BigBank recognised Microsoft Solution providers2. While the contractor was able to
amend the Internet Explorer version4 browser, the functionality of NetMeeting affected
the whole system impinging on all the development work. As a result the TCN project
team, ideally, required assistance from the Microsoft software providers and a dialogue
with their designers. With most software developers, this model would be appropriate
for the relationship with the provider allowing mentoring for the client regarding any
product alterations and amendments. The BigBank relationship with Microsoft followed
a different model.
Microsoft has a very different relationship model from other technology suppliers. The likes
of Digital, IBM or BT have massive account teams that support us and they'll be people in
selling to us, showing us things and we spend millions and millions with them. We only spend
a couple of million with Microsoft but it is very, very different in that they don't have a
massive account team. They sell us software and the nature of the relationship with the
organisation tends to be based on support. I suppose they pile it high and sell it cheap and
you pay for all the extras with IBM. It is all included in the bill at the end of the year. So
Microsoft had very little direct dialogue with us and they only started getting involved when
we started putting support calls in because some bits of Microsoft product weren't working
(Research Group NMM Project Manager).
This quote indicates that the relationship with Microsoft was constructed around
fault handling in that when something broke they were asked how to fix it. This
2 This represented companies whose consultants met a required level of capability in using Microsoft
applications.
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relationship was handled by a central department which handled their support issues.
The communication was prioritised according to the severity of the problem. This
relationship was completely inappropriate to that required by the TCN project team as
they were involved in development issues which centred, not so much around the
product not working but about how to re-engineer the system to work in a different way.
In addition, their problems did not directly affect BigBank operations and as a
consequence had a low priority within the Technology Department's software support
group's framework.
The TCN team decided to use their relation with the Microsoft Solution Provider
(MSP) from whom the contractor had come. Via the MSP they would refer issues to
Microsoft although they did relate any contact to DIM in order to 'Keep DIM in the
loop'.
7.5.2 Organisational Issues
Diagram 7.1: TCN Project Organisation Overview
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Within a highly structured corporate bureaucracy such as BigBank, it can be
difficult to operate ad hoc project teams as they do not possess established lines of
communication and resource. However, this less structured circumstance is often what
enables these teams to work at a faster rate as their relations to other sections have not
had the time to fossilise into red tape. It was this free rein that the Research Group
Project Manager thrived on as she was used to operating in that way and had survived
within the corporate jungle by exploiting this types of situation. Unfortunately, when
this balancing act fails there is often no structural safety net support.
The Research Group Project Manager had an inkling of this and her
organisationally nomadic existence was in part due to her aim to establish an
organisational home that she felt fitted her aims. The TCN project was supposed to be
the genesis for such a position. Early on during the project, the Research Group Project
Manager began to move to evolve this project team into a department which would
serve as an 'Intranet Centre of Excellence'. This was not a surprising move by someone
who had acted as a technology champion for a number of innovations that had served as
a useful vehicle to enhance her role within the organisation. With the Intranet expansion
to a corporate wide level, this department would possess extensive influence that would
allow the Research Group Project Manager to broaden her scope beyond the Technology
Division.
Despite this longer-term ambition, the TCN project team still had to contend
with the difficulty of operating to tight time scales while relating to other departments
without the existence of formal lines of communication. This caused difficulty in
obtaining resources and also integrating developments into the technological
architecture via testing.
As with the integration of the technology into the organisation, the
responsibilities of the section had to be integrated as well. This at times meant a degree
of territorial competition with existing sections that handled areas affected by the TCN
project. This was evident at the inception of the project development when the team was
drawing existing resources away from departments that they were attached to at the
time. An example of this was the enlistment of one of the ASP (Active Server Pages, a
programming language) experts to the project who had been attached to the Praxis
Intranet team and was, in fact, still required by that team.
While attending to the problems with internal competitors, the team also had to
establish and maintain relationships with internal customers as well. These internal
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customers would be the Retail Banking division as well as Human Resources who were
responsible for overall training requirements.
Some of the work within the project was beyond the scope of the TCN project
team so they had to contract to external suppliers, such as JNM. In dealing with these
external parties, the TCN project had to consider a number of issues. The primary
difficulty was in defining the exact requirements to the suppliers as these had not only to
include the actual technicalities of the system but also the need to integrate with the
developments of other sections. If this was not accurately scoped and alterations in the
technical design were required at a later stage then this would cause the contract to be
renegotiated. If the external party supplied their work according to revised requirements
without contract alterations, they would be technically in breach of contract. Of course,
this presented another problem because the supplier could choose not to renegotiate and
simply work to the initial contract, delivering to the original specification and providing
a useless item but still requesting payment.
Relations with other suppliers were further complicated by the potential threat
the project posed to their business. This was the case with Studio Videos. Studio Videos
supplied the studio that was used for the broadcast of BigBankTV and would have to be
utilised for the work on the TCN. The studio, as a result, would need to be altered
considerably to allow the technology used for the network. This alteration threatened
Studio Videos' existing business so in order to ensure their successful co-operation, the
TCN project team would require considerable diplomacy and political acumen. Of
particular benefit was the Research Group Project Manager's links with the Corporate
Affairs Department who were Studio Videos' sponsors within the bank. Corporate
Affairs Department's support for the TCN project provided considerable leverage to
obtain Studio Videos' assistance. One complication was that Studio Videos were not
actually very good at their job as had become apparent during the NMM project. When
tapes of their broadcasts had been analysed, it was apparent that there were technical
weaknesses in their production techniques. The TCN project team would have to work
round these deficiencies while retaining Studio Videos' support.
7.5.3 Internal Suppliers / Contributors
Issues of physical location and logistics had to be addressed in addition to the
technological requirements. The TCN project team had to liaise with the Property
Department in order to deal with these aspects. One of the Property Department's
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principal tasks would be locating the TVs and PCs within the branches and this proved
to be a considerable stumbling block. The original placement of the TVs within the
branches had filled an entirely different role. The TV was located to allow the whole of
the staff to view broadcasts on BigBankTV whereas the TCN learning purpose required
a more isolated setting in order to aid the learning process. This would mean moving the
TV with fittings and connections to a position that facilitated this wider viewing but,
also, had space suitable for the PC to be located. The property section surveyed the
locations and established that this would first be very costly and secondly, physically
impossible in some locations.
This is a good example of the physical factors affecting innovation. The TCN
project team realised as a consequence of this situation that they would have to explore
alternative solutions to placing a TV and PC together. The Property Department had
been able to locate positions for the PCs so the TCN team returned to the aim of
incorporating the TV image within the PC. A number of routes to achieve this were
identified:
> TV tuner card: This would feed the signal into the PC to be displayed on the terminal.
> BT system delivering images via networks using new technology by Future Software.
This was unproven.
> Fantastic Corp. identified by the Research Group, operated on the European continent
and had previously performed this type of function although they were unknown in
the UK. Their system involved the same concept as the BT system solution by
broadcasting the images via the network.
The latter two suggestions were rejected. The BT system was deemed unsuitable
because it was based on a system which was unproven and the TCN project team did not
wish to take a risk on unproven technology at that stage during the development cycle.
While Fantastic Corp. had proven their concept on the continent they were still
new to the UK. BigBank was, therefore, unsure as to the level of support that they would
receive from the organisation. In addition, some internal politics were motivating this
decision. The suggestion of using Fantastic Corporation had been put forward by the
Research Group after the Research Group Project Manager had left in order to pursue
her own projects. There was some animosity between the former Research Group
Project Manager and the members remaining within the section so she was not keen to
rely on them in any way for this project.
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This left the first option of using the TV tuner card that relied on technology
which was not as forward looking as the other options on the table. It was, however,
proven and did not require direct integration with the system. The card could also be
installed by the BigBank's IT section without having to rely upon 3rd party expertise.
As discussed previously, the TCN project team faced a number of problems
getting the necessary resources and personnel. A number of the team members had been
drawn from other projects which were still running concurrently to the TCN project.
These projects still required the input of the scarce resources from the TCN project and
this impacted upon their time spent on this project. This caused complications in
planning of the project. A major complication arose due to the Technical Team Leader
leaving to get married followed by a six-month honeymoon. The Technical Team Leader
had proved central to the project, having been involved from the inception, during the
feasibility study and then taking a role within the project planning and guiding the other
developers through the project. The date of his wedding and the proposed honeymoon
had been planned prior to his involvement in the project and as the Technical Team
Leader put it, "I'm disappointed that just as the project is beginning to get interesting I
have to leave but, of course, I am delighted to go travelling and get married".
This factor of losing a key person with scarce skills had not been effectively built
into the project. Although there was an Assistant Project Manager, he did not possess
enough expertise to allow smooth development.
The Contract Web Developer who had been drawn from the Intranet team was
viewed as the 'guru' within the bank regarding ASP which was an important element of
the Intranet. He was still involved in the development of a room-booking system for the
Technology Intranet. The Research Group Project Manager had to exert some political
influence to draw the Contract Web Developer into the project and had therefore needed
to provide assurances that his role in the previous project would be completed.
Unfortunately, the milestones of the Praxis project (Chapter 6) often clashed with those
of the TCN project causing conflicts. The Contract Web Developer was the key
developer in the room-booking project and was also essential within the TCN Project
Team. This created a number of issues between the two teams regarding the allocation
of his time to each project.
A number of the other developers operated on a contract basis and this caused a
number of problems. Contract workers tend to have less loyalty to the end result of the
project as they will shift onto another project upon assignment completion and will not
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be responsible for the ongoing support. As a result, the quality of documentation was not
strictly maintained. Within the TCN project this was certainly the case. Another
difficulty was that the contract periods for the contractors were not extended for
budgetary considerations. Subsequently they would leave for new projects before the
culmination of the project so when problems occurred, the person who had worked on
the section was no longer available and there was little documentation to explain how
the work had been performed.
The development of the system was obviously crucial but it would be of little
use if the equipment was not in place within the branches. In order to ensure the correct
implementation of the infrastructure, the system rollout had to be handled well. This
area thankfully held little mystery to the BigBank Technology Section as they had a
Rollout team that performed this function on a regular basis. The TCN project team
would be able to hand that function straight over to this team thus 'giving them one less
thing to think about'. The Rollout team had to concern themselves with organising the
branch implementations around other upgrades or rollouts and this was achieved
through scheduling which prevented clashes and minimal disruption to branch
operations. The ITS Manager responsible for this work was brought in at a very early
stage to allow the early planning for this event.
It also gave the ITS Manager an understanding of the project enabling him to
flag up the need to develop instructions regarding the installation of the system. These
instructions would be needed by the engineers to perform the work but also training
would be needed for the system users.
7.6 IMPLEMENTATION
In order to achieve this training aim, the Research Group Project Manager drew
upon her experience in the previous project with the Praxis Intranet. In that project, they
had designated an individual from each section to act as a Content Co-ordinator who
would educate the members of their individual section about the system. It was decided
to use a similar approach by appointing a similar individual within each branch who
would be trained in its use and then pass that information on to others within the
organisation.
These individuals would also be involved in the initial testing of the system. The
initial training on system use would be provided during the testing of the system's
robustness and capabilities. This achieved two aims of both testing the system under
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realistic conditions as well as providing training for the staff. The project timelines
would also benefit from this planned overlap.
The learning experience provided by the TCN project would be affected by the
look and feel of the site and this would strongly influence the usability. This had to fit in
with the prescribed look and feel for the overall Corporate Intranet known as Orbit. The
Orbit system had evolved from the Praxis system with more thought and planning
having been given towards corporate image considerations.
We worked hard to get Corporate Affairs to take overall responsibility for devolved
publishing. The infrastructure became more productionised. Praxis got revised and re-
revised. Everyone worked hard to make things better. We got more standards applied and
developed on the back of TCN because we got some money for Intranet applications and for
really pulling together a Corporate Intranet. On the back of the TCN project we launched
Orbit. I think it is a classic evolution of an Intranet. The difference is we've always done ours
within a shared infrastructure. I think a lot of Intranets evolve as servers under people's
desks and in various rooms and are then linked together in a web cell. Whereas we've always
had it as an ever growing web farm (Research Group Project Manager).
7.6.1 Testing
First impressions are always a key factor in users' assessment of a new system.
Accordingly, the testing for the TCN system graduated through a number of different
venues in order to minimise operational difficulties in implementation. Firstly the
testing was performed on a test set-up within the Technology division. This simulation
was then exported to the test branch that was located in another area of the city. This
was a model of a fully functional bank branch and was used to test all branch additions
prior to rollout. The rollout would then take place in six selected branches prior to the
final rollout to all branches. 'Piggybacking' on the experience of another rollout for the
'new branch' benefited this rollout as the Research Group Project Manager commented
"New Branch innovated that and we just bolted onto that because there was a lot we
could learn from them".
The new branch team handled the main work within the rollout and as the
Research Group Project Manager admitted "They did our rollout for us". As with any
testing phase a number of bugs were uncovered.
There were a lot of stability problems in the early part of the pilot with the audio. It was a
real baptism of fire but we managed to get two weeks from somewhere without losing too
much face which allowed us to do about 20 enhancements to the software (Research Group
Project Manager).
It was important to fix these problems and develop high availability for the system.
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We've established all the business procedures and the technical recovery procedures. If
anything falls over we can recover very quickly and invisibly to the user. At the moment
someone is monitoring each broadcast and logging what happens and how to recover from
any problems (Research Group Project Manager).
7.6.2 Rollout
With the stability, recovery and monitoring refinements just discussed in place, it
was possible to roll the solution out over the entire branch network. One of the
difficulties with any project is deciding when it is complete. Uncontrolled testing phases
can give rise to new suggestions and pieces of work that go beyond the intended scope
of the project. The Research Group Project Manager was well aware of this potential
problem and commented
The problem with updating is that you end up in this dynamic updating cycle that is ok for
maintenance which can be done as you go along. We need to bundle a number of key
enhancements and turn that into a project so we can formally agree a scope, requirements
and deadline, but that applies to any technology (Research Group Project Manager).
With this possibility recognised, some situations also required that some problematic
sections of the original scope be eliminated in order for the system to go live. These
areas included the proposed link to the PeopleSoft Human Resources application. This
PeopleSoft link would have allowed TCN to update employee files with the details of
the courses that had been taken, allowing their profile to be held in a central record.
Integrating systems is difficult enough to perform when both are stable entities but near
impossible when one is still in development. It was decided that it was important to first
of all get the TCN system operational and then create the links.
Once sufficient satisfactory testing had been conducted on those parts of the
project to be implemented for initial live operation, the testing phase was deemed
completed and the system was rolled out in 1999.
The project demonstrated the pragmatic cost orientation of the central corporate
body in comparison with the more experimental atmosphere within technology where
the two components of the system had evolved. As the Research Group Project Manager
reflected:
The business say they want this, this and this so we work out how much it costs and they
usually make fairly pragmatic decisions based on upfront cost and cost of ownership
(Research Group Project Manager).
In order for the project to be realised it required some of the more freewheeling
attitude of the technology team.
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They're blinkered. They're just very focused on what is on their change plan and don't look
outside the box. We just cajole, persuade, ride roughshod over their political shenanigans.
Part of the time the project was managed on the business side by Retail Bank change
management. We got a lot of benefit from that in terms of the model office and their
managing the rollout. We were part of them when it suited us (Research Group Project
Manager).
This exemplifies the spirit shown by the project teams throughout the case
studies. Their focus was always on the end goal both individually and organisationally as
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Throughout literature, we see a variety of approaches to tackle the same
issue. How do we understand and plan innovation effectively? The sheer volume and
variety of perspectives support the consistent belief that this process is complex.
Across the theories a progressive appreciation of a wider range of factors is evident.
Foremost of these is the need to understand the innovation environment and most
specifically the user. No model has emerged that provides a comprehensive method
of providing this understanding. While broad, high level theory has been offered, it
has failed to move from generalisation to practice and studies made have frequently
focused on isolated scenarios. This offers a number of areas to consider during our
investigation. Principally, do interactive models of innovation operate in practice? If
this is the case how do they network and what factors affect them and thereby the
technology trajectory? It is also important to consider how the organisation manages
this process over time in terms of resource and expertise, aspects which may be
accommodated via formal methodologies and social learning. Analysis of these areas
should assist in identifying a model of innovation, or at least consistent themes, and
guiding principles to allow some reduction ofuncertainty.
Multimedia innovations are driven by new technologies providing
opportunity for advancement of actors' agendas. Innovation is driven by the twin
forces of project champions and new technology. Project champions develop a
community of interest around the proposed innovation. The final design of the
technology is shaped by the alignment of actors enrolled within the community
evidencing social shaping. New technology generates interest within the organisation
as it offers a potential power resource creating readjustments in the existing power
relations. The agendas are aggregated across networks or communities of interest
aligned to support the innovation.
Multimedia technologies are configurational technologies created from
various components. In each case, BigBank was required to configure the solution to
the setting. This necessitated considering both technical and social elements and the
interactive cycle of influence between the factors. Considerations include
infrastructure (network, computers), content (sourcing and conversion) and expertise
(managing and delivery). These aspects must be woven into the network to facilitate
the deliveiy and ongoing maintenance of the innovation. As a result of the emergent
nature ofmultimedia within the market overall and BigBank specifically, resources
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offering these capabilities are in limited supply. This creates twin concerns, finding
or creating these resources and then, the ability to assess and judge their value.
The process to find, align, combine and deliver the complexity of factors
requires management of relations among a network of end-users, technology
suppliers and project sponsors. The project champions manage the network to
identify, appreciate and appease the issues and agendas of the various actors. This
has created a shift in the operations of the Technology Department. Formalisation of
this process presents significant problems for the organisation but in order to make
sure the innovation is beneficial to BigBank, it must provide business benefit in order
to gain formal approval. Surprisingly, business benefits were not the initial
motivation behind any of the initiatives. While the need to meet user requirements is
frequently expressed, in practice this is used only to validate opinions of project
sponsors and influencers. This requires political tactics to be applied to align
differing agendas and perceptions around a common objective.
Through the case studies, we gain insight into the innovative drivers behind
multimedia in this organisation. The opportunity of multimedia technology is
embraced by actors within the organisation as an opportunity for advancement.
Advancement includes control over resources and establishing expertise.
The implementation ofmultimedia creates both technical impacts in terms of
infrastructure and social impacts in terms of content sourcing and system use. In
order to accommodate the joint consideration of both social and technical factors a
complex navigation of the innovation process occurs.
Within this section, we shall try to draw together the themes which have
occurred through the three case studies. This will be done by viewing the cases as a
whole as opposed to individual pieces, allowing a view of the commonalities that
exist among them. We shall examine why changes occurred, what those changes
were and the process which allowed these changes to take place.
8.2 MULTIMEDIA INNOVATION PROVIDES VEHICLE FOR ACTORS TO
ADVANCE AGENDAS
Through the course of the three case studies within this thesis, we have seen
changes in aspects of the operations of BigBank. Innovations have occurred where
actors have perceived an opportunity to advance their agendas through multimedia
technology. While a number of actors may perceive the opportunity, a central actor,
the project leader, drives it. Project leaders act to align resources and actors within a
community of interest that can deliver the innovation.
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Within the cases, we witness an informal structure, conforming to Burns and
Stalker's (1961) view, driven by internal politics. Actors engage in political activity
in order to advance their position and influence within the organisation.
Innovation activities were born out of the desire for advancement by an
individual and/or group. These personal motivations acting as drivers for innovation
provide an alternative perspective to traditional supply push, demand pull theories
which present rational business motivations. What was defined as 'advancement'
varied between actors, varying from hierarchical advancement to expertise
acquisition.
The NMM project presented a variety of advancement opportunities for a
number of actors. The Change Planning Executive views the project as a way to
understand and advance Microsoft's NetShow application, advancing his reputation
for discovering and implementing technologies. The Research Group view it as an
opportunity to establish their multimedia capabilities and reinforce their relationship
with an influential internal customer. Technical Strategy, responsible for the
technical direction of the bank, is enticed by the opportunity to test best practice for
the BigBank network to deliver multimedia services. EUCS seek to advance by
acquiring knowledge of a technology relevant to their distance learning operations.
Learning Technology and Corporate Communications perceive an opportunity to
influence the next area of technology development.
Praxis offered actors the ability to acquire valuable web expertise. The new
Communications Department Head, and Content Co-ordinators seek to advance by
gaining a 'very sellable skill'. The Research Group Project Manager desires
hierarchical advancement while the Technology Director desires to keep pace with
competitors.
For the TCN project, the Board view it as a good Public Relations project
which will be perceived as putting them ahead of market competition. They also
view it as being a cost-effective measure allowing them greater return on investment
from outlay on their satellite link by saving money on training costs. The new Head
of Training from the Human Resources section views it as a high profile project
which will immediately benefit him as does the Research Group Project Manager
who aims to use it to establish a departmental role.
Agenda advancement acts as both as catalyst and shaper for technology
innovation. The desire for advancement causes frictions to occur between factions as
each drives to position their own agenda, such as conflict between the Technology
Department and Learning Technologies. Within these conflicts, technology acts in a
political manner (Winner, 1977), both shaping and being shaped by the struggle.
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Innovation was not only a struggle to solve technical problems (Hard, 1993) but also,
social problems arising from conflicts and issues between actors.
Observation of linked projects provides details of the progression of project
champions across projects. (See Diagram 8.1 below). During this entire process, they






























































Diagram 8.1 Resources' Involvement Periods
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The Research Group Project Manager evolves from presentation of
knowledge claims concerning intranet expertise, to a more prominent position
against departmental colleagues. This positioning provides the opportunity to lead
the Praxis initiative offering advancement from the Research Group. The role of the
Communications Manager offered through this move does not, however, fulfil the
Research Group Project Manager's agenda. Leveraging acquired expertise in web
technologies, the Research Group Project Manager campaigns for other advancement
through the TCN which provides additional opportunities outwith the technology
department.
Evolutionary agenda advancement occurs for groups as well as individuals.
We see Edinburgh Technology section advancing its position against London
Technology for servicing web technology. This service facility had previously been
provided by London, but the legitimisation of knowledge claims through NMM and
Praxis projects altered this perception of expertise.
On a wider scale, we also see the Technology Department advancing its
position within Multimedia work against the Learning Technologies group. This
advancement eventually sees this latter section being eliminated with their work
being transferred to Technology Department as their role is marginalised.
The political evolution of technical experts and groups across linked projects
has not been possible through isolated case studies. Examination of a series of linked
cases provided an appreciation of agenda advancement over time and the shaping of
agendas based on previous activity.
Actors drew together to create a network of shared interest, or 'community of
interest' to all for a mutually beneficial advancement of agendas. Within each
project, one actor fulfilled a primary role creating the reason for initiation then
driving delivery. Within the Networked Multimedia project, the NMM Project
Manager from the Research Group serves this role. In the Praxis and TCN projects,
the Research Group Project Manager performs this capacity although in the TCN
project, she is not the key driver. The Corporate Communications Executive occupies
this role.
While a central actor fulfils the role of Project Champion, other actors within
the community assist in aligning resources. Within the NMM project, we see the
EUCS Network Specialist being recruited by the Research Group and then acting to
align resources within his area of influence, the University, for the needs of the
project such as the Multimedia lab facilities. This is also true of the Research Group
Project Manager recruiting the Corporate Communications Executive who then acts
to champion the project within the Retail Bank.
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8.2.1 Technology Statespeople
In each case, the communities of interest formed around innovations are
created and orchestrated by a central actor. Studies of technology innovation have
consistently identified actors within cases who draw together the elements of the
project and act to drive it forward. Actors in this role have been variously termed as
'system builders' (Hughes, 1983), 'project champions' (Bessant, 1985), 'project
leaders' (Tidd et al., 1997) and 'heterogeneous engineers' (Law, 1997). Shared
characteristics focus on the demonstration of both social and technical capability,
enabling navigation of the complex of considerations required for successful
innovation.
Application of their hybrid expertise has been frequently documented but the
process of their creation and evolution has been obscured. The use of isolated case
studies has made it problematic to view actors migrating from innovation to
innovation. Within our study, we were able to a gain insight into both of these
aspects. This insight allowed us to appreciate the motivations and social construction
of these actors. In contrast with Bessant's (1985) belief that these actors are formal
appointments, we instead witness project champions emerging patterned by the
constitution of their organisational environment.
While these terms capture the richness of these actors and their application of
hybrid expertise to technical innovation, it does not assist the identification of factors
that contribute to making these individuals successful over time and therefore assist
in their selection and appointment at the outset of projects. Instead consideration is
focused upon their actions during an isolated project and what problems were caused.
Identification of the various actor roles within projects is useful, allowing
differentiation between the important roles of the technology sponsor, project leader,
etc. (Tidd et al., 1997). It assists in understanding the activities performed by these
roles, but fails to add value in considering which individuals should occupy these
positions to minimise project risk. Indeed the use of'system' and 'project' within the
description of these actors is as limited as the isolated case studies that identify them.
These actors migrate from project to project with the consistent aim of advancing
their own personal agenda and gaining legitimisation of greater power, a process
more akin to politicians than scientists or businesspeople. Precise roles within
projects may alter, sponsor in some, leader in others but common traits most likely
exist driving them to those roles. Identification and assessment of these traits should
assist in the construction of teams with innovation activity.
Each innovation is merely a different manifesto to gain 'election' to
legitimate influence. We witness these actors 'lobbying' other actors to create a
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community of interest around a central agenda or manifesto of innovation in the
belief it will offer advancement of their agenda. In order to reflect this apparently
ongoing pursuit of power beyond individual initiatives, I have set aside the terms of
Bessant and Hughes, project and system. Instead, I will refer to these actors as
'Technology Statespeople'. This term is aimed to reflect the broadly political agenda
aimed at legitimising power through appointment to a desired role. The inclusion of
'technology' is equally as important as their ambitions are grounded in the real world
implications of the innovation they are linked with. Their opportunities are not
'blindly political' with their ambition 'bounded' by the actual and perceived
technical possibilities. In order for the 'Technology Statespeople' to legitimise
knowledge claims to achieve and retain power, innovations they champion must
deliver value to stakeholders. Technology Statesperson must focus their efforts
against 'doable problems' (Vergragt, 1988) in order to satisfy allies and build status.
Classification in this manner is also reflective of the long considered political nature
of technology (Winner, 1977), a role supported by Burns and Stalker's (1961)
discussion of technology's role as a power resource in the factional struggles within
informal structures. Acquisition of ownership of such a resource offers a lever to
legitimise power, a pursuit evident within our cases. Indeed, we witness actors
migrating between innovations in search of one that will provide suitable
legitimisation. Technology Statespeople also seek the sponsorship of those who have
achieved this legitimisation, the Change Planning Executive, Technology Director,
and the Board, enrolling them to assisting in guiding this process.
Sponsors each possess their own agendas, advancement of which provided
the core of the innovative activity. The NMM agenda was driven by the Change
Planning Executive's friendship with Microsoft and his interest in their offerings.
Praxis arose from the Technology Director's interest in intranets, while TCN is
motivated by advancement possibilities for the Corporate Communications
Executive and Corporate Communications Department who in turn enrol the Board
to become sponsors for the TCN project. Sponsors utilize their hierarchical power to
assist the Technology Statespeople in creating and aligning the community of interest
and achieving formal approval.
Technology Statespeople emerge through a largely social process contrary to
the view that project leaders, champions, etc. are organisational constructs (Bessant,
1985). Participant observation of the pre-project environment and the forces therein
uncovers social aspects that create Technology Statespeople, similar to
Intermediaries.
Technology Statespeople and Intermediaries (Williams, Slack and Stewart,
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2000) are fundamentally different roles driven by contrasting motivations.
Intermediaries exist primarily to assist social learning, whereas Technology
Statespeople exist to advance their agendas through technology. This is not to say
that a single actor cannot act as both. For example, serving as an expert intermediary
may assist social learning, aid knowledge claims and advance personal agendas
thereby fulfilling both motivations.
An informal, politically driven structure acts to affect the formal within the
BigBank pre-project environments. Political tactics were used to create factions and
groups as part of this informal organisation allowing people to act out within their
formal role to advance their position.
This is seen in Praxis with the Technology Director's Executive Assistant
assisting the Research Group Project Manager in positioning herself for the Intranet
project. In turn, the Research Group Project Manager encroaches on the area of
expertise of her colleague who had been doing work within that area. Technology
Statespeople exhibit the characteristics of 'project leaders' (Tidd et al., 1997),
'system builders' (Hughes, 1983) and 'project champions' (Bessant, 1985) as they
fonn 'communities of interest' around an innovation agenda.
Communities of interest are collections of actors and resources mobilised to
deliver a particular innovation akin to 'actor networks' (Latour, 1986; Callon, 1994),
'socio-technical constituencies' (Molina, 1997), 'socio-technical constellations'
(Williams, Slack and Stewart, 2000) and 'socio-technical systems' (Hughes, 1983)
where actors are enrolled and aligned around a central agenda with social and
technical aspects. They share the common objective of these constructs, creation of a
network to deliver innovation. This process is characterised by negotiation to tackle
'doable problems' (Vergragt, 1988) with decisions influenced by economic, political
interests and power relationships of the actors involved. Communities of interest
present a hybrid between the various socio-technical frameworks, principally due to
its existence across both pre-project and formal project stages. Within the pre-project
stage, it shares the loose coupling of actors captured by socio-technical
constellations. Actor networks and socio-technical constituencies display closer
linkages between players. Players typically have direct relationships and
commitments to particular facts and artefacts, features evident in communities
following formal approval of the project.
Communities of interest were used to enforce a degree of control and
ownership around power resources (Burns and Stalker, 1961). Power resources
within the studies were represented by artefacts and expertise valuable to the
organisation such as the BigBank Network and infrastructure. The relative
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importance of these resources is dependent on a number of social factors. As we see
across the cases, the importance of multimedia CD-ROM diminishes due to
alternative technologies emerging. Technology Statespeople used a number of
political ploys to create the informal networks of influence building co-operation
between the groups by negotiating a way by which they would all benefit from the
endeavour. In addition, the Technology Statesperson will act to marginalise
competitors and neutralise threats to the project taking place and succeeding. This
was witnessed through the marginalisation of internal threats, such as Learning
Technologies and external ones, such as BT. In order to pursue these initiatives they
had to align aspects of the organisation to allow this to happen. Before the formal
structure aligned, an informal influence network had to be established which could
then affect the formal structure. This allowed the dominant informal factions to
marginalise other groups, including their allies and excluding opposition via this
boundary. The aim was to legitimise power formally within the bank, by creating and
owning the innovation they would place themselves as the obligatory point of
passage between the resources and other bodies creating legitimate power.
8.2.2 New Technology: Multimedia Technology advancement
opportunities
Emerging multimedia technology offered exciting new possibilities to alter
existing power relations and provide actors an opportunity to advance their agendas.
The innovations developed in each of the cases supported theories concerning the
characteristics of multimedia technologies. The array of systems conforms to the
perception of multimedia as a 'cluster of innovation' (Williams, 1997) under a
common banner and sharing common features. Each system allowed for expansion
and co-ordination of the media by which information could be provided and shared.
The facility for interactivity with the information was consistent, but convergence of
media evolved across projects. Within NMM, the system provided a new medium to
view a number of formats, with control over type, viewing time, and so on. The
Praxis Intranet system did not expand media as such but created new access options
for data plus increased facility to maintain and improve the content. This differed
from the previous repository for data which was a hard disk drive that only allowed
file names to be viewed after the file was accessed with a confusing navigation
system. The Intranet would provide the information on the file as soon as the user
accessed a link and was structured in a more logical manner to the users. Within the
TCN project, the systems of Praxis and NMM are combined to create a corporate
wide, networked training system providing wider options for content, times and
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location.
While each application provides the capacity for technical convergence, the
demands on content creation and delivery placed considerable demands upon
BigBank. These demands were met incrementally across the projects: functionality
was deployed and extended once successful. The TCN system was made possible by
the success of the NMM and Praxis systems, supporting Gilb's (1988) belief that big
systems develop from successful smaller systems.
The complications experienced in sourcing multi-channel content lend
credence to Fransman's (1995) scepticism regarding the actual level of convergence.
While Fransman's concerns are directed at the macro market, by implication they
question micro organisational aspects.
Each system was created from configurations of component technologies.
While some of the components were used across projects, e.g. HTML, no stabilised
design emerged.
Project Component Technologies
NMM Network equipment, Microsoft NetShow, HTML, Microsoft PowerPoint,
Silicon Graphics content editors, VHS and audiotapes.
Praxis HTML, ASP and Microsoft FrontPage.
TCN Microsoft NetShow, NetMeeting, HTML, TV streaming, Internet
Explorer browser, C++, ASP and JNM Company's application.
Final integrated system designs varied but were constructed from standardised
component offerings. These technologies marked a departure from the discrete
multimedia applications BigBank had used previously. The emergence of integrated
systems was assisted by the realisation that the BigBank network could support
multimedia applications. Programs previously run on individual client machines
could be distributed more effectively across the network.
In the first case study, the Technology Department believed that the network
would be unable to handle the loads required without readjustment. With this
perception reassured they became comfortable in supporting this expansion.
The possibility for distribution meant that new mediums could be created
which would provide content in a more timely and user-friendly manner. The content
already existed but was not always in formats that were uniformly acceptable. With
this distribution potential, a wide number of possibilities now existed. However, an
organising mechanism to share this content remained a major challenge. This
organisation required not only technological consideration but also the structure for
content governance and management.
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The potential value of multimedia innovations for BigBank positioned them
as an attractive opportunity for advancement. Multimedia's emergent state presented
a 'greenfield' ownership situation for actors to claim. Societal attention around the
multimedia revolution, both within consumer and corporate spheres, was coupled
with attention from senior figures within the bank.
Before any project could occur it required formal approval.
Every project required a business case in order to gain approval. Business
cases needed to present a solution to an existing BigBank issue. This requirement
allowed the BigBank's formal structure to ensure that the organisation's objectives
were not neglected by employees pursuing personal agendas. Conventional business
theory believes that business needs act as the driver for organisational activity. Our
study presents contrary findings with business needs retrofitted on to each project all
of which are initiated to serve as vehicles for the advancement of actor's personal
agendas.
The official objective for NMM was network testing to assess multimedia
capability, although the initial motivation was curiosity around Microsoft NetShow.
The BigBank Technology Director's motivation to have an intranet because other
companies had them became transformed into a business case on the best way to
share data offering the capability of providing the 'one true word' thus replacing the
archaic J-drive system. TCN's benefit as a cost saving system, built on expanding




The innovations viewed within the cases studied created a number of social
and technical impacts for BigBank. BigBank moved from using discrete multimedia
technologies to integrated solutions. This was combined with an increase in scale and
importance of these systems as they moved from experimental tests to corporate
wide applications.
A number of areas were required to be involved in order to allow sourcing,
configuration and delivery of these systems to BigBank, impacting the role and
requirements of the Technology Department. The realisation of the network's
capability to support multimedia applications was a key stage in the emergence of
integrated offerings within BigBank. This allowed migration from the stand-alone
CD-ROM delivered applications to TCO/IP delivered applications.
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The migration of multimedia applications to the network altered the
possibilities for information delivery. Delivery over the network allowed information
to be delivered in a more interactive and timely manner. This in turn required revised
sourcing options for content. New options required content to be sourced in timely
manner from a range of sources. Content sourced also required technical
compatibility in order to be inputted into the system. The complexity of this process
was consistently under-appreciated. Developing and delivering these innovations
placed new requirements on the expertise of the technology requirement through the
necessary dual appreciation of both technical and business issues.
8.3.2 Network Use Changes
Revised understanding of the network's capability to handle multimedia
applications offered the possibility of corporate wide, integrated multimedia systems.
From being viewed as a support system for current bank operations which would
require considerable change to support multimedia traffic, the results from the NMM
tests change its perception to that of an enabler for multimedia traffic. This opened
up a number of attractive options for integrated applications thus increasing its value
as a power resource.
Shift in perception was a result of both technical and social factors. In the
NMM case, the group was involved in the tests to examine the possibilities of
sending multimedia content over the network. The Technology Department believed
that they would need to make changes to the network in order to make it capable of
handling this task. This existing capability did, however, prove to be sufficient. It
was not only sufficient but offered a number of advantages which consequently
enhanced the perception of the network.
Transmission of multimedia content via the BigBank network offered
economic benefits compared with broadcasting over the existing satellite link.
Additionally, faster data updates were possible than with CD-ROM. Alterations to
multimedia CD-ROMs required them to be remade. Material shared over the network
merely required updating on the server to be available.
The BigBank Network was already a considerable power resource within the
organisation with its support for key bank operations. It was the power resource
around which the Technology Department positioned itself as the obligatory point of
passage with any operation to be performed on it having to be qualified by them
before it could be added to the network.
Due to the importance of this resource for them and their responsibility for its
operation, they needed to be very conscious of any threats to this situation. For this
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reason when systems were to be deployed in the live system, they had to be tested
and approved as the technologies used within the projects did not exist in isolation
and their operation impacted on the overall network performance. The results of
these tests meant that they could not only feel confident of the effective operation but
also expanded the scope of the Network as a power resource.
Providing training over the network placed it under the Technology
Department's jurisdiction and ownership, raising potential conflict with an existing
specialist group Learning Technologies. The logic of networked delivery was
implicitly supported by Learning Technologies, external suppliers of training CD-
ROMs, directing R&D activity in this area. In order for the department to feel
comfortable using the network for this type of work, it needed to believe that the
system could provide both stability and acceptable speed which could only be
answered by a network assessment. This was set as a business reason for the NMM
project.
The network needed to remain stable withstanding the additional loads placed
on it. We see this as a requirement in each project. The transmission of various
multimedia loads in NMM set a benchmark of BigBank network's capability. The
tests carried out during the NMM project supported the network's ability to handle
the web pages ofPraxis and rich training broadcasts ofTCN.
The Technical Department was wary of the impact of additional loads. As a
result, the business reason for NMM was concerned with finding how far the system
could be pushed. By discovering that the system was sufficiently robust to
accommodate additional multimedia loads, the department had the comfort to engage
in the TCN project. As noted, this original vision would enable the loads to be
transmitted via the network instead of the satellite link which was eventually used for
other financial reasons discussed later.
Usability requirements dictated that speed of transmission was an important
aspect of performance. As previously discussed in reasons for change, a major
attraction of multimedia technologies was the possibilities that they provided for
interacting with information. These possibilities were limited if the system took an
excessive amount of time to provide the infonnation required. This requirement was
due to the social factors of actors' impatience.
Within the TCN system, if the responses took too long to be received, the
flow of the lesson would be disrupted while in Praxis if the pages took too long, the
user may give up. The demonstrations of the work on the NMM project made the
Technology Department and stakeholders confident that sufficient performance
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could be achieved. The proven ability of the network to handle rich loads at a
satisfactory transfer and quality level shifted perceptions and raised new possibilities.
This change was not due to any individual technological change. The network
had been set up to allow BigBank to perform a number of other operations. Its ability
to support these multimedia initiatives/technologies was a fortunate by-product. The
technical reality of the network did not change, only the perception changed. This
perception changed within the minds of a number of relevant individuals creating
shared interest.
This shared interest opened up other possibilities for the network use for
multimedia technologies offering new technologies and power resources that the
Technology Department could affect and own. The actors associated with the
network and testing gained reputational expertise and social learning concerning the
implementation of multimedia systems on the BigBank network. This knowledge
encompassed technical issues as well as adherence to organisational standards which
could potentially exclude certain innovations. For example, the technological
direction of Learning Technologies CD-ROM technology excluded them from
network inclusion.
The above evidence goes against the linear model of innovation and
determinism where the direction of technology development is considered inevitable.
The innovative possibilities for the network are opened by the NMM project, which
was only engaged due to the interest of the Change Planning Executive in Microsoft
NetShow and the Research Group's efforts to justify this request.
As can be seen, revised perception was an important shift for the network.
While it did not affect the technical content of the network, the resulting projects it
encouraged would have implications that required alterations in other areas of
BigBank's technology infrastructure. One of these areas impinged upon was the
equipment required for these projects.
8.3.3 Required Equipment
Migration of multimedia systems onto the BigBank network required
enhanced equipment to input and access multimedia content. Revised requirements
necessitated improvements in operating systems and machine specifications. Within
the NMM project, equipment of a particular specification was required for capturing
and converting the material, whereas in Praxis the machines required to run
Windows NT, instead of 3.1, and had to be upgraded in order to perform at the
desired level. In some situations, the required standard could be met. Where this was
not possible, trade-offs occurred around system capability and direction. These
166
restrictions were due to political, economic and social reasons demonstrating social
shaping of the technical trajectory.
PC operating systems offered opportunities and restrictions on content
creation and processing possibilities. Parallel to our study BigBank was migrating
their standard operating system from the antiquated Windows 3.1 to the more
advanced Windows NT. As a result of the size of BigBank and the number of PCs,
this process took considerable time so for an extended period BigBank had different
sections operating on different systems.
The implications of dual systems were particularly evident within Praxis but
affected each case. For content to be developed for the Intranet, developers required
access to an NT machine as the FrontPage application would not run on Windows
3.1. It was then necessary that a development infrastructure be in place, which
allowed content authors priority access to machines that were on the network. This
priority need had to be communicated to the NT Supply Team by the TCN project
team for early accessibility.
The requirement for NT machines for development was also true for tire
TCN project but at this point the company rollout was further along and they were
more prevalent. Whereas the Praxis project could have users access the Intranet from
Windows 3.1 machines, although not very well, the TCN system required that users
must have NT machines. This was due the higher requirements of the application. In
addition, the PCs had to have video cards installed when it was decided that the TV
pictures would go via them as opposed to the existing TV sets.
Due to the importance of the operating system both in terms of development
and access, the machines were seen as a power resource with those actors who
determined the priorities for allocation holding a strong position. The teams in both
cases managed to gain an influence on this allocation process. For Praxis the sponsor
was the Technology Director so the project team was able to trade on his position in
the formal organisation. The Intranet team then used this as an enlistment tactic with
the Content Co-ordinators. In return for providing their time on the project they
would receive priority for machine allocation. For the TCN project, a smaller number
of machines were affected and with Board approval it was a straightforward task to
influence this process.
The inclusion of the required equipment to allow the content to be captured,
created, shared and managed successfully was an important piece of the
infrastructure required in each project. As detailed above, both Praxis and TCN
required this but for the NMM project higher specification machines were important.
Because it was an isolated project setting up a couple of boxes was not as great an
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issue compared with the TCN and Praxis projects which required rollouts across
multiple business units. Without these machines and the appropriate software and
operating systems, none of the development for that project could have been carried
out either, so equipment was a constraint factor that had to be managed. For NMM
this equipment was donated to the project from the IT Services for involvement in
the project that would allow them to understand the implications for the network,
their key area of responsibility.
Until these pieces of equipment were in place, trade-offs had to be made
regarding the functionality of the system. With Windows 3.1, the colour palette was
limited to 16 colours constricting design. Also performance was worse than on
Windows NT so more interactive and richer content could not be used. Thus we see
these socio-economic factors influencing the direction of the innovation as
everything had to be developed to the lowest common denominator, Windows 3.1
until the whole bank had Windows NT in place. Also the lower machines'
specifications meant that while the network could supply content at the required
speeds, the client machines could not handle it. The project innovation had to be
engineered to account for this.
8.3.4 Content required important consideration
Multimedia technology's purpose of providing new ways to access and
handle information makes it critically dependent upon content. Users expected
benefits when accessing and handling information. Functional benefits were
secondary to the value of the information contained in the system. If the information
was valueless, users would not waste their time accessing the system no matter how
pretty it looked. The integrated, networked multimedia offerings studied offered new
possibilities to increase functionality and value of information delivered compared
with previous methods. Possibilities existed in many ways including format,
relevance, production, accessibility and sourcing.
The possibilities of integrated, multimedia technologies differed from the
previous discrete CD-ROM and video conferencing applications used by BigBank.
While both offered interactive media-rich experiences, they were restricted by
freshness of data and audience accessibility, respectively. Information on CD-ROMs
was only as recent as the date of its creation, whereas video conferences had a
limited number of participants before they became impractical. Networked
multimedia applications allowed the widespread dissemination of information
utilising a variety ofmedia that could be updated as regularly as necessary.
These possibilities had extensive organizational and technical ramifications
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for the process used to access and update the system. Throughout the case studies,
the value to the system of the information contained within it and the complexity of
providing this information was evident.
Use of existing content was important in order to ensure the NMM tests were
relevant to BigBank operations. Within the Praxis case, this status was more clearly
defined by the team who stated that a core part of the system which it offered was the
'one true word', content that was relevant and reliable. Within interviews, users
stated that their use of the system was largely dependent on the relevance of the
information held on it to their work. For the TCN, again the system value was based
on the information on it. The network was only of use during broadcasts of training
deemed valuable by employees.
Appreciation of the value of information offered a valuable insight as most
studies of multimedia have focused on the functions offered, and technical
infrastructure required, rather than the importance of the information provided. From
these cases, the success of the system is critically dependent on content.
Content sourcing required inclusion of previously disparate groups
In order to provide up to date content, the system would need to ensure that it
was able to source required information from relevant owners within the
organisation. This presented another possibility for conflict with existing specialist
groups.
In order to fulfil this process project members require appreciation of the
business value of the content and the technical issues when entering into the system.
This required hybrid skill to understand how to present and how to get it there. In
order for this new channel of delivery to function in each project, the above factors
had to align to create an appropriate infrastructure. As with content, this
infrastructure was both technical and organisational covering the physical network,
skilled resources and equipment along with structure to support it. This required
previously disparate groups to work together as a community of interest.
In conjunction with considering the technical needs for content population
and skill mismatches, the project teams were also faced with the issue of creating
channels within the organisation for that content to be sourced and submitted.
A process for sourcing content is present in each project. The sourcing
process develops increasing sophistication through the projects: from the ad hoc
sourcing from siloed sections of historic content in NMM, through the Content Co¬
ordinator network in Praxis which collects current data, to the up to date visual and
dynamic training information ofTCN.
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Within the NMM project, content was collected in an ad hoc manner with the
development team concerned with older content that had been used by the bank. This
was because the tests had to operate in isolation and not provide the base for an
ongoing system. Praxis and TCN both differed fundamentally in that respect as they
were both part of ongoing initiatives and currency of information was of greater
importance. As a result, they required not only the information to establish the
system, but also the creation of a governance structure to support ongoing, timely
submission of content. In Praxis, the Content Co-ordinators who source, channel and
vet the content for their areas of responsibility facilitate this content submission. This
would be an unfunded role so in order to enlist these parties they were provided with
training in web technology, priority in distribution of new equipment and
involvement in an area which would benefit their advancement. This is also apparent
in TCN but the existing trainer group fills the role of providing the new content. This
also provided them with access to a new and valuable skill.
A key reason for the need for organisational structures is to manage
ownership of content. In NMM the development team needed to identify and source
from the existing content owners. Praxis does this but takes this a step further as, by
creating an ongoing route, it demands a shift in the existing organisational structure
which the Technology Statespeople need to find a way to make palatable to each
section.
This navigation of the ownership of data, which acted as power resources, is
critical in order to move from informal organisation to formal organisation. First the
Technology Statespeople had to gain agreement for access from the existing content
owners.
One way of dealing with the shift in organisation is where the power
relationships of content owners are not adversely disrupted. In NMM, this was the
case as it was a one-offwhich provided new avenues for the content owners to share
their information. The information was also historic so of lesser value. The content
owners in return received inclusion in the reputational network about the use of
networked multimedia technology.
In Praxis, the development team sought to maintain the ownership by
planning decentralised publishing. This would allow the existing owners, once they
had the required skills and knowledge, to manage the publishing of their own content
in the new system. By recruiting a member of each of the sections to act as Content
Co-ordinator they gained an advocate within the section to assist in the running of
the system but also raised visibility of the entire project. The sections were also
coerced into joining by this reputational network with the 'published or be damned'
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manifesto. When a critical mass of sections had joined, the others were obligated to
participate themselves. It was also a useful medium to publicise their department
activities.
In TCN, the ownership remained with the training group and was not
threatened as the trainers were brought in at an early stage to aid system design for
their needs. The group excluded was the Learning Technologies group who had
previously provided the medium of communication via CD-ROMs. Responsibility
for the training content remained with the trainers and they were provided with
another outlet.
Throughout the projects, the key was enlisting an agreement from the content
owners to access the personnel who would own the new delivery channel for content.
With permission thus established and content owner participation, it was then
important to define a procedure for smoothly transferring the content technically onto
the system.
8.3.5 Technical Complexities of content creation were underestimated
The technical complexity of capturing, converting and delivering content was
underestimated in every project. No consistent method of content creation emerged
across projects. Differences were evident in the sourcing and conversion of content
for transmission in NMM, the production of information on web pages for Praxis and
the application of training materials in TCN.
Difficulties were driven by two key factors: lack of an agreed technical
format and limited facilities to develop content. As a result of the newness of the
technology generally in society and specifically within BigBank, IT facilities to
perfonn content creation were limited. In order to determine what facilities were
required it was first important to know what type of content was acceptable.
Format Technical Capture and Transmission
In order for the system to be technically viable, each project had to have the
technical means to populate and share the relevant content in a manner easily
accessible and manageable by the users. In each of the projects, we see that the
formats which the system uses can pose a barrier to information being transferred to
the system. This is due to technical barriers against converting between different
formats. In some cases, this was merely very difficult, in others impossible. In order
for the content to be provided and shared in this manner, it needed to be available in
a format technically compatible with the delivery system.
Different formats were required throughout the projects: for the NMM case,
the Microsoft proprietary .asf format for Microsoft NetShow, the HTML format for
171
Praxis and also a mix of PowerPoint and HTML for the TCN plus video broadcast.
The ability to meet these requirements, would serve as an inclusion or exclusion
factor for the systems.
As we have seen, each case was faced with the issue of formats and
standards. Moreover they had to deal with a number of issues in determining how to
tackle it. They needed to identify the current format of the content, if and how it
could be converted and the facilities required for performing this conversion.
Invariably, the format of the existing content was not of the type required for
the new multimedia systems — from the Microsoft Word documents for Praxis
information to the VHS tapes on NMM. For many of these, upgrade / conversion
paths were possible. The exception was the training CD-ROMs provided by Learning
Technologies in the NMM case.
The CD-ROMs were designed for a stand-alone proprietary interactive
training exercise, representing the previous era of multimedia with discrete, broadly
standardised offerings. In order to convert the information in these CD-ROMs, all the
content needed to be stripped out and rebuilt in the NMM system as would happen
later in TCN through the trainers' involvement. In the TCN project the use of the
trainers and their PowerPoint materials in a live broadcast delivered the content of
the training. This was the content that was buried in the CD-ROMs in an
incompatible format. By using the trainers directly, the technical barrier was lifted.
Conversion was too large an undertaking and was therefore left out of the NMM
project. This technical isolation is indicative of the Learning Technology section as a
whole, as will be discussed later. This situation demonstrated the ability of BigBank
to reverse the technology choice ofmultimedia delivery through CD-ROM in favour
of network delivery as well as the costly obsolescence of technologies developed
against the standards for un-networked multimedia technologies.
Content conversion facilities were scarce
For other formats such as the aforementioned Microsoft Word documents
and VHS cassettes, while the conversion paths were more amenable, they still
required appropriate facilities for the conversion. Locating and accessing conversion
facilities presented a constant problem.
In the NMM case, the problem was at its most severe in locating equipment
that could capture and convert the video loads and transfer the large files to the test
environment. Robust network facilities were sourced from EUCS alongside the
laboratory network testing facilities and knowledge resource for inclusion in the
project and access to data.
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In the Praxis project, while the network could support the transfer, the
applications required to perform the creation could only operate on Windows NT
which was in scarce supply. The software acquisition was discussed in the equipment
section.
A specialised studio was required for TCN, demonstrating the investment
required to ensure content was of the appropriate technical format. This was gained
by involving Studio Videos who already provided BigBankTV working for
Corporate Communications sponsors of the TCN project. In addition, the Board
backing and budget secured these facilities.
Sourcing issues required the Technology Statespeople to align the required
resources through negotiation with resource owners. The EUCS resources were made
available to the NMM team through the negotiations of the NMM Project Manager
with Technology Strategy who had paid for the resource for some of their existing
projects. The EUCS contractor then provided additional time due to his own interests
in the Multimedia area. So we see the incremental development of the social network
which is supplemented as the Technology Statespeople trade access to their power
resources in return for required resources. This is where we see the importance of the
informal organisations which work to align resources which the formal organisation
could not given the level of justification which would have been required but not
obtainable at that point.
When the content could be transferred into the appropriate format, the
development teams still had to consider the design characteristics particular to the
new format. Multimedia technologies provided new presentation channels for
content, each with technical constraints and resultant design limitations.
Technical aspects imposed visual design considerations
In the NMM case, the design limitations were only apparent after the content
had been created. The key problem was that a lot of movement within the videos
exposed the low frame rate. Because the frame rate was less than for TV, people
would respond adversely to the video. The best way to minimize this was to shoot
the video with 'head and shoulder' camera shots. Unfortunately, when this was
discovered it was too late and costly to re-shoot the videos in this manner. In an
effort to minimize this visual weakness, the videos were shown on smaller screens
where the deficiencies where less apparent.
For the Praxis case study, the medium of web pages was a better understood
quantity but migrating the information from Word documents required consideration
and pre-planning. The layout of the content would be altered to allow for the new
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hyperlink navigation options and the data size of the file would need to be
considered. The size of the file affected how long it would take to transfer it over the
network and ultimately display it. This related to the importance of speed in the
network as noted previously.
Within the TCN project, considerations had to be made about how the
training content could be delivered over the network in a way which was useful to
the trainers who were used to a traditional classroom situation. For the trainer and
student, the interfaces to the content had to accommodate the new situation without
losing the training benefit.
Each of these situations was new to the organisation. The previous depository
for data was the J-drive, a file server with an extremely limited graphical interface
compared to Praxis and without the multimedia capability of NMM or TCN. The
CD-ROMs and classrooms used for the training previously did not offer the
combinations and possibilities of the TCN system.
The complex consideration necessary for multimedia content supported the
increasingly multi-disciplinary nature of innovation with an expanding range of
interest groups and knowledge required for successful innovation, implementation
and utilization (Burns and Stalker, 1961).
Through the case studies, we have seen changes in how the organisation
aligns itself to deliver this type of project effectively. To support this requirement,
the skill base for the organisation needed to be altered to meet this need.
8.3.6 Required Skill Base
Expanding knowledge, interest groups and complexity within multimedia
innovation exposed gaps within BigBank's expert resources, which the Technology
Department attempted to fill. Expertise gaps occurred around web skills and broad
delivery expertise for multimedia technologies. The Technology Department lacked
actual hands-on development skills and, as evident in the Praxis user interviews, a
general lack of awareness ofmultimedia and web technologies existed.
Within the NMM project, the team required the ability to understand the
presentation, message, development requirements and system issues, for technology
unfamiliar to the Technology Department. Praxis needed web skills and
understanding of requirements of different business units. For the TCN project,
BigBank had no resource with experience in developing systems of this type but
needed to combine previous project experience.
BigBank users with awareness and experience of multimedia technologies
tended to be younger, junior employees who had experienced its use at college or
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university. This meant that the more junior employees often had a more advanced
understanding of the technology than their seniors. In interviews for Praxis, this
factor contributed to a feeling of frustration amongst the junior employees about the
perceived lack of progress within web technologies in comparison with systems they
had used previously.
Employees did not have access at work to the Internet due to security issues
surrounding outside access to systems. While in their home environment, they
wanted a break from the technology they worked with all day. This sentiment was
expressed by a number of Technology Department employees during the survey
interviews.
Project teams required not only awareness but the capability to understand,
technical, business, design and process aspects to deliver. This was a gap within the
organisation and required hybrid expertise combining technical knowledge with
business understanding. This is a common feature for organisations tackling
emergent technologies (Fincham et al., 1995; Williams and Proctor, 1996). In order
to cater to this requirement, the project teams had to provide the solutions through a
collaborative network with actors from within and outwith the organization. These
groups were similar to the types viewed by Williams and Proctor (1996).
The Technology Statesperson had to operate as a generalist specialist
(Fincham et al., 1995) who co-ordinated all the parties involved in the development
of new configurations in order to align and operate these groups. These groups acted
as a conciliatory force for the firm's knowledge and expertise base. This meant that
the Technology Statesperson needed to have social skills to build these groups as
well as the technical skills to execute them. Each project studied possessed a
requirement for hybrid expertise as outlined above but each varied in how these were
mobilised.
Project resourcing was a relatively pragmatic process but suffered great
complexity. The procedure was complex because expertise was evolving and hybrid
so people did not necessarily exist who possessed the requisite skill set. In addition,
people within the organisation did not have the experience to define what that skill
set should be. As a result, use of reputational networks to ascertain ability was
necessary.
During the course of my study, the organisation developed increasing
capability to accommodate the required expertise for multimedia innovation. Aspects
of Pettigrew's (1975) belief that specialisations develop through an evolutionary
process are evident although no formal grouping emerges.
Within the NMM project, all the development staff came from external
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organisations in the shape of EUCS. With the Technical Strategy, IT Services and
Learning Technologies being brought in as necessary by the Research Group to
provide their particular domain expertise. As a result, no special organisational
changes were required. During the Praxis case study, we see the web development
capability formalised and placed within the Communications team, altering their
remit from largely offline print work to online Intranet activity as well. This group is
only responsible for the Intranet for the Technology Department. In order to
accommodate the need for deeper development knowledge ofweb technologies such
as ASP (Active Server Pages) and to add dynamism to the Intranet, the firm recruits
labour. This labour comes in the form of contractors who end up forming the
majority of the skilled resource required. For Praxis, the Lead Web Developer and
part-time Developer are both contractors as is the ASP developer who was hired.
The more sophisticated multimedia applications developed within TCN
required extended skill sets to be accommodated. During the case, we see the
Research Group Project Manager using a number of strategies to create a formal
department as an 'Intranet Centre of Excellence' which will hold the 'power
resource' of the multimedia capability formalizing the Research Group Project
Manager's role. In the TCN case, only the Project Manager was a BigBank
employee. The problem this strategy creates is that maintenance of a key technology
is subsequently reliant on resources BigBank does not 'own'. The issues this can
cause are evident when the Technical Lead for the TCN project leaves for six months
to get married and go on honeymoon. A full time employee's holiday allowance
would not allow for this length of absence, thereby guarding against the problems it
can create.
Through the projects, we see the new skills become more entrenched and
formalised within the organisation. Reputational networks (Whitley, 1988) form,
combining expertise to deliver projects. Members of these networks are enrolled
repeatedly across processes as their knowledge claims become entrenched through
perceived success. The social learning gained by actors through these successes gain
increasing importance as multimedia adoption grows, generating increased need for
BigBank to provide expert support. Innovations driven by the informal structure
thereby impact the formal structure. As the formal structure begins to use and see
value in these innovations, they must protect their investment and reliance with
organisational support. The creation of formal expertise capability relies upon
qualitative judgements referencing intangible metrics such as reputation. The
evolution ofweb capabilities across projects from NMM ad hoc team structure to the
proposed formalisation of an 'intranet centre of excellence' in TCN supports the
176
evolutionary development of specialisation (Pettigrew, 1975) through a socio¬
political process (Wood and Kelly, 1982; Cockburn, 1985; Burns and Stalker, 1961).
Consideration of the development of expertise and ownership of knowledge across
projects shows this broader social process.
For the NMM project, ongoing ownership was not an issue as it was an
exploratory investigation. While a temporary team was established to conduct the
project, ownership within the organisation rested with the Research Group who then
organised the sharing of the project discoveries with the relevant parties. The
demonstrations and results of this work were used to enhance the Research Group's
perceived capability to perform multimedia work. Research Group's revised
multimedia knowledge claims were reinforced when the development resource they
used for this work was brought into the TCN project. This provided benefits to the
TCN on two levels, primarily the improved perception through use of expert
resources but also the transfer of social learning from another multimedia innovation.
During the early stages of the Praxis project, ownership was held by the
temporary team headed by the Research Group Project Manager. The ownership was
then formalised and placed with the Communications Group causing a large
expansion of their areas of responsibility. This in turn caused the addition of new
positions in their team, e.g. Web Developer, and placed them at the centre of the
Content Co-ordination network. Associated training courses in web skills represented
a formal investment in this technical capability. This was typical of the firm as it
found formalising ownership of artefacts easier than establishing expert groups. By
setting ownership of the system, expertise was focused on the owner group. The
Research Group Project Manager did not accept the formal managerial role as the
level of seniority did not fit the personal agenda.
For the TCN project, a new section was established to own the project.
Challenges emerged as they worked to set up and develop interdependencies to other
sections in order to fulfil their role. This led to attempts at establishing an Intranet
Centre of Excellence. The Research Group Project Manager worked to position
herself as the head of that section. She aligned herself with other actors and created a
reputational network to legitimise her capability to run such a section and to justify
the need for it. As this was a new area, she avoided accusations of encroachment
common with the development ofnew specialisations.
Internal actors were reliant upon reputation built upon previous history and
validation from other actors. This supports the role of reputational networks
(Whitley, 1988) to support knowledge claims and therefore perceptions of
technology value. Knowledge acquisition and capturing social learning during the
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process of expertise development are only valuable if they can be presented and gain
legitimation with a wider audience. NMM demonstrations and 'word-of-mouth'
publicity from community members were essential for those involved to establish
knowledge claims. Similarly, the value of capability of the Praxis team is
disseminated and established by Content Co-ordinators and 'Friends of Praxis'
communicating to the user base. The Research Group Project Manager conducts
presentations within the firm raising profile and perception with influential actors.
For TCN, perceptions and exposure are critical to success. The 'spin' tactics and
presentations of the Senior Corporate Affairs Executive and the Corporate
Communications Executive legitimise claims with the BigBank Board.
These tactics allow both individuals and groups to establish and legitimise
their reputations. This is important because when they are viewed as having valuable
knowledge or expertise, their ability to advance their influence in the organisation is
enhanced.
The very nature of multimedia as a communications tool lends itself to the
creation of expert reputation as the system owners can use it to promote their role
and can be contacted through it. Its use is very visible and this allows its owners to
raise and promote their involvement.
The fact that the Communications Group is viewed as the hub for Intranet
activity in technology with the Research Group Project Manager involved in the
corporate rollout, attests to the legitimisation of their knowledge via this method.
This supports Pettigrew's (1975) assertion that knowledge claims are legitimised by
gaining recognition of knowledge claims, allowing them to act as owners and traders
of that knowledge.
8.3.7 Formalised accommodation of technical resources:
responsibilities of support
In order for multimedia applications to retain an ongoing role within the
organisation, the formal organisation must make accommodation for them.
Reorganisation was required in order to accommodate this inclusion. The most
obvious formal change that happened with the decision to introduce new technology,
was the acknowledgement that the organisation would support it. This required
compatibility with existing organisational standards, and, where necessaiy, the
creation of new standards. Organisational standards are designed to ensure cohesion
with existing technology and ensure appropriate support resource is available.
Recommended principles for standards are consensus, usability, feasibility and
harmonisation (Ruggles, 1990). The bank's adherence to these principles was ad hoc
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and subjective. While some principles were followed to varying degrees, socio¬
political drivers were apparent behind some of the standards.
Standard compliance was most rigorous concerning the inclusion of
multimedia technologies on the bank Network. The support for this was the
responsibility of the IT Services group within the Technology Department. This is
why this section is included in each project.
Through the projects, we also witness shifts in the formal organisation to
support the innovations and resulting systems through the creation of standards and
guidelines concerning the initiatives. IT Services helped setting up the test bed for
NMM to give an accurate indication of the issues they would face with multimedia
content. For Praxis, the IT Services team approved the system and had maintenance
handed over to their Web technology team. For TCN, the IT Services team was
brought in at the inception so the development team could understand what they
required to ensure a smooth transition onto the network.
Standards for multimedia evolved through the projects as the Technology
Department gained knowledge and understanding of the technology. Tests performed
in the initial NMM case confirmed conformance to previously existing standards and
established a benchmark. Key deliverables from NMM were the technical
quantification of the broadcast options and guidelines/lessons learned on how to
achieve the best results when sending loads of this type. The social learning gained
during this project were distributed within the Technology Department through the
use of expert resources in subsequent projects. Difficulties experienced during
content conversion supported the need for the harmonisation within standards. In
order for the information to be shared effectively, it needs to have been made
available in the correct, agreed format.
The Praxis project established content sharing standards and via the Content
Co-ordinator network, a method of diffusing and governing these standards.
Unwittingly, this also served as a channel for actors to share social learning across
the group. Training courses also supported standard adoption. Acceptance of Praxis
standards was a key stage to allow decentralised publishing.
8.3.8 Formalisation and Evolution of Standards
The creation and enforcement of standards can also exclude and marginalise
actors and groups. A number of intranets that pre-dated the Praxis system were
eliminated or absorbed as a result of the standards propagated by the Praxis team.
Praxis was established as the premier intranet through senior approval and faster user
growth. Previous intranets generally covered a single section preventing them from
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building a critical mass of users, an important stage in establishing standards (OECD,
1991). Control over standards provided the Praxis team with governance of intranet
style, publishing and management so their power was legitimised.
The ascendance of networked delivery of multimedia and associated
standards drove the CD-ROM based role of Learning Technologies into
obsolescence. At the outset of our study, Learning Technologies, a department in
Human Resources, was responsible for multimedia training delivered via CD-ROM.
CD-ROM was the sole medium accessed via stand-alone PCs. The department's
combined technology and training function had evolved due to initiatives in the
Human Resources section that could not be satisfied, at the time, by the Technology
Department due to lack of expertise. Because the technology did not impact on the
other technology operations, their existence outside the Technology Department was
accepted. The new possibilities for networked delivery changed this amicable
situation.
Incompatibilities between the standards for stand-alone clients and networked
delivery emerged immediately. The stand-alone applications were rendered obsolete
by the new networked direction supported by influential actors, thus reversing this
earlier selection. The ability of the TCN system to provide a superior training
experience combined with the Intranet was a compelling argument. It was no longer
technically realistic for the section providing this to exist outside the Technology
Department. The area of ownership held by Learning Technologies was being
undermined by shifts in technology and organisational logic and requirements. As a
result, the section was disbanded having been usurped by technology and the
responsibilities it held split between the Training function of Human Resources and
Technology Department. As a by-product, social learning was retained and shared
within the employees' new roles.
The evolution of multimedia standards occurred through a process of
consensus shaped by environmental factors. Consensus building was linked to
communities of interest created by Technology Statespeople. Acceptance involved
negotiation and acceptance of a mutually beneficial option which was not necessarily
rigorously considered. Consensus was rarely aligned along other logical principles of
standards which seemed secondary to political acceptance. This demonstrates social
shaping within the creation of standards and the influence of informal structures on
formal. The reason there is so much interest in influencing the creation of standards
is that they are strong tools for implementing power maintenance strategies, allowing
the inclusion or exclusion of certain areas.
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The requirement for this adherence to these standards necessitates some
group to enforce them and to enable sanctions on non-compliance. This
responsibility for standards provides a great deal of power to the controllers of these
standards with regard to excluding or including parties from access to these power
resources. By employing the adherence to standards, the organisations and various
power holders within it were able to exert a level of control.
Socio-economic elements affected technology standard formation. The
Microsoft NetShow development tool was selected due to the project sponsor's
interest and low price. Similarly, the development tool for Praxis content, Microsoft
FrontPage, was selected due to economic considerations as it was free and the design
guidelines were set due to the whim of the lead developer. Selection of a proprietary
Microsoft standard endangered future technical options. This goes against Ruggles'
principles as well as failing to embrace existing standards. The standard used for the
bank CD-ROMs was such that it did not translate into ASF so all the material built
up on that medium was rendered obsolete. This was a self-inflicted redundancy as
the standards used there had failed to follow the principles outlined and in
themselves had inhibited technical innovation by not following any of the general
market standards.
In forming new standards, those perceived as having knowledge of these new
technologies are called upon to give advice as to what these standards should be,
allowing them to use reputational credibility as a means to determine them. So the
involvement within a reputational network can benefit the actor's position and power
in seeing their views expressed within the formal standards.
While the informal organisation will influence the creation of standards, it is
ultimately the role of the formal organisation. This formal power can be used as a
tool to ensure that the new innovations will operate in line with existing operations
and thereby adhering to previous organisational decisions creating entrenchment
along certain avenues of technical development. We saw, however, with the case of
Learning Technologies that these decisions can be reversed.
Standards presented an important power maintenance tool and means for the
formal organisation to create a cohesive strategy despite the influence of micro
actors. The ability to reverse previous decisions was an important aspect allowing
recovery from mistaken selection.
8.3.9 Role of Technology Department moves from creator to
orchestrator
Through the cases, the role and responsibilities of the Technology
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Department changed from creator to orchestrator, a shift observed in a number of
studies concerning the organisational application of configurational technologies
(Fleck, 1994; Fincham, 1995; Williams and Proctor, 1996). The Technology
Department was required to create and align a community containing a number of
disparate groups. Communities drew on both external and internal parties from
business unit users, to technology suppliers, to technical specialists. Effective
development required this group to provide relevant and effective knowledge,
whether sourced internally or externally. Within each project, we witness the
Technology Statespeople from the BigBank IT group acting as a generalist specialist
(Fincham, 1995) through application of hybrid expertise to mediate each community.
The ability to match business needs to technology possibilities was a core skill for
Technology Statespeople and reflected the revised role of the macro department.
This is representative of the shift in the role of technology with the members
of the IT department creating an interface for the organisation and various technical
artefact companies and specialists. The Technology Department was able to provide
local knowledge of the organisation to configure the systems bringing knowledge
required to combine the components into a system that delivers the requirements for
BigBank users. This changed the engagement between user and supplier and raised
the challenge ofdefining who the user of the system was.
The change in the role of technology created a three-tiered relationship with
the suppliers of the generic systems that were used by the Technology Department to
create systems for the BigBank end-users. Within our study, the Technology
Department seeks to moderate 'end-user customisation' (Williams and Proctor,
1996). Communities of interest create a composite end-user requirement moderated
by BigBank standards. In corporate environments, there are multiple audiences and
therefore multiple users. The Technology Department needs to moderate user
innovation as complete personalization of systems would be uneconomic and
unsupportable.
The Technology Department fulfilled the role of customer/user to technology
suppliers. In reality, they are more of a composite 'user' as they drew together
requirements from a range of users. In turn they presented technological
opportunities to internal business units. While the motivation behind individual
projects is actor's advancement, in order for any of its initiatives to be approved, it
needs to demonstrate a business need and therefore a user need. As a result of the
number of actors affected by the integrated multimedia application in our cases,
multiple user types are involved. This complexity is appreciated within literature
with various perspectives on user-led innovation, human-computer interaction and
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user centred design methodologies. Each argues the importance of the users within
the design process. Within our cases, these techniques were used sporadically and
primarily to support the views of sponsors and team members. These actors served as
'proxies' for sections of the wider user groups, utilising testing techniques to
legitimise their opinions.
Within the NMM project, testing was performed on a sample group drawn
from university staff and students who were taken as being able to represent the end-
user group, as they represented a similar demographic balance and skill set to bank
staff. Test results were favourable and supported the legitimacy of project results but
the opinions of influencers within BigBank, such as Learning Technologies and
Corporate Communications exerted greater influence in designing the usability of the
system.
The Praxis system survey also gathered user views which were used to
validate the roadmap for future Intranet developments. Decisions on what initiatives
to engage in were effectively agreed before the results were received as the manner
in which the questions were asked was slanted to support these decisions. For
example, the need for greater interactivity, supported by the survey, was a view the
section had received from the Content Co-ordinators and had already been acted
upon. The survey merely provided the illusion of involvement within design.
For the TCN case, the involvement of the trainers from Human Resources
provided support for the system as well as bringing in the content. The trainers also
had a more direct input into system design than users in the other cases as they were
given the resources to design the Took and feel' of the system.
From this evidence across the cases, we see some use ofHCI techniques with
user testing and surveys but the direct results of these are far less significant than the
socio-political direction for actors within the community of interest. In no case do we
see test results influencing the development of the technology. In contrast the social
shaping aspects are evident and impact in each instance. These aspects are delivered
by community actors who act as 'proxies' for the BigBank user group. The
Technology Department operated to fulfil user needs in a manner they deemed best,
as opposed to obeying the findings of best practice techniques. From then-
appreciation of the internal user requirements, they had to identify technology
options within the market that could fulfil those needs. With Multimedia this
required a range of component technologies.
The Technology Department's role in configuring systems is assisted by
suppliers offering more-or-less standardised technological components that can be
configured together on a pick-and-mix basis to meet user requirements, although as
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witnessed with content, standard incompatibilities do exist. This has allowed
components to be 'picked and mixed' to meet project objectives (Williams and
Proctor, 1996). This allowed project teams to exchange components dependent on
political pressures.
The Technical Department serves as a 'middleman' controlling the supply
channel to end customer corporate bank. Both parties with whom they interact are
reliant on their knowledge. The suppliers need them to identify the business issues
their offerings can cater for while the business needs the reverse. The Technology
Department essentially acts as a translator and guide for each party. This agrees with
other literature which has studied the operation of Technology Departments in
similar projects and found that situation to exist.
Whilst this was written at a time when most technology was built in-house
before the move to componentised, configurational technology, the principles remain
the same. As we have seen in the case studies, this link to external sources of
knowledge is still required. The additional insight we receive here is the tactics
required to maintain this role and the informal conflict and negotiation that occurs in
trying to do this. This is due to the more visual, user friendly aspects of the
technology which make it more decipherable by business users. This causes the
Technology Department to have to act to reinforce their role as in TCN with JNM
and BT.
Communities of interest require Technology Departments to manage a
complex assortment of suppliers, users, sponsors and specialists. In this capacity, the
Technology Department and its representatives acted as gatekeepers and moderators
between the various parties. Managing these relationships offered the Technology
Department an influential role. By managing supplier relationships, the Department
moderated access to new technology options for the entire organisation.
Friction occurred between development teams and corporate bank
relationship managers tasked with managing business units' awareness and adoption
of technology. Conflict arose around when and how to communicate technology
opportunities to bank business units. In some instances, development teams worked
around relationship managers to present opportunities to gain momentum around
particular initiatives, particularly Praxis and TCN. This provided the teams with
influence over budget owners and suppliers. To business units, they held knowledge
of technical opportunities while to suppliers, they acted as gatekeepers to the
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potential revenue from BigBank. This provided a powerful but complex role similar
to the IS Roles witnessed by Fincham (1995).1
Within the NMM project, Technology Strategy applied tactics to maximise
benefit for BigBank from its supplier relationships strategy used for managing the
suppliers of network equipment. BigBank used two suppliers, 3Com and Cisco, for
network equipment and pitted them against each other for bids to supply equipment.
Desire to advance their position versus their competitor motivated Cisco to offer
equipment and facilities to the NMM project. From this, we see some social shaping
of the technology within NMM as the choice to use Cisco equipment over 3Com was
economic, based on the fact that they provided the equipment for free. It also met the
standards set by the department limiting selection to Cisco and 3Com. If equipment
had been offered from another supplier, such as Ericsson, it would have been
unacceptable. Use of standards is therefore an important tactic in managing supply
relationships.
With the power offered by this role, it is unsurprising that the department
faced challenges from both internal users and external suppliers. Suppliers attempted
to use alternative routes and political tactics to position themselves directly with
decision makers within BigBank.
The TCN project showed an example of a supplier circumventing the
Technology Section. Corporate Communications had met a company called JNM at
some conferences giving them a direct relationship with the project decision-makers.
This allowed JNM to sell their perceived abilities and establish themselves without
the technical scrutiny that the Technology Department would have placed them
under. The Corporate Communications section of the Retail Bank introduced JNM to
the Technology element of the TCN initiative, with a view that the company could
provide functionality for the interactive training.
At around the same time, another bank supplier BT approached the Corporate
Communications Executive from Corporate Communications directly, instead of
working through the Technology section, as they held the budget for the project. BT
'offered' to perform the work themselves as they argued they had better resources to
deliver the project. This caused problems for the Technology Department as external
parties had some advantages over the internal section when bidding for work. The
1 Fincham observed technology departments acting 'as the gatekeepers of external sources of
knowledge, they largely determined the timing and scope of recourse to suppliers constraining
interaction between in-house and external supply'.
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BigBank business units have greater visibility of the Technology Department's
resources and capabilities than an external party. This gives the external party greater
latitude regarding the capabilities they can claim and the perception they create. In
response, the Technology Department has to use some political tactics in order to
enforce its position.
The JNM group were enlisted into the project by the Technology team to
solidify their claim of expertise against BT. This proved successful but this situation
shows the need for the Technology Department to use power maintenance strategies
to protect their position. It also shows the conflict between technical specialists and
hierarchical management. In order to allow leverage against the Technology
Department, it could be argued that Corporate Communications demonstrated its
options of selection when resourcing this project by speaking to both companies. The
result was that Technology had to involve JNM despite their reservations about the
technical capability of their solution.
The heart of the technology mission remained the operation of BigBank's
technical infrastructure. Maintenance of these elements and its support of the
activities in BigBank are core functions of the Technology Department as it takes the
role of a Network Gatekeeper. This is the basis for this Department's operations, as
all its decisions and, as we have seen, influence, revolves around this responsibility.
As detailed, this task was a key lever for the Technology Department's increased
involvement in multimedia. Without the test results ofNMM, the subsequent projects
would not have occurred.
The changes to the BigBank environment by Multimedia technology were
driven by Technology Statespeople managing communities of interest. Communities
operated through a complex dynamic affected by social, cultural, political and
technical factors. The relationship of these aspects within the community would
serve to forge the technical trajectory of the innovation.
8.4 PROCESS OF CHANGE
In the previous sections, we have looked at the causes and effects of
multimedia innovation within BigBank. Within this section, we shall consider the
model of innovation it follows and the factors affecting it.
In the case studies, we identified the twin forces of actor's advancement and
technological opportunity that fuelled innovation projects. The innovations studied
required a number of events to occur to advance. The project must be formally
approved by the organisation in order to gain budget and official access to resources.
186
Senior sponsors played a key role in achieving this approval. Access to resources
required this approval but also needed Technology Statespeople to enrol and align
resource owners within a community of interest around the project to ensure access.
Projects tended to evolve through initial opportunity identification by the
Technology Statesperson or sponsor: resources are then sought through enrolment
and negotiation with actors. Formal approval occurs at some point during this
process with the alignment of actors and resources being necessary throughout the
development.
The process witnessed within the case studies supports the interactive model
of innovation proposed by social shaping theorists, rejecting the deterministic model.
The enrolment and interaction of the community members served as an important
area in affirming this shaping process through social aspects impacting technical
decisions.
We have seen a number of choices made during the process, for example to
use NetShow for the testing of NMM due to sponsor preference. This supports the
core precept of SST that technology development contains choices with uncertain
outcomes, affected by complex social processes. Again in TCN, the JNM technology
component, whilst technically inferior, is included due to sponsor preference and as
the Technology Department seeks to protect its position.
8.4.1 Communities of Interest: An arena for choice. What do
communities consist of? Variety of actors, suppliers, sponsors and
users.
The technical trajectory of each innovation is a product of the community of
interests creation, alignment and evolution. This is a process that involved the
creation and selection of a number of choices and trade-offs based on actors' agendas
and environmental considerations. These communities were informal structures
acting to influence the formal structure. The existence, operation and decision
making criteria have been the subject of numerous studies (Bums and Stalker, 1961;
Pettigrew, 1975; Whipp and Clark, 1986) but here we gain a refined view across
linked cases encompassing the pre-project stages.
The creation and constituents of each community of interest were driven by a
Technology Statesperson, acting to fulfil the sponsor's initial agenda. Initial agendas
included the technical evaluation of multimedia tools (NMM) to desire for intranet
activity (Praxis).
Communities of interest were formed around these initial agendas which
were shaped due to a complexity of factors including political motivations and
187
technical restrictions. Actors are enrolled due to their ownership of an artefact or
skill valuable to the project which they provided, in expectation of benefits for their
own agendas, through involvement. Communities succeed through enrolment of a
'sufficient' level of resources in order to gain formal approval. In addition to
necessary resources, approval also required an approved business case.
Sponsor enrolment serves as the catalyst for each community. This occurs
through a variety of means. For NMM, the Change Management Executive sponsor
approached the Research Group whereas for Praxis, the Research Group Project
Manager approached the Technology Director as her friendship with the Technology
Director's Executive Assistant had advised her of the interest in intranets. With a
sponsor obtained, the Technology Statesperson would proceed to create a community
of interest around the opportunity.
Enrolling the Community of Interest
The Technology Statesperson would enlist this support using various tactics
to gain this actor's involvement and support and more importantly gain access to
resources required for the project. As discussed previously, the new technology
represents a potential new power resource. In order for each of the projects to
happen, the team needed to align existing power resources, e.g. equipment, access to
network, expertise, and so on. The need and process to align the community supports
Vergragt's (1988) view that 'doable problems' require the alignment of the technical
and social worlds through the coordinated efforts of various actors. He further
contends that in order to achieve this alignment, the structure and direction of
technology must be negotiated as these aspects are aligned.
Within the case studies, the Technology Statespeople had to negotiate with
the owners of these resources to gain access. Negotiation required alignment of the
actor's agenda with that of the innovation in a mutually beneficial manner. What was
beneficial differed from actor to actor through variances in their situation and
agenda. They each possessed a different interpretation of the innovation and what it
represented.
Much of the initial negotiation occurs during the pre-project setting. Pre-
project trading gives an insight into how Technology Statespeople enrol actors into
their network using quasi-commitments and setting informal expectations around the
value actors will receive from their involvement when the project is formalised.
Resources are aligned prior to formalisation in each project through informal
agreements, which do, however, require formal approval to be actionned.
188
Actors enrolled in communities based on subjective judgments of the value
the project would offer to them. This was often necessitated by the limited economic
means available to these experimental investigations. During the project phase, no
budget was assigned at all so any expectations were based on the subjective
judgment of the project gaining approval. The use of quasi-commitments and
potential benefits applied to external and internal parties alike.
NMM's sponsor possessed no budget but enlisted the Research Group due to
his position as valued customer of standing within the formal organisation. The
Research Group perceived benefits through gaining a hierarchical ally within the
organisation and the opportunity to enhance their reputation for identifying and
assessing new technology areas for the bank. The Research Group in turn enlisted
Technical Strategy and IT Services by agreeing that the experimentation with
NetShow could be linked with these sections' interest in the effects of multimedia
loads on the performance of the BigBank Network. This negotiation created the
business case for the project. This then went for formal approval as discussed later.
The perceived value of multimedia expertise served as a consistent lure for
enrolment. The Praxis team traded on the 'buzz' around web/intranet technologies so
that people would commit time feeling they were learning something that would
allow them to advance their situation. The network of Content Co-ordinators was
based on this attraction. Content Co-ordinators provided content and promoted the
intranet within their departments. This function was unpaid requiring the employee
to devote their personal time.
Content Co-ordinators were eligible for web training courses, a restricted and
highly valued privilege. The cost of the course was covered by personnel training
budgets assigned by the company. This provided the Praxis team with access to
individual section's information content following the respective Content Co¬
ordinator's web training, a critical resource for the system to succeed. Access to and
monitoring of this information was the value that the Content Co-ordinators traded
on in order to evolve into valuable internal actors.
As projects progressed and multimedia gained greater profile within
BigBank, actors became more interested in being involved in projects. TCN gained
the interest of the training section through offering them a new interesting medium
for training. This and the high profile, helped to enlist the support of the, recently
arrived, Head of Training. TCN managed to get his buy-in by offering the
opportunity to make a quick impression through association in a high profile project.
The enrolment of Human Resources and the Training boosted the project's
credibility.
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In creating the community, Technology Statespeople need to consider not
only the resources necessary but the creation of perceived capability. The
involvement of Edinburgh University contributed to both elements. Edinburgh
University's involvement was gained quasi, informal commitments in return for
resources but more importantly, independent and academic credibility. The majority
of the testing across the cases was performed using University facilities and
resources. The NMM study used EUCS labs and resources for development and
usability testing which was conducted on university subjects. Praxis user surveys
were conducted by the participant observer who also worked as part of the TCN
development team. The participant observer shared social learning from each project
across the cases and Technology Statespeople used the academic association to
support the credibility of the projects and results. The University participant observer
also gained access to valuable case material.
In some instances, Technology Statespeople enrolled resources for perception
alone, as they assisted marginalisation of competitors. The involvement of JNM
within the TCN case was used to marginalise a competitive threat from BT and
appease the wishes of the project sponsor.
JNM were a technology supplier who had managed to bypass the Technology
Department and meet the Corporate Communications Executive sponsoring Praxis.
JNM produced a technology offering that polled electronic responses and created
GUI presentations of results with connected analytic ability. Their application had
been mainly used at conferences, at which they met the Corporate Communications
Executive. The sponsor was impressed by the application but investigation by the
TCN team exposed a number of technical and organisational weaknesses in their
proposition making it unsuitable for the bank. JNM were very enticed by the
reputational benefits of working with BigBank as well as the possible future revenue
possibilities. The perception ofCorporate Communications was that JNM had proven
expertise relevant to the TCN project.
The TCN team only included JNM when Corporate Communications began
discussions with BT. BT proposed developing and providing the whole system for
BigBank, excluding the TCN team. In order to fend off this approach, the TCN team
enrolled JNM to reinforce their perceived capability to deliver the solution. In reality,
the TCN team had to re-engineer the JNM solution to deliver the project. As a result,
JNM gained a vastly improved enterprise level project. The inclusion of Studio
Videos (TV broadcast team) within TCN was another example of poor technical
components being included based on perceived expertise. Technology Statespeople
when constructing the community of interest, need not only to understand the
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technical reality of the actors and artefacts but also how they are perceived,
perception frequently having more importance.
In order for each project to achieve formal approval, it required an accepted
business case. This justification was retrofitted requiring the Technology
Statesperson and sponsor to align the informal community with an acceptable
motivation.
8.4.2 Business purpose: Funding and Resources
With the variety of personal agendas operating within the organisation and
fuelled by the desire for advancement, placing factions in opposition, it is extremely
important that the formal organisation ensures that the needs of BigBank are met.
The requirement for an acceptable business case for each initiative was a mechanism
used by BigBank to protect the interests of the formal structure. Business reasons
were retrofitted on each project in contrast with the belief that business need for
projects is identified first in order to justify the project. The business purpose was
reached via negotiation and agreement between the parties involved and the formal
sponsors.
In each case, the parties involved have different objectives that they are
looking to achieve from the project, with the core objective being that of individual
advancement. Following agreement around these aspects, the business reason is then
presented. In NMM, the motivation was the Change Planning Executive's interest in
NetShow with the testing of the network a result of negotiation with Technical
Strategy and IT Services. For Praxis it was due to the Technology Director's peer
pressure and for TCN the desire was for a vehicle to expand the Corporate
Communications Executive and the Resource Group Project Manager's roles. The
business reasons provided for each were, as follows:
For NMM, the benefits of understanding the implications of carrying these
loads were added to justify examining NetShow and fulfilling the interests of the
other groups. The business purpose was to evaluate the effect on the system of
multimedia loads that would be relevant to BigBank activities. BigBank was aware
that at some point they would have to deal with loads of that type and wanted to
know what steps they would need to take for their network to handle them.
The Praxis business case was that it would provide an improved method of
storing, organising and retrieving information. It would replace the outmoded J-drive
system and provide the 'one true word' of information.
For the TCN case, the benefits were built on those of Praxis as it was built
onto the corporate rollout of the Intranet. It also had a cost-benefit for BigBank
191
which was required to provide a large amount of training, e.g. regarding the new EU
monetary legislation. By setting up this training network, BigBank would save
money on booking training facilities, paying for employees to travel to and stay at
the training facilities plus not lose man-hours with the person being out of the office.
The Training Network was added to the Corporate Intranet to provide a
bottom line reason which the Board would understand instead of the vague and
diffuse benefits of the Intranet. In addition to the construction of the business case it
needed to be presented effectively. Presentation and lobbying of the BigBank board
to approve the TCN project demonstrated considerable sophistication. The original
project aim was to expand the Praxis Intranet model across the company. They
diagnosed that the selling point of the system would be the 'bottom line' benefits and
as a result they sought to find a way to accommodate this perception. The training
possibilities that they had seen in the NMM demonstrations fitted with the training
requirements of BigBank and provided the cost-benefit.
As a result of changes in EU regulation, BigBank would have to train a
number of its employees in these regulations. In addition to the costs of the trainers
BigBank would incur costs for venue, accommodation and travel for attendees plus
loss of revenue from their time out of the branches. By setting up the training in a
multimedia format over the network, they would save on these costs. This then
created the platform for the business case.
The enlistment went further as Corporate Communications produced a video
which they showed to Board members to engage their support prior to the official
Board meeting to approve the project. They sold to the Board members the fact that
they would have cost-benefits and a system more advanced than any of their
competitors, thus appealing to the business vanity of the senior executives.
When these projects where viewed later, it would appear that these were the
business reasons that had been identified. Due to the view gained by the
methodology employed for this thesis, we were able to view the socio-political
drivers which created these initiatives and the projects. Typical post-project
examination would have observed projects fitting a normative mode, ignorant of the
activities of the pre-project phase. The insight of participant involvement across all
stages of linked projects demonstrating the dynamics of social shaping in the
informal organisation would have been obscured within the fog of post-hoc
rationalisation.
While projects received formal approval, this only enabled access to
relatively meagre budgets. As technology projects were perceived as cost savers
instead of revenue generators, grand investments were not considered. Each initiative
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needed to prove its worth on a low budget in order to receive any more funding
required. TCN is an amalgamation of Praxis and NMM on a larger scale. The fact
that these technologies had proved themselves on lower budgets in smaller
environments provides them with the validity to try for funding for the bigger TCN
project.
The impact of economic factors can be seen across projects. The use of
Microsoft NetShow for NMM was not solely due to the Change Management
Executive's personal view as Microsoft, Cisco and Intel provided testing applications
and equipment free of cost. The consortium's motivation was not charity driven.
Through support and collaboration with BigBank they would gain insight and social
learning on the environment and use of multimedia offerings aiding future
innovation. Collaboration between supplier and user is consistent with the interactive
model within emergent markets where offerings are being developed and require
'user' involvement. While research has considered this at a market level for discrete
Multimedia applications, insight into this process within the corporate environment is
scarce. Within case studies, suppliers repeatedly offer applications at low price to
gain adoption.
Economic considerations combined with social factors to impact technology
selection for the Praxis and TCN cases. The decision to use Microsoft FrontPage as
the development tool for Praxis was based on the fact that it was free and the lead
developer for the project liked it. Also Microsoft applications were entrenched within
BigBank. This was despite the fact that many other tools existed that may have
provided superior functionality albeit at a higher cost. Non-technical factors
established this as the best application to use. Here we see socio-economic factors
influencing technology decisions (Hughes, 1983; Law, 1992).
The TCN projects technological trajectory was impacted by BigBank's desire
to increase return on investment from previous technology selections. The planned
use of TVs was to pander to the Board who had already invested substantial amounts
on that system and wanted to feel it was correct by maximising the return on their
investment. This was despite the fact that the NMM tests had shown that the
BigBank network could accommodate loads of that type being sent over it. The use
of Microsoft NetShow for those tests and the subsequent experimentation with its
sister product, NetMeeting, in the labs led to that being selected for use in the TCN
project. These links to the previous project validated the Research Group's work and
enlisted their assistance with the TCN project. Despite the existence of a superior
method, combining operation and use in one device, the satellite option preferred by
the Board was selected. This choice ensured the support of the Board for the project.
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The operation of the community of interest does not terminate upon project
approval. Throughout the development of the projects, we witness their impact,
combined with that of the wider environment, upon the technological trajectory of
multimedia innovation. Through management of the community, Technology
Statespeople may exert influence outwith their formal role. The Praxis community of
interest allowed the Research Group Project Manager, the pre-project Project
Champion, to maintain influence over the project via her friendship with the
Technology Director's Executive Assistant. The Communications Department Head
reported into the Technology Director's Executive Assistant who informally liaised
with the Research Group Project Manager to direct the project.
Technology Statespeople must utilise the community to technically deliver
the system and manage the perceived progress and success of the innovation. As a
result of the various agendas of actors, the presentation of the project to all relevant
groups should be appropriate as this will affect their benefit and success perceptions.
Technology Statespeople attempt to set expectations so that the perceived
reality of the technology bears relation to the technical reality to make it deliverable.
The perceived expertise of the Technology Statespeople when making these claims is
an important factor. Within our studies, the Technology Statespeople possessed
sufficient reputation to support their claims. In fact the success of each project
further assisted the legitimacy of claims.
The manner of communication of project results was as important as the
results. During the NMM, expectations were carefully managed by the project team.
Locating the development lab at the University allowed the Research Group to fully
control who saw the work, when and how. Project work presentations to business
units included the relationship manager for that section, responsible for managing
technology awareness and adoption within their assigned department, who attended
along with business owners. Immediate discussion was allowed on opportunities and
business needs in a controlled manner. The relationship manager received full
knowledge of what the business owner had viewed and the ability to identify and
qualify the possibilities.
The visual demonstration possibilities provided by Multimedia innovation
positively impacted the delivery of the project's findings. These demonstrations
gave visual evidence that the Technology section had the capability to deliver
projects of this type in a way that could be understood by the layman. This
established knowledge claims and created the avenues for further multimedia work
by the Technology Department. This visibility was something that BT and other
competitors for the project could not demonstrate. From an internal technology
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perspective this also demonstrated the Research Group's value in pursuing these
projects and their capability in delivering them. The visual aspect of multimedia
made this relevant and differentiated from less visual technologies. This process
allowed the project team to effectively stage manage and deliver the successful
findings of the project in the best setting.
Project sponsors were also concerned with perceptions created by the
published report. The Change Planning Executive was concerned about negative, yet
accurate, aspects of the report. These aspects discussed the considerations required
when building loads and mentioned some of the difficulties that could arise. While it
was aimed at providing practical assistance, he felt it highlighted these problems too
much. This demonstrates the concern with creating a beneficial perceived reality
whilst filtering aspects of the technical reality.
Creation of a positive perception was also managed by the Praxis community
of interest. When reviewing the system survey, they decided that the weighting
should be on beneficial wording to create a positive feeling to the system. This was
more important than maintaining the objectivity of the survey. Both situations
demonstrate attempts to shape the social reality of technology. It is important to note
that these attempts are designed to enhance technical realities as opposed to pure
social creation of technical 'myths' divorced from reality.
The communication and perception management process was managed
throughout the project. During the Praxis project the technology presentation was
altered during the project. In order to gain initial enrolment, the Praxis team raised
expectations of what was possible with the technology and their ability to deliver
these possibilities. Once enrolment and project approval were gained, expectations
were tempered to more realistic levels. Within the Praxis case, the business owners
were sold the overall vision. Their relationship managers from technology would
subsequently tone down what was possible. Expectations of richer functionality were
constrained until development resource to deliver that functionality had been
recruited. A number of sections requested dynamic features within their areas on the
Intranet but sections with representatives in the 'Friends of Praxis' received
preference.
The nature of multimedia technologies communication capabilities provided
an important medium for managing perception. Perceptions were managed to
marginalise competitors as well as to promote the community. The 'published or be
damned' statement during the Praxis project expressed the fact that sections which
published little on the Intranet were viewed as having little interest and hence
received less support and assistance from the development team. In many cases, the
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lack of publications was due to the system not being ready to handle the type of
content they required. Unfortunately, the quantity of visual representation was used
as the literal indicator of interest.
The Praxis team used this visual representation quantity measure to their
advantage in order to establish the perception of Edinburgh as being the leaders in
Web development. A number of the sections, which had limited presence on the
Intranet, were based in London, mainly because they were traditionally the client-
server experts, and had their own initiatives in the Intranet area outwith Praxis. The
Praxis team presented the lack of content activity as indicative of interest level and
used this to support their position. They bolstered this perception by establishing
standards as a power maintenance strategy. Thus other intranet groups were forced to
align with their initiative. These practices in the NMM and Praxis projects helped the
Technology Department and relevant Technology Statespeople to legitimise
knowledge claims (Pettigrew, 1975) and influence over power resources.
8.5 SUMMARY
Through consideration of the study as a whole, we witness a complex,
interactive innovation process with social and technical considerations intertwined.
The dynamic of Technology Statespeople enlisting new technology opportunities
establishes this relationship which then permeates every impact and choice during
the innovation process. Technology Statespeople use the potential value to the
innovation as an attraction to enrol actors within 'communities of interest' who
negotiate and direct the technology trajectory of the innovation, fashioned through
the interaction of the various agendas. Within the following conclusion section, I will
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Social and technical factors require joint consideration throughout the
multimedia innovation process. This was evident by the factors shaping the
technological trajectory and the process of multimedia innovation throughout this
study, especially within the supplier-user interchange of the configurational
technologies encountered. As a result, the determinist linear model was rejected in
favour of social shaping's interactive model.
Analysis of case study data has enabled the identification of some key
findings to assist organisations acknowledge uncertainty and minimise costly
mistakes when engaging in multimedia innovations. Innovation is driven by the
operation of Technology Statespeople seeking advancement of their individual
agendas through technology opportunities. This operation begins during the pre-
project phase and continues throughout the process including delivery. Appreciation
of the dynamics present within the previously obscured pre-project phase and
Technology Statespeople are presented leading to appraisal of the themes of
multimedia innovation they must navigate. Across each project we faced recurrent
issues arising around the delivery method, content requirements and application of
standards for multimedia. The collage of interests presents a picture of intertwined
social and technical interests challenging the formalised management process of the
Technology Department. The Technology Department's attempts to accommodate
the requirements as orchestrators instead of producers offer beneficial findings
regarding the management of a range of users, suppliers and business sponsors. The
configurational nature of multimedia placed a need for collaboration restrained by
the corporate need to balance user need with corporate objective.
The method of gaining this insight is also considered. In order to gather the
rich case data contained, the research process adopted departed from the study
techniques dominant within this field. The typical use of isolated case studies
analysed through post-project interviews faces two main challenges: actors can post
rationalize decisions and impacts of other projects are not satisfactorily considered.
For this study, the involvement of the researcher as a participant observer
through three linked projects allowed unique insights. Access to the pre-project stage
allowed understanding of the alignment and enrolment activities that occur prior to
formal discussion within the organisation. Involvement in decisions as they are
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made, from initial agenda formulation and establishment of the constituency of
players involved as well as throughout the subsequent development of the project,
provided first hand assessment of the decision mechanics at a micro level. By
drawing on a variety of areas of study, an interdisciplinary lens of analysis was
applied to retain and appreciate the richness of factors at play within these
environments.
9.2 INNOVATION POSSIBILITIES NEGOTIATED DURING PRE-PROJECT
PHASE
Pre-project environments proved a critical stage within the multimedia
innovation process. The environment consisted of a variety of actors working to
advance their own agendas within an informal structure (Bums and Stalker, 1961).
This structure provides actors with an additional route to gain influence beyond the
formal hierarchical structure, supportive of the organisational dynamics noted in
previous studies (Bums and Stalker, 1961). To advance these personal agendas they
create or participate in communities of interest where they buy into a shared agenda
that also benefits their own individual objectives. In this process, choices are made
as to intended business sponsors for the innovation to succeed: allies who possess
key resources required for the innovation and potential opponents who need to be
accommodated or overcome. These communities include actors internal to the
organisation, such as the Technology Department and business units as well as
external actors such as technology vendors.
Communities operated around a shared technology agenda, in this instance,
the creation of multimedia technological resources of value to the organisation. The
exact features of the agenda were impacted by the enrolment process of actors
possessing required artefacts or expertise.
A number of innovation communities existed within the pre-project
environment. Moving from discussion to execution, the community required
alignment and involvement of sufficient resources and formal approval. Formal
approval usually took place once the majority of the resources had been aligned.
Alignment of resources required negotiation with resource owners and
influencers. The Technology Statespeople acted to gain informal agreement to
participate from the owners and influencers of these resources prior to formal
approval. Specific resource requirements are dependent upon the particular project
and the organisational environment but the commonly required resources within
BigBank projects included Technical Facilities and Equipment, the Bank Network,
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Standards, Data, formal internal organisation hierarchy, various suppliers and staff
with relevant expertise.
Actors were enrolled due to their relationship as either owner of or influencer
over particular resources. Enrolment required negotiation between Technology
Statespeople and actors to align actors' personal agendas with the community
agenda to allow mutual benefit. During the pre-project phase, benefits offered by
Technology Statespeople were seldom economic or tangible. Technology
Statespeople offered potential or intangible benefits such as acquired influence,
expertise or reputation.
Negotiations were necessary to deal with the delicate aspect of potential
conflicts, due to new innovations causing disruption of existing balances of power.
Potential issues and opponents were either enrolled or marginalised to allow the
innovation to progress. As a result the process of alignment frequently required
trade-offs. These trade-offs impacted the technical direction of the innovation in
order to accommodate the requirements of certain actors and environmental factors.
The socio-political enrolment process thereby shaped the technical trajectory.
The principal benefit to actors enrolling within communities was access to
resources or knowledge that could assist advancement of their agendas. Exact
benefits varied due to actors' individual agendas but typically involved enhanced
political influence either through artefact ownership or possession of expertise.
Multimedia innovation projects were attractive to actors due to the high
interest within the organisation and business community concerning their potential.
This interest supported their potential as power resources within organisations (Burns
and Stalker, 1961). This perception imparted value not only to the configured
solution but the components as well. Owners and influencers traded on the value of
these components, using them to negotiate benefits from involvement in the
community. A key benefit was eventual influence over the configuration, allowing a
greater level of political power. Technology artefacts' ability to act in this manner
was a key reason for networks to be fonned around them under a shared vision of the
potential resource's overall value and its benefit to the actors involved.
Gaining Multimedia expertise and social learning through technology
creation also attracted community members. Actors constructed knowledge claims
through association with innovation activities and gained reputation for knowledge
as a result. It was also important to enrol actors possessing established knowledge
claims.
Involvement of expert resources benefited the credibility of communities'
ability to deliver the project, a key aspect for approval. Support from 'experts' and
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owners of 'expert' resources such as programmers was also an important aspect of
community building. The embryonic nature of multimedia technology within
corporate environments caused a scarcity of expertise. Thus, the resource was
valuable and actors possessing or controlling this expertise held significant influence.
These actors were able to exert influence above their hierarchical role, such as
HTML developers selecting the visual presentation of the Intranet, a selection
usually made in line with corporate marketing guidelines.
In attempting to assign resources, formal approval required the community
agenda to be aligned against a perceived BigBank need. In the same manner as
individual actors' agendas are served, the initiative had to answer the perceived need
of the formal organisation. In order to advance the shared agenda of the 'community
of interest' and the interests of the various members, they sought to answer issues
faced by the organisation.
Formal approval is necessary for the project to receive the funds, resources
and official permission to proceed. While informal agreements for resources may
exist in the pre-project phase, they still require official validation. In this manner
BigBank established a technique to ensure the activities of the informal structure are
beneficial and not solely dedicated to in-fighting and political positioning. In every
case, however, this objective is reverse engineered on to the initiative. This presented
an interesting and contrary motivation behind the technological activity.
The motivation of advancement was a consistent driver behind projects. This
finding provides an interesting nuance to the 'demand pull' perspective that argues
technology emerges due to market need. In our case, the market need was not
initially economically based but politically motivated. This motivation could be
argued to have created the market for the componentised multimedia solutions. This
view also opposes the 'supply push' perspective as multimedia technologies do not
appear to create a market around their introduction. The market was created by
technical specialists identifying an opportunity and configuring the relevant
components to meet it. In each of our case studies, the opportunity for advancement
constructs or identifies the need to provide a vehicle for this agenda.
Certain actors or Technology Statespeople acted to identify opportunities and
align resources as described above. Political skills were critical as actors chose which
projects to participate in based on their understanding of the importance of the
project to the organisation and the benefits they can gain through involvement. In the
absence of quantifiable means of evaluation, actors took decisions based on existing
knowledge and perception of the project as well as Technology Statespeople's
manipulation. Large groups of actors changed the direction and behaviour towards
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the role of the bank network in multimedia applications. Test results indicated
improved and wider potential for the network and therefore opportunity for
associated parties. The alteration of political agendas as a result of perceptual
alteration is consistent with 'bounded rationality' analyses (Whipp and Clark, 1986)
whereby actors are seen to make 'satisfactory' solutions in the context of incomplete
information through the use of heuristics and repertoires of problem
definitions/solutions instead of executing agendas blindly without consideration or
reaction to the environment (Pettigrew, 1975).
Perception was repeatedly impacted by the actions and statements of actors
considered to possess expertise relevant to the area. As communities received
favourable commentary, they gained credibility and certainty around their value and
likelihood of happening. Evaluation of 'expert' opinions called for perceptual
analysis due to the newness of the technological arena and the difficulties in
assessing an intangible such as expertise.
It was therefore unsurprising that power imparted by possession or
association with resources was variable dependent on existing perception constructed
by a mix of social, technical, economic and political factors. As the importance of
the CD-ROM as a method ofmultimedia delivery decreases across the case studies,
the political influence of the owners of the medium diminishes.
Project leaders emerged during the pre-project phase and remained pivotal
through the project, managing and influencing these changes to the groups'
advantage. The alignment of communities of interest occurs largely through the
efforts of these individuals.
9.3 PROJECT LEADERS REQUIRED TO BE 'TECHNOLOGY
STATESPEOPLE'
The Technology Statesperson occupied a pivotal role throughout the course
of the projects but is of especial key importance during the pre-project phases.
During the pre-project period, the project leader operated to create the initial
alignment of resources for the project. The project leader applied hybrid expertise to
enrol the necessary actors and resources within the community navigating the
negotiation process by which this occurs. This 'steering role' is seen to continue
through the project as the various factors of the social, economic, technical and
political environment maintain the innovations advancement. It is important to draw
distinction between the characteristics of the Technology Statesperson and the roles
of: 'project leader', 'technology sponsor' (Tidd et al., 1997), 'project champion'
202
(Bessant, 1985), etc. Technology Statesperson is not an alternative but instead
identification of the type of actor that operates in these roles across projects offering
'generalist specialist' or 'hybrid' skills (Fincham, 1995). Technology Statespeople
are typically middle management individuals in pursuit of hierarchical legitimisation
of power. In this pursuit, they select and align with technology projects to advance
their agenda, migrating as they realise or fail in their objective. Technology provides
an effective vehicle for them to establish and apply their expertise and influence.
Observation of linked case studies has provided insight of these individuals'
evolution between innovations. Isolated case study research does not allow for
observation of this process since it presents only a 'snapshot' of their activity and
suggesting the drivers of projects were formally appointed (Bessant, 1985; Tidd and
Pavitt, 1997). Observation of the pre-project environment demonstrated that project
teams and communities of interest are created through socio-political activity of the
Technology Statesperson prior to formal recognition.
At this point, the Technology Statesperson may not be the 'officially
designated' owner. In fact in a number of instances, it was observed that the latter
role was occupied by another officially identified individual. The project leaders
were defined by the relationships they held and the influence they possessed over the
innovation network. The unofficial role of informal community management evolved
into the official project leader in some cases. In other cases, actors would play this
role in an unofficial capacity steering a 'puppet' project leader. The core role was to
manage the social forces involved in the innovation. This dynamic is contrary to the
process of establishment of project champions which previous commentary (e.g.
Tidd et al., 1997) had posited was solely an operation of the formal structure.
The Technology Statespeople were generally the initiators of the community
building and they succeeded or failed in that role by their own efforts. Successful
alignment of the resources was needed to gain the required 'critical mass'. In
achieving this stage, they proved their suitability to occupy the project leader role.
The case studies reveal a number of actors who were displaced or disadvantaged by
proceedings, thereby suggesting that they were Technology Statespeople who failed
or were overcome by the success of others. Although merely inference, given the
dynamics of Technology Statespeople interactions, it is reasonable to assume that
when some succeed others fail.
A number of factors impact the positioning and success of actors within the
project leader role. In those cases, when an actor was successful at creating
momentum for their role as project leader, one of the key factors was the existence
of an executive sponsor for the project. In each of the cases, we saw an actor
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fulfilling the role of sponsor in a manner akin to technology sponsor. The sponsor
engaged the community either proactively or reactively in response to a project
leader approaching them.
The sponsor assists, and supports, the project leader in alignment with the
formal organisation and can also contribute with leverage and connections to gain
access to required resources. The ability to gain access to these resources and build
relationships with their owners and influencers was another important characteristic
of an effective project leader's positioning.
The project leader's role at the nexus of this community was dependent upon
his or her ability to align and maintain the requisite actors and resources. The aim is
to create a community capable ofmeeting and matching an agreed 'doable problem'
(Vergragt, 1988) through the coordinated elements; social, technical, political and
economic possessed within the community.
In creating the community's 'doable problem', the Technology Statespeople
must negotiate agreeable terms with the actors. Negotiation is required to
accommodate any incompatibilities between the community's agenda and that of the
actor. Conflicts commonly occur around technological direction. In these instances,
compromises are reached whereby both objectives can co-exist. Compromises were
manifested by alterations in the technological trajectory. Thus, multimedia was
demonstrably the subject of social shaping and negotiability (Vergragt, 1988) from
social, economic and power relationships within the innovative environment.
Enrolment of actors required Technology Statespeople to 'sell' the agenda to
the actors. This process required the articulation of the potential of the innovation
and potential benefits the actors could gain. Technology Statespeople are required to
display technical expertise whilst also accommodating the social dynamics of the
other actors. These dynamics impact the perception of the innovation which was
slightly different between actors as each viewed it based on their own knowledge and
relationship to their role. The Technology Statespeople in many cases targeted actors
who had restricted technical knowledge allowing them to more easily 'sell' the
potential of the innovation with less rigorous scrutiny of the limitations.
This practice is supportive of the often nebulous understanding many
managers have around the actual detail of the technology identified in other studies
(Fincham et al., 1995). Managers' concern is around the business impact so their
expectations need to be set by those they perceive as knowledgeable as to what is
and is not possible. The operation ofbounded rationality is again evident.
The project leader role provided attractions and potential benefits to actors
looking to advance their own agendas. Benefits correspond with the instruments of
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political control observed in the informal structure, influence over a technological
resource or perceived expertise. The value of these was considered in relation to the
environment. Technology Statespeople sought to acquire the role as point of contact
in order to legitimise power. An alternative route to gain influence was through
acquired expertise. Association with certain projects allowed actors to gain social
learning and perceived expertise through reputational networks (Fincham et al.,
1995). Due to the embryonic nature of the area, formalised multimedia expertise did
not exist within BigBank. Technology Statespeople attempted to formalise their
knowledge claims to position themselves as influential owners and traders of
multimedia knowledge. These efforts were made through lobbying of hierarchical
supporters and associated experts in a manner supportive of Pettigrew's evolutionary
view of occupational specialization (Pettigrew, 1975). Technology Statespeople
played a significant role in this process.
Expertise required to implement multimedia innovations was certainly scarce.
Across the cases, we witnessed a complex and demanding model of innovation.
9.4 DELIVERY, CONTENT AND STANDARDS: THEMES OF MULTIMEDIA
TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION
The case studies present a complex interactive model of innovation for
multimedia technologies requiring joint consideration of both social and technical
factors throughout the project. Multimedia configuration required consideration of a
range of interest groups, from different user groups, project sponsors and
infrastructure operators. Each group carried different agendas and needs. This was
compounded by the emergent nature of multimedia and growing realisation of the
demands and restrictions it posed during development. Technical specialists guiding
the project had to aggregate the needs of their internal clients and match against the
shifting technical possibilities offered. The process of aggregation served as a forum
for interest groups to exercise political desires, the essence of which became
ingrained within the resultant innovation.
The interactive nature of the system also required users to contribute content
as well as request functionality. Content would drive system usage amplifying the
importance of users' involvement, although this was usually through proxy
representatives. Adding to the complexity of internal alignment, configuration drew
upon componentized offerings from a range of external suppliers. Development
teams were required to understand individual components, their configurational
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possibilities and how they could be translated into a solution to meet local
requirements, a translation process that required compliance with BigBank technical
standards. The maelstrom of considerations, factors and actors presented was
radically at odds with the linear model of technology determinism concerned with
'black box' solutions of stable design. Instead, the interactive model for multimedia
innovation proposed by SST advocates provided an applicable model employing the
evolution of technology impacted by social, cultural and political aspects.
Multimedia innovations are configured from a number of components
including HTML code, Microsoft FrontPage, VHS, Network, and streaming
technologies. These configurations require integration, a process which is impeded
by the lack of uniform standards. Componentised development supports the view of
multimedia as a configurational technology (Fleck, 1988b). Common components
are used across projects, e.g. HTML but no stabilised design is evident.
The ongoing struggle to account for environmental, political and social
aspects within formal methodologies was evident in our study. Despite the wide
variety of methodologies that exist for technological development, through our
studies, we saw no universally utilised model. Consistent issues are evident but
Technology Statespeople applied hybrid expertise and social negotiation to navigate
these issues. Whilst this does not provide us with a formulaic recipe for success, it
does provide a useful guide for management of these factors, although they are of a
'lessons learned' variety as opposed to a methodology. Methodologies had limited
impact on the projects within our study.
Project teams failed to utilise an iterative, incremental methodology and
while no official methodology was present, their approach aligned closely with the
classic waterfall model. This was despite the well documented failings of this method
and the challenges it faces when accommodating IT innovations. Certainly the need
for a wider range of knowledge was required as we witnessed groups previously
separate from each other having to share knowledge within the communities of
interest. BigBank, like corporate society at large, experiences an erosion of
boundaries between technical and business fields as TCP/IP standards facilitate the
explosive growth of digitisation. The process of growth leads to expansion beyond
procedural automation into complex interactive operations necessitating greater user
understanding and environmental insight.
While the formal methodology followed a linear model, many of the
practices of iterative and incremental techniques were carried out informally.
Alterations occurred within the requirements and direction of the projects at very
fundamental technical levels that impacted the project. The project teams and leaders
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navigated these issues through social negotiation instead of formal methodology.
The principal factor for success with each of the cases observed is the buy-in from
the key stakeholders relevant to the project. Technology Statespeople would iterate
the technological design of the innovation in response to the requirements of the
stakeholders. The shift from network delivery to satellite delivery for TCN exhibits
iterative development in response to changing requirements.
Multi-level consideration of implementation environment was required.
In applying multimedia to BigBank, consideration of the existing formal
structure and the informal power relations within it was made by the development
teams. Successful appreciation and navigation of these areas was critical to the
sourcing and alignment of the requisite expertise and resources to undertake these
projects. The NMM project remained dormant until the project team was able to
enrol requisite expertise and facilities from the University which allowed the project
to be approved and move to execution. Without awareness of where relevant
resources are and how to access them, it would be impossible to align a community
around a 'doable problem'.
Financial implications were, not surprisingly, of great importance to BigBank
and required consideration and accommodation for the project to formally advance.
Pressure existed for projects to use officially recognised standards, such as Web
standards for Intranet and de facto standards, such as the TV satellite link. Economic
pressures guided the selection of suboptimal technology solutions to accommodate
organisational return on investment objectives. The selection of the satellite network
over bank network in TCN serves an example as the BigBank Board directed this
decision to recoup simken investment in the former system despite the technical
superiority of the latter. Thus, the entrenchment of technology choices motivated by
desire for return on investment is demonstrated (Cowan, 1992).
Multimedia characteristics place specific demands upon infrastructure
required, content inputs and standards employed. Multimedia applications initially
delivered on stand-alone platforms via CD-ROMs were slowly migrated on to
networked systems during our case studies. The migration ofmultimedia solutions to
networked delivery presented a new set of considerations. This provided advantages
in terms of cost, availability and currency of information but created additional
demands upon areas of the organisation previously uninvolved. The network is
shared by a number of bank functions. The impact of the additional data load
imposed by multimedia needed to be balanced against the combined needs of the
organisation to ensure additional use was not detrimental to the organisation's
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overall operations. Impacts contained both technical and resource considerations for
the separate groups handling the network delivery and CD-ROM delivery. The
corporation had to consider how best to handle this sensitive migration of operation
and responsibility whilst retaining and redirecting leverage skills. The original
department was broken up and resources reassigned.
Multimedia's inclusion on the network required conformance with the
organisational standards for network use and this was consistent across projects. The
responsibility for enforcement of these standards was held by the Technology
Department. During development, groups responsible for specific areas of
compliance were assigned to test and ensure relevant standards were met.
Interactivity was a consistent feature throughout the projects. 'Multimedia-
ness' and the convergence of a number of channels were not consistent, instead
evolving across the projects as the static content of Praxis combined with video
broadcast for TCN. This incremental move is in line with the caution of
organisations surrounding systems development and its potential impact upon other
operations. As each system release proved its value, BigBank allowed additional
development.
The content requirements of multimedia innovations were a constant issue
across innovations. The importance of content has been neglected in previous studies
with focus directed on other aspects of the technical infrastructure required. While
the delivery systems were certainly important, content was equally important. In
order for the users to select certain types of information, it must be available on the
system. Populating the system with information raised two equal concerns,
conversion of data and governance of information.
The requirement, consideration and sourcing of content was important but
the complexity of this process was not fully appreciated. Consideration focuses on
where to get the content, how to input it into the system and who needs to be
responsible and accountable for the activity. The 'where' and 'who' created the need
to interact with groups that previously had limited interaction with the Technology
Department. This included functions such as Corporate Communications and Human
Resources whose main purpose was the production of content. Producing and
providing content was an important aspect of these groups' operation and essential to
their power relationships in the organisation. The enrolment of these actors required
the effective presentation of benefits of another channel of delivery for their content.
Accommodation needed to be made for their technological naivety and concerns
about sharing the source of their group power. The highly visual aspect of
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multimedia assisted Technology Statespeople in communicating the benefits to a
technically naive audience.
The technical difficulty of inputting information was underestimated. Whilst
a number of different standards existed, none was dominant and translation between
these formats was problematic at best. Translation was hampered due to the twin
concerns of technical incompatibility and lack of facilities. Multimedia data
demanded extraordinary technical facilities necessitating external sourcing. Even
when facilities were available, the technical barriers to format translation proved
insurmountable as it would have required content to be completely reconstructed
placing additional resource requirements upon the project. As a result of the
importance of content to multimedia innovations, project teams cannot
underestimate the complexity of sourcing and technical translation.
Multimedia innovations were possible in BigBank due to a receptive
environment. As a result of the need to configure multimedia technologies to the
local setting, appreciation of multimedia characteristics must consider the specific
organisational setting. In order for the innovation to be viable, the organisational
structure, both formal and informal, must be receptive. In real terms, there must be
individuals who have the interest and ability to initiate a project via alignment of
interest as detailed within the pre-project stage. During this process, these actors will
'de facto' test the organisation's receptivity to multimedia innovation. Whilst this is
dependent on the actor's skill in this area, if no actors' agendas can be aligned with a
project, it is reasonable to assume that it is unsuitable for the organisation. These
reasons could be due to technical unsuitability, lack of business benefit or lack of an
innovative culture. The matching and balancing of the various agendas of influential
actors within the organisation was the necessary first step within the innovation
process. It therefore appears important that prior to commencing innovations of this
type, the project proponents should test the receptivity of the environment to the
benefits of the innovation.
Conformance with organisational standards was acknowledged as an
important stage within this process especially for network access. In some cases due
to the emergent nature of the technology, these standards have yet to be established
but as the technology matures within the organisation and its impact extends,
standards conformance becomes an increasingly important aspect. The NMM project
had greater latitude due to its experimental, isolated state. The subsequent projects
faced greater demands for conformance due to greater organisational impact. For
BigBank, these standards served as a method of enforcing reuse of technological
investments and a cohesive technology policy. This governance did not create a
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Darwinian process, solely concerned with identification of the technologically fittest
standard. Instead the process of selection was influenced by preferences of local
'experts', external actors, e.g. corporations (Microsoft, Sun Microsystems), industry
consortiums, economic considerations and agenda alignment. In the absence of set
standards, knowledge groups adopted recommendations of those perceived to have
superior knowledge. The selection of certain development tools and design
directions through existing technical understanding shaped by 'expert' opinion was
common within projects, such as the selection of Microsoft FrontPage for web
development. This aspect suggests the social shaping of standards with expert
opinion, social setting and technical considerations requiring combined
consideration. In light of this possibility, multimedia developers should carefully
assess, as far as possible, the actual merits and motivations for standard selection.
BigBank standards did not experience the competitive pressure of competing
market standards. Instant monopoly is achieved reducing choice and competition
through the elimination of the competitive possibilities prior to deployment. This
move was sensible due to the limited resources available within the organisation and
the limited benefit from wasting resources within a 'market' type struggle. The
formal organisation has little interest in groups within the organisation gaining
'competitive advantage'. The objective instead is to deploy resources on technology
initiatives which will provide maximum benefit to the organisation. Selecting a
standard allowed focus and direction.
The danger occurs if these decisions are irreversible and based on incorrect
knowledge. Our case studies did not gain insight into the extent to which this danger
existed and how it was dealt with.
The important ramification of standards upon technological direction requires
careful consideration of the selection method. Attention needs to be paid to the
agendas of'experts' involved and the amount of knowledge available.
The confusing construction of expertise.
There has been considerable study concerning the construction (Wood and
Kelly, 1982; Cockburn, 1985; Burns and Stalker, 1961), quantification and
application of expertise within technological innovation. Despite this investigation,
assessing this intangible aspect remains a problematic issue for technological
innovation and specifically, from our investigation, multimedia innovation. This was
true within these case studies.
In the absence of formal quantitative metrics, actors relied upon qualitative
social measures such as reputation (Pettigrew, 1975), a practice consistent with other
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innovation studies (Fincham, 1995; Whitley, 1988) with actors being assessed based
on their associations with relevant actors and resources. During the study, actors
created a 'track record' by gaining credibility through involvement in technology
projects which allowed them to gain influence over the technology direction. In
addition, their opinion imparted expertise upon resources and actors. Experts'
opinions were used as a source of validation for the knowledge claims of other
actors. For example, we witnessed the formal project owner for Praxis gain position
due to the assertion from 'experts' that he is the appropriate person for the role. As a
result actors seek to enlist and align other actors in the hope of gaining credibility via
association. This proactive association behaviour was a common practice in the pre-
project phase. In the absence of tools to evaluate expertise, we witnessed
organisational actors accepting expertise based on these social aspects. Some aspects
of expertise contained a quantifiable aspect. Programming capability was one such
area with a test of expertise provided through ability to apply this skill to defined
tasks. BigBank quickly discovered the ASP developer's capability through coding
performance. The testing of technology also provided a proof ofknowledge as in the
case of the quantitative testing for the NMM project.
Although some aspects of skill have the capability to be quantifiably
assessed, the pace and complexity of multimedia innovations seriously challenged
structured methods of evaluation and we saw a continued reliance upon qualitative
assessment by experts. The need for hybrid expertise combining both technical and
social knowledge to manage the complicated application ofmultimedia technologies
to the organisational setting was consistent across projects.
To assess this expertise, we see actors reliant upon reputation as the
barometer for assessment. Actors who have demonstrated this expertise through the
successful application of associated technologies were enrolled to either lead or
assist in subsequent innovative processes. In this manner, social learning outcomes
are shared through projects. The uncertainty and associated risk attached to these
projects and the need for risk mitigation was a central driver for their involvement.
The Technology Department needed to include the requisite resources within
projects to minimize risk. As a result of the scarcity of the resource within the
organisation, experts had to have the risk of involvement in problematic projects
balanced by reward.
The operation of the Technology Statesperson requires skilful assessment of
the state and possibility of technology projects. As their political possibilities and
reputation are grounded in the perceived success of the project, they must act to
align and migrate with projects with a likelihood of success. Judgment of success is
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relative to their personal agendas. For the Research Group Project Manager, the
Praxis project was a limited success. While it assisted repositioning through
establishing knowledge claims and achieved success from the sponsor's perspective,
it did not deliver a legitimised position to match personal ambition. On realising the
project was 'failing' to meet her expectations, the Research Group Project Manager
moved to the TCN project. This provided an opportunity to leverage expertise and
pursue a wider opportunity. The year long lull of the NMM project prior to
alignment of a sufficient community of interest, encourages reservation on making a
premature assessment of project 'failure' subjectively. During the lull, the project
could be considered a 'failure' but on completion was considered widely successful
fulfilling and sufficiently benefiting community members. Drawing on wider studies
within literature, attention has been directed to experimental multimedia projects
(Williams, Slack and Stewart, 2000) that while resulting in economic failure
achieved success in terms of social learning or network creation. Therefore 'success'
needs to be considered against actors' agendas and timing of involvement is
essential. Actors need to assess when a sufficient community exists around a project
for it to progress and understand when and how they will receive benefit from
involvement. In this manner, an opportunity cost is accepted, with involvement in a
particular project preventing the potential realisation of benefit from other
opportunities. As indications that the project will not deliver the actors' perceived
benefits, competing options should be considered and pursued as in the case of the
Research Group Project Manager and the Praxis and TCN projects.
Initially, it was simpler to contract external resources sourced to
accommodate the organisational gap. External resources provided social learning
from other developments that were passed to BigBank as it built up their internal
capability to support the developing area. In doing so, the organisation moves to
formalise and codify the area of expertise significant for the changing Technology
Department.
The complexity of User involvement
There has been considerable discussion around the role of the user within the
innovative process. This discussion is directly related to the importance of user
involvement for effective configuration of the various components to meet
organisational needs. The discussion has a variety of strands from the user directly
leading innovation to the user defining how to effectively articulate and incorporate
their needs within the development process. During the study we witnessed BigBank
struggling to accommodate user demands effectively while maintaining a centralised,
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cohesive direction. The various groups involved within the organisation also raised
questions as to who the user actually was.
The Technology Department, as the systems integrators, found themselves as
both supplier and user especially when considering the user requirements. In
fulfilling this role they acted to consolidate local knowledge and requirements by
aggregating insight from the various organisational areas. Although some formal
techniques, such as HCI tools, are used, this understanding is principally gained
through 'proxies'. 'Proxies' were members of the community of interest who acted
informally as representatives for the wider user base. For example, the Content
Coordinators within Praxis managed the content for their section but also served as a
proxy for their section's user needs. Proxies were enrolled within the project
network. In this capacity, they provided insight into a particular setting as well as
acting as project ambassadors within their own sections to enable technology
adoption. These informal and often politically motivated opinions were the primary
'user' input. While HCI techniques, such as user observation and surveys, were
employed they served as validation or an afterthought to support pre-determined
actions. While a perceived attention to the user existed, influencing impact
predominantly came from sponsors and user input was used primarily to achieve
their political ends rather than provide a functional, effective system. While this has
provided user input into the innovative process, it does not conform to the end-user
led process which has been proposed by some writers (Williams and Proctor, 1996;
Williams, Slack and Stewart, 2000).
9.5 TECHNOLOGY SECTION AS ORCHESTRATORS
Studies of the innovation process for information technology have suggested
a revised role for technology departments (Fincham et al., 1995). This revised role
posits that in order to meet contemporary models of innovation, technology
departments no longer operate as builder/supplier but instead serve as an integrator
or orchestrator of various actors and interests across the innovation. The benefit of
this departmental role for multimedia innovation is evident within this study. Indeed
the departmental role is a meso level mirror of the Technology Statespeople micro
role. During the study, it was difficult to obtain a macro perspective on the position
of the Technology Department and the time period did not allow for radical
organisational change and formalisation. From observing the activities of a number
of departmental units, we were able to draw generalities about the shifting role of the
department. Just as Technology Statespeople created and marshalled teams of actors
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from various areas, the Technology Department was required to fulfil this
requirement at an organisational level. The department attempted to moderate and
manage the relationship between external vendors and BigBank's business units. As
an entity, the department orchestrated and configured supplier components to match
the needs of the organisation and maintain the infrastructure required for corporate
operations.
In managing this network, units of the department were required to identify
the possibilities of multimedia (Research Group), identify benefits for the
organisation (Project Leaders) and configure the system (Project team liaising with
departmental units) whilst retaining existing operations (IT Services).
Despite the operation and requirement for hybrid expertise, the formal
organisation struggled to create structure to accommodate this need. Technology
Statespeople applied experience and hybrid expertise in a micro setting through the
use of ad hoc informal tactics. Formal capture and fostering of this knowledge did
not occur. Problems arose around classification and alignment against existing skill
types. Instead of capability building, BigBank assigned ownership of particular
innovations and aligned resources aroimd it. While the organisation established a
research group dedicated to investigating new technological possibilities, its role was
limited to initial investigation and was not seen to operate in any wider adoption of
the technology. This wider role was not, in fact, fulfilled by a formal group.
The research group was evidence of the Technology Department acting in a
'gatekeeper' capacity to mediate between organisational need and external
possibilities. The Technology Department had to manage the flow and form with
which communication occurs between these parties. This position created new
challenges for the group.
Due to the pace and range of technological advancement, the department
needed to consistently justify its capability to fulfil the role of technological leader
and adviser. New developments were accompanied by new skill requirements and
obsolescence of older skills, necessitating migration and education of resources to
areas of increasing priority. This combined the need for long-term knowledge
acquisition and short-term need fulfilment. The latter need was accommodated
through the enlistment of external experts who would play a key role in establishing
initial credibility to knowledge claims. Sourcing external parties to provide skills in
an emerging area of ignorance for BigBank presented obvious problems. How do
you assess capability? The department employed qualitative measures of CV based
track record and references which created their reputation, an important asset in
itself. This reputation was used to marginalise the claims of external parties when
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internal parties sought outside opinion. This situation was experienced during the
TCN project as business units entertained propositions from BT to act as system
integrator. Outside opinion was shaped by the possibility of commercial benefit.
Resorting to outside input commonly appears in areas of new advancement where
standards and systems have yet to be established. In each of the projects, we see
outside opinion solicited requiring the Technology Department to have to re¬
establish and reaffirm its expertise.
The Technology Department applied a number of resources to effectively
formalise and defend its operational position. The department's formal role provided
legitimised power for the section as they act as the first resort source for business
users seeking technology solutions. In the cases viewed, business users did not
proactively seek these solutions but instead reacted to interest created by suppliers or
members of the technology department. As noted, the greatest danger of these
situations was the activities of outside suppliers. These suppliers attempt to gain
direct access to these internal users to present technological and expertise claims.
These claims create expectations which then required negotiation by the Technology
Department in order to maintain their position.
Maintenance strategies are required in order to defend against encroachment
attempts by other parties. These strategies leverage the power resources available to
the department. These resources consist of technology, expertise and formal
authority such as that enabled by ownership and enforcement of standards. In
addition, Technology Statespeople used informal relations and negotiation with
actors within the community to maintain alignment. In order to defend project
involvement, we see that the TCN project team conceded to a technical opinion of a
BigBank business unit, Corporate Communications who were also the project
sponsors.
A core resource for the Technology Department is the BigBank Network. As
multimedia technologies move to a networked application, they place themselves
under the control of the Technology Department. This control is exerted via the
requirements for network access operated by the department. These requirements or
standards needed to be met in order for applications to be allowed on to the network.
By setting and maintaining these standards, the Technology Department established
the direction and parameters for future technology development. Within the projects
observed, these standards helped to control the activities of the informal groups.
The Technology Department faced the complex challenge of allowing
innovative activity whilst ensuring it is directed towards the organisational needs.
215
Meeting this challenge, the Technology Department needed to create mechanisms to
understand organisational needs effectively.
There was an attempt to have these skills formalised into an intranet centre of
excellence. This formalising attempt was driven by a project leader to create a
legitimised power but proved to be unsuccessful.
9.6 RESEARCH METHODS
What was allowed?
Participant observation across linked projects allowed tracking of actors and
innovations as they were encoimtered and adopted by BigBank. Pre-project activities
previously unexplored by isolated case studies proved an important arena for
innovation with the roles of Technology Statespeople within this scenario and
throughout project activities identified for the first time.
How was this different?
Many previous investigations have used studies of isolated cases with data
gathered through post-project interviews. This allowed the researchers a greater
degree of flexibility in selection of the case material. Outcome and lessons from the
project could be considered at a broad level with greater detail gained from
interviews. Second-hand accounts however, often obscured the real motivations and
factors around choices as actors post rationalised in light of their own situation and
involvement. The snapshot of the isolated case prevented observation of the
evolution of actors and technologies over time and the impact of choice in one
innovation in related activities.
Participant observation across linked projects reduced the ability to 'cherry
pick' cases, with researchers having to monitor and position within upcoming
initiatives. As actors had to consider the possibility of success for each project, so
did the researcher. In order to achieve this access, the researcher had to partake in
the negotiation process offering relevant and legitimised expertise in order to gain
the admittance and trust of the community of interest.
How was it enabled?
In order to achieve this level of access, it was necessary to gain credibility
with actors within BigBank. Initially, University credibility and relevant academic
qualification (M.Sc. in Computer Science) served to allow entry into the organisation
through labour for the NMM project. Technical background also allowed
understanding of the true technical reality of the innovations, instead of explanations
216
filtered through technical specialists which, as discussed, operate to their own
agendas.
Indicators of credible expertise had to be validated by actors within BigBank,
an opportunity provided by the NMM project. Project performance within the NMM
project was vital in establishing legitimacy with BigBank actors and enabled access
to other projects. Placement within the Research Group enabled access to
multimedia projects during the pre-project phase. Alignment with the Research
Group provided benefits: their role researching new technologies allowed their
involvement in multimedia activities as they dealt with emergent technologies.
As BigBank actors negotiated their enrolment within communities of interest,
the University participant involvement underwent the same process. To gain access
to the case material, I had to commit to performance of project activities for
BigBank.
What difficulties did it create?
This created dual responsibilities of fulfilling the organisation's requirements
and research agenda. Demands upon time and objectivity were faced due to the need
to live in and fulfil the demands of two worlds, a common issue within fieldwork
(Evans-Pritchard, 1973). Maintenance of a journal to record activity allowed isolated
reflection away from the subject environment, particularly once fieldwork has
concluded. This assisted in the objective reflection on data gathered. Informal
interviews gleaned the most valuable insights with actors providing unguarded
insight.
Participant observation in the overall series of linked case studies opened up
areas of innovation development previously unappreciated (pre-project phases)
allowing insight into the socio-technical interplay operating around technical choice
(suppliers, standards, etc.) and organisational politics. Importantly, the impact of
individual choices on selections across projects was viewed.
This access required the participant observer to display relevant expertise and
gain credibility within BigBank. Sponsorship of the Research Group was key due to
their linkage into developments in the multimedia area.
9.7 SUMMARY
Social and technical factors require joint consideration throughout the
multimedia innovation process. Study and analysis of multimedia innovation in
operation led us to reject the determinist linear model in favour of social shaping's
interactive model.
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In order to reduce uncertainty and minimise costly mistakes, organisations
engaging in multimedia innovations should seek to: manage the enrolment and
alignment of actors and resources, ensure actors (Technology Statespeople) with
hybrid expertise operate networks, accurately assess multimedia content and
infrastructure requirements and implement formal mechanisms for technology
departments to orchestrate these developments.
Enrolment and alignment of actors and resources take place from the earliest
pre-project and innovative phases, an aspect previously obscured by post-hoc
studies. Advancement of personal agendas, individual and collective, is the principal
motivation for actors. Actors act within a 'community of interest' which must offer a
'doable' solution to an organisational issue to receive formal approval.
Technology Statespeople emerge through a process of positioning and
construction shaped by their specific organisational circumstances. Within
innovation, they act as 'Technology Statespeople' enrolling, aligning and
maintaining innovation networks through the application of hybrid expertise.
Technology Statespeople position themselves in the pre-project environment in line
with their own agendas. Formal recognition of the 'actual' project leader at this stage
is inconsistent.
Formal methodologies provided limited benefit to the management of social
and technical aspects of multimedia innovation. Consideration of infrastructure,
integration standards and content requirements demanded by Multimedia technology
needs capabilities beyond these techniques. Some aspects allow quantified
assessment, for example, network delivery of multimedia required measured
consideration of the additional impact on existing bank operations. Formal testing
and adherence to corporate standards had to be met by each multimedia innovation.
Information delivery from multimedia systems required sourcing, conversion and
input of appropriate content. The complexity of the process of content management
was underestimated. Quantification and assessment of expertise requirements remain
problematic and heavily reliant upon the intangible measures of perception and
reputation. Subjectivity was also witnessed in the capture of user requirements.
Despite the range of HCI techniques employed, results served only to validate
existing thought with team members and user 'proxies' input given greater
importance. While this method ignored best practice implementation principles, it
assisted in an essentially 'political' buy-in for the project.
Interactive innovation required by multimedia technology was served by the
Technology Department's move from a creator/supplier role to one of
orchestrator/integrator. Within this role, management of relations between internal
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business units and external suppliers required effective use of power maintenance
strategies. These include formal structures (e.g. standards) and establishing
knowledge claims. Knowledge claims impart expertise and validate the role of the
department as technology 'experts'. The pace of technical change necessitates
continual re-establishment of recognised knowledge. Appropriate staffing and
political positioning was an important component of this validation.
The research process adopted in this thesis departed from the study
techniques dominant within this field. The typical use of isolated case studies
analysed through post-project interviews faces two main challenges: actors can post-
rationalize decisions and impacts of other projects are not satisfactorily considered.
For this study, the involvement of the researcher as a participant observer
through three linked projects allowed unique insights. Access to the pre-project stage
allowed understanding of the alignment and enrolment activities that occur prior to
formal discussion within the organisation. Involvement in decisions as they are made
at this stage in the initial agenda formulation and establishment of the constituency
of players involved and throughout the subsequent development of the project,
provided first-hand assessment of the decision mechanics at a micro level. By
drawing on a variety of areas of study, an interdisciplinary lens of analysis was
applied to retain and appreciate the richness of factors at play within these
environments.
9.8 FURTHER STUDY
The findings of this thesis present a number of areas for further investigation
within the interactive model of multimedia innovation presented. Technology
Statespeople and communities of interest act to shape and direct innovation. In order
to better appreciate their role and how they can be used to mitigate risk, investigation
should be directed to identify common characteristics and their implications. Further
linked case studies should be engaged to validate the existence of Technology
Statespeople operating and evolving across projects. By specifically investigating the
role of Technology Statespeople it will be possible to confirm the failure as well as
success of those individuals and the contributing factors. In addition, better
definition should be gained around their hybrid expertise and how their operations
are assisted by it. Linkage between Technology Statespeople and communities
should be considered. What are the important constituents of the communities? Does
a common model exist? Studies should consider operations across the project
lifecycle with particular attention being paid to the pre-project stage due to its
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evident importance. In linking this to the community constituencies, what aspects are
necessary for the projects to move between stages? Within this, are there features
evident at the approval of a project that provide a greater likelihood of success,
aiding organisations in the selection of what projects to support and areas to
supplement projects demonstrating risk.
Content management and consideration presents itself as a common area of
risk through neglect. Multimedia innovation would benefit from enhanced
understanding of issues and best practice to aid the effective execution of this
process. The method of translating informal information sharing into formal
governance while important for content, would also provide important learning for
the Technology Department's management of multimedia innovation. The
Technology Department's shifting role continues to present challenges around the
creating of formal structures to manage the complex social process of managing
multiple user needs whilst maintaining a cohesive organisational technology policy.
Further investigation into how this may be achieved is essential in order that
organisations deal effectively with this difficult and costly area.
CLOSING THOUGHTS
Technology innovation is complex, impacted by social, economic, political
and cultural factors. Appreciation of this view and experience of it in practice
provided me with invaluable experience. Through my fieldwork and associated
analysis, I gained insights that have helped me in my working life.
Since completing my fieldwork, my consultancy work has allowed me to
experience a range of organisations from Ericsson to Shell to Motorola to
Sainsbury's implementing a multitude of technologies from E-Commerce to Content
Management to Customer Relationship Management (CRM). A wide range of
situations but with common problems all very similar to those experienced within
this thesis.
The problems continue to defy formalised models instead relying upon
actor's ability to apply social learning and hybrid expertise to the particular project.
Issues arise where strict segmentation is applied between groups and expertise. These
efforts of division of labour to simplify tasks tend to miss the important complexities
that can make the difference between success and failure.
Hybrid expertise in projects is restricted to combined business and technical
ability. I feel the social studies knowledge I gained makes a profound difference,
provoking the need to look beyond surface appearances to consider the factors
creating and influencing the technological trajectory. Through this appreciation of
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the knowledge I gained, I feel that social scientists and associated theory have a far
greater role to play within corporate innovation. While focus has been given to the
provision of a fully formed, standardised model of innovation, the complexity and
individuality of innovation suggest this is unlikely. Instead, a toolkit approach
highlighting areas of concern and potential risk in addition to offering possible
tactics for navigation appears more beneficial. An increasingly interactive
relationship would increase the access and quality of research material while
benefiting corporations. Issues are sure to arise around the need for academic
distance, but surely these must come second to the benefit of sharing social learning.
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11. Abbreviations
ANT Actor Network Theory
ASP Active Server Pages
BCS British Computing Society
CSCW Computer Supported Co-operative Work
DSDM Dynamic Systems Development Method
EUCS Edinburgh University Computing Services
GUI Graphic User Interface
HCI Human Computer Interaction
HTML Hypertext Markup Language
JNM Software company with graphical presentation system
LAN Local Area Network
MOT Management of Technology
MSP Microsoft Solutions Provider
NMM Networked Multimedia - Case Study - Chapter 5
Praxis Corporate Intranet - Case Study - Chapter 6
RAD Rapid Application Development
SCOT Social Construction of Technology
SLIM Social Learning in Multimedia
SSK Sociology of Scientific Knowledge
SST Social Shaping of Technology
TON Training and Communications Network - Case Study-
Chapter 7
URL Uniform Resource Locators
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This appendix gives some background on the organisation which was the subject of all
three studies. An overview of the company organisation is given with emphasis on the
structure in and around Technology Department.
1. INTRODUCTION
BigBank is a company that has progressed over 3 centuries from a time when
transactions and records were recorded by the use of quill pens and ink to today's
electronic recording via the Internet from palm tops, mobile phones etc. While business
may still be conducted face to face, it may equally be conducted a hemisphere apart with
the monetary transactions timely processed. BigBank has always had to maintain a
reputation of the utmost stability and trustworthiness while conversely being highly
innovative and responsive, indeed proactive, to changing times.
2. HISTORY
BigBank was founded in the 18th Century but the Group's roots can be traced
further back through the amalgamation of private and joint stock banks which are its
past and present constituents. This absorption of other banks within the BigBank Group
umbrella has been a constant occurrence over the centuries contributing to its overall
growth as a major player in the UK banking sector.
BigBank's history is as much a story of responding to or influencing social
change and practices as it is developing banking methods and services. A simple
example of this is to consider how people have been paid for their labour over the
centuries. An early method was by cash with the employer paying on site with monies
often drawn from the banks. It later became payment by cheque with people requiring
access to their earnings either by drawing cheques on their accounts or withdrawing cash
in person necessitating banking hours responding to their needs. Now we have automatic
bank depositing of salaries and withdrawal of funds augmented by Internet transactions.
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This tracing of social change and complementary monetary transactions could be
applied to other subjects such as property ownership, trade including agricultural and
industrial revolutions, foreign travel. Was BigBank responding to or driving the change?
Both are probably the answer to this conundrum.
It has to be recognised that people generally are uncomfortable or wary of
change especially the negative impact of failure. An organisation like a bank has to be
seen to be highly dependable generating an air of assurance while moving forward to
accommodate an ever changing local and world economic environment. Therefore
change has to be well planned and innovation implemented well. Innovation in the early
days of banking could be segmented into the three main categories of currency, services
and customers but latterly these have become intertwined. There have been stages such
as
• Currency money design to reduce counterfeiting
• Transactions by cheques, promissory notes etc
• Credit card transactions processed by hard copy vouchers
• Credit cards electronically cleared, and
• Internet transactions.
Technology System innovations can now embrace all categories in a single
change. In an introductory article to BigBank in 1995 the accelerating rapidity of change
was emphasised by the following comments made by the Chairman: "More recently,
however, BigBank has undergone a period of dramatic transformation - changing
perhaps more profoundly in the last three or four years than in the previous centuries".
How BigBank organises itself to appear to seamlessly absorb these increasing
communication and service support demands will be reviewed in the next two sections.
3. ORGANISATION DURING CASE STUDIES
During the period that the case studies for this thesis were being conducted, the
organisation structure was as shown in this section. The organisation charts were
displayed on BigBank's Intranet for reference by staff. The areas of responsibilities of
the different functions and divisions were given as well as job positions with
incumbent's names and photographs of persons in the more senior positions.
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3.1 Corporate Structure
The chart on this page shows the three main arms of BigBank are UK Banking,
Direct Services and Overseas Group. Operations Division is shadowed to highlight that
the formal or structured reporting control for the Information Technology function
descends from this box. The Operations Division supplied a range of professional
services to BigBank, including human resources, property, money transmission as well
as information technology. It also ran the extensive plastic card services.
The broad roles of these divisions are. as follows
(1) Retail Banking
Retail Banking provides a wide range of banking, insurance and other financial
services to individuals and small business. These are provided through a Branches
Network and also include direct telephone services and offshore private banking and
trusts.
(2) Business Banking
Corporate Banking and Financial Markets provides an integrated range of
products and services to mid-sized, large corporate and institutional customers in the UK
and overseas. These include
• Corporate Banking • International Banking Services
• Treasury and Capital Markets • Shipping Business Centre
• Securities Services • BigBank Development Capital
• Leasing
(3) Operations Division
This provides a range of professionally run services to the overall banking
business. These include property, personnel and training, information technology,
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money transmission services, business consultancy and administration. The Division
also operates plastic card services and estates management businesses.
(4) Direct Services
Sells and underwrites retail and wholesale general and car insurance on the
telephone and the Internet to customers.
(5) Overseas Group
Includes US subsidiary engaged in retail and corporate banking activities carried
out through its branch network in some states as well as alliance relationships in Europe.
3.2 Operations Division
The Operations Division reported into the BigBank Board through an executive
board member. The areas of responsibilities of the above 6 functions were, as follows:
(1) Operations




• Technology Service Delivery
• Infrastructure
• Development Projects








Technical & Application Strategy






(5) Finance and Business Services
• Finance • Purchasing & Contracts
• Business Consultancy Services
(6) BigBank Cards
• Card Transactions Services • New Card Promotion Support
3.3 Technology Function
The sections within the Technology Function (chart overleaf) can be divided into
two types:
3.3.1 Technology Support Departments
These departments provide the support to the Supply Services by providing the
administration, financial and planning framework. These are Communications, Financial
Planning and Control, Human Resources and Strategic Value Management.
A brief outline of the Technology Support Function is
• Communications
This department deals with the public relations of the Group interfacing with the
media, public organisations and general public.
• Finance, Planning and Control
All financial reporting both internal and external is the responsibility of this
department along with monitoring and conducting risk analysis. Internal Audit ensures
procedure compliance within the organisation.
• Human Resources
This department deals with personnel recruitment and matters dealing with the
staffs general well being.
• Strategy Value Management
Strategic planning department supports the process of developing long and short
term plans to assist in the structuring of future growth.
3.3.2 Technology Supply Service Departments
The Technology Supply Service Departments are much more banking specific
operations and their scope was more what people probably expect under a functional
description of technology. They are also much more pertinent background material to
this thesis and will be, therefore, listed in greater detail.
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(1) Retail Banking Systems Development
• New Operating Platform / Credit / Sales








• UK & International Banking Services
International Systems
Payments and Integration
- Electronic Banking Systems
• Architecture
• Card & Cashline Systems Development
• HR, Property, FBCS and Year 2000
(3) IT Services
• Distributed Infrastructure Services
• Systems Integrity
• Telecommunications
• Central Infrastructure Management
• Central Services Delivery
• Distributed Services Delivery
• Business & Change Planning
(4) Technical Strategy









• Group Finance Systems
• Group Risk Systems
• Research Group
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I was attached to this section which had responsibility for identifying and
evaluating emerging technologies beneficial to the bank.
• Year 2000
• Training and Communications Network
This section featured prominently in the case study described in Chapter 7.
(6) CIB Development
• CIB PC, Midrange & Mainframe Support & Maintenance
• Operational Framework, Strategy & Architecture
• Risk & Portfolio Management / Finance & Administration
• Trustee / Savers / Registrars
• EMU/Year 2000
• Corporate & Commercial Banking / Corporate Processing Centres
• Structured Finance / Shipping
Looking at the organisation of a Technology Section can often provide an
encapsulated overview of the width of the commercial range of services offered by the
organisation. This is certainly true when one sees how the BigBank Technology
Division is aligned to support the commercial activities.
4. SUMMARY
It is clear that the increasingly rapid development in information technology will
have to be matched with managerial foresightedness, judicious project selection and
drive along with society responsiveness if the benefits for all are to be maximized. The
many objectives in the three case studies all lend credence to this quest by BigBank to





The following questionnaire was used during a controlled usability test.
Details of the exact testing strategy are contained within:
PROCTER, R., A. MCKINLEY, S. GALLACHER, (2001), 'The Influence of
Network Quality of Service Factors on the Usability and Effectiveness of
Multimedia Internet Broadcasting', in: A. Sloane; D. Lawrence (Editors),
Multimedia Internet Broadcasting, 35-52, (Springer).
Subjects were shown a consistent set of multimedia assets then presented
with the questionnaire. The Usability questionnaire was used to assess the
effectiveness of the interface between subject and system, considering how the
subjects' technical background impacted their expectations and user experience. The
comprehension questionnaire focused upon the efficiency of the various multimedia
loads, and media, in delivering information, considering the impact of quality
degradation.
Appendix A: Usability Questionnaire
Identification number:
Age: Sex: Female Male
I. User Background
1.1 How long have you used computer based multimedia systems?
Never 6 months to less than 1 year
Less than 1 day 1 year to less than 2 years
1 day to less than 1 week 2 years to less than 3 years
1 day to less than 1 month 3 years or more
1 month to less than 6 months
1.2 On average, how much time do you spend per week using multimedia packages?
Less than 1 hour 4 to less than 10 hours
1 to less than 4 hours Over 10 hours
1.3 How many different types of computer systems, including mainframes and PCs have you
worked with?
A: None C: 3-5
B: 1-2 D: More than 5
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1.5 How long have you used the Internet?
A:Less than 1 day
B: 1 day to less than 1 month
C: 1 month to less than 6 months
D: 6 months or more
1.6 How much time, on average, do you spend on the internet?
A: Less than 1 hour C: 4 to less than 10 hours
B: 1 to less than 4 hours D: Over 10 hours
1.7 How often do you use a computer in your average week?
A: Less than 1 hour C: 4 to less than 10 hours
B: 1 to less than 4 hours D: Over 10 hours
1.8 What applications do you use? (Please grade in order of frequency use 1 - 6, or 0 if you
never use these applications.)
Word Processing Graphic Design Packages
Spreadsheets Internet Browsers
Games Other (please specify)
Programming Tools
2. Overall User Impressions
Please circle the numbers which most appropriately reflect your impressions about using the
system. (Not Applicable = NA.) There is room on the last page for your written comments.









2.5 Much worse than Much better than
live presentations live presentations
12345 NA
2.6 Very Unusable Very Usable
12345 NA
3. Technical and Content Quality
3.1 Overall the technical quality was:
Poor Excellent
12345 NA
3.2 How easy was it to hear/see and understand the speaker?
Very Easy Very Hard
12345 NA
3.3 How would you rate the content in this session?
Poor Excellent
1 2 3 4 5 NA
3.4 What was your level of interest in the content?
Very Low Very High
1 2 3 4 5 NA
3.5 Please rank the following in terms of importance.
Audio Quality Signal delay
Visual Quality Gaps in transmission
Audio- Video Synchronization Other
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3.6 Was the presentation impaired by any of the following? (tick where appropriate)
Quality of Slides Gaps in transmission
Quality of Audio Picture refreshment rate
Quality of Video Other (please specify)
Audio- Video Synchronization
Users' Comments
Please write any comments you have in the space below.
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Appendix B: Post-trial Comprehension Questionnaires
Evaluation One
1. In the new salary scheme, managerial salaries will be related to two separate measures.
What are they?
2. Name one feature of the old salary scheme that will be eliminated when the new pay
system is introduced.
3. How much holiday will staff be entitled to under the new scheme?
4. What is the name of the interviewee (the person being interviewed)?
5. In what city did he meet with his officials to discus details of the scheme?
6. Name the three key components of the new scheme.
7. What does the interviewee invite you to do if you have problems with your manager over
the new scheme?
8. How are "competencies" defined?
9. In which city is the new scheme already operating?
10. What, very briefly, will be the impact of the new salary scheme on the bank?
Evaluation Two
1. What is the name of the bank?
2. What period is covered by the results?
3. What are the names of the principal divisions of the Bank whose results are reported?
4. What did 'TS' say about staff morale?
5. When did the division headed by 'Rl' come into existence?
6. Of what Division is 'MN' the head?
7. How many new customers has his division added to BigBank?
8. What are NewDivision's profits over this period and how much have they risen?
9. In what two areas is NewDivision "continuing to grow"?
10. What is the overall profit of BigBank for this period, and what percentage growth has been
achieved?
11. How many of the speakers did you see?
12. How many of the speakers wore glasses?
13. Were there speakers who did not appear on camera at some time during the
presentation?
14. Where did the speaker who introduced the presentation say it was coming from?
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Evaluation Three
1. What is the general name for the kind of behaviour that is the main subject matter of the
video?
2. What is the main aim of the video?
3. What proportion of BigBank staff are said to have witnessed this kind of behaviour and what
proportion have experienced it for themselves?
4. What is the attitude of BigBank towards this kind of behaviour?
5. Five different forms of this behaviour were identified. Name three of them.
6. In the first work scene featured a manager talking to one of his staff:
1. Were either wearing glasses?
2. What was the manager holding in his hand when he walked over to the desk?
3. What time was the manager's meeting?
4. What was the name of the staff member to whom the manager was talking?
5. Record your assessment of the manager's behaviour by choosing a point on the
scale below between the following pairs of opposites. In each case, also record your
confidence in your assessment.
Confidence
Appropriate 1 2 3 4 5 Inappropriate Very 1 2 3 4 5 Not very
Aggressive 1 2 3 4 5 Non-aggressive Very 1 2 3 4 5 Not very
Supportive 1 2 3 4 5 Confrontational Very 1 2 3 4 5 Not very
6. Record your assessment of the staff member's behaviour by choosing a point on
the scale below between the following pairs of opposites. In each case, also record
your confidence in your assessment.
Confidence
Anxious 1 2 3 4 5 Composed Very 1 2 3 4 5 Not very
Impatient 1 2 3 4 5 Patient Very 1 2 3 4 5 Not very
Constructive 1 2 3 4 5 Unconstructive Very 1 2 3 4 5 Not very
7. How many other people did you see in the room?
8. Record your assessment of the other staff members' reaction to the conversation
between the Manager and his staff member by selecting a point on the scale below
between the following pairs of opposites. In each case, also record your confidence in
your assessment.
Confidence
Concerned 1 2345 Unconcerned Very 1 2345 Not very
Aware 1 2345 Unaware Very 1 2345 Not very
Anxious 1 2345 Composed Very 1 2345 Not very
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7. The second work scene featured several colleagues talking:
1. How would you describe the role/status of the first person to speak relative to the
other people present?
2. What part does the first speaker play in the remainder of the scene? Justify your
answer
3. What two options are mentioned as things to do on the night out?
4. Record your assessment of the attitude of the other staff towards Barbara by
choosing a point on the scale below between the following pairs of opposites. In each
case, also record your confidence in your assessment.
5. Record your assessment of Barbara's reactions by choosing a point on the scale
below between the following pairs of opposites. In each case, also record your
confidence in your assessment.
Confidence
Friendly 1 2 3 4 5 Unfriendly
Sympathetic 1 2 3 4 5 Indifferent
Attentive 1 2 3 4 5 Unattentive
Very 1 2 3 4 5 Not very
Very 1 2 3 4 5 Not very
Very 1 2 3 4 5 Not very
Confidence
Aware 1 2 3 4 5 Unaware
Indifferent 1 2 3 4 5 Interested
Happy 1 2345 Unhappy
Very 1 2 3 4 5 Not very
Very 1 2 3 4 5 Not very





In this appendix I outline the survey approach, including focus areas,
questions, and techniques, which formed the backbone for the interviews referred to
in Chapter 4. The questions were structured in three main sections: Subject
Background, Multimedia Views and Experiences, and Project Information.
Subject Background
To put the subject at ease and get them talking, I would start the session by
asking simple, straightforward questions which covered basic, general facts about the
subjects. These questions were posed in a casual, unobtrusive manner. The strategy
was to present the questions as if confirming information, but actually aiming to
elicit response and elaboration on the information.
Question Areas:
1- Who are you?
2- What is your role within BigBank?
3- Career history (asked in a casual manner so as not to appear too intrusive e.g.
"How long have you been in that section?"). They would hopefully answer the time
and where they came from providing an avenue to probe further. If this did not occur,
then I would follow with "And you've been with that section since you joined
BigBank?" in a manner suggesting that they should interject if I am incorrect, thus
providing me with an avenue to continue questioning. The key objective of the
discussion would be to ascertain whether they had always been within the
Technology Division or had some experience working outside of it. This distinction
would provide some information on staff circulation and knowledge range.
Project Information
If a subject had been through a multimedia project these questions were used
as a lead in to questions on Multimedia in general.
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Question Areas
1- How did you become involved with this project?
2- What purpose do you feel this technology concerned will fulfill?
3- What is your role and the role of the others involved within the project?
4- What technical training/expertise do you possess with regard to computing
technology in general and multimedia technologies?
Multimedia Views and Experiences
Next, I would discuss with the subject their views, experiences, feelings and
expectations towards multimedia technologies. If the subject being interviewed was
not connected to one of the case study projects (NMM, Praxis, TCN), I would go
directly into this section without questions regarding any of the projects.
Question Areas
1- What multimedia technologies have you used within BigBank?
2- What functions have they catered for?
3- How were they introduced to your work/department?
4- Were other departments involved, who and in what way?
5- Are there any other multimedia technologies you are interested in at the moment?
How are these being pursued? (How are the items sourced via an internal group or
via liaisons with the suppliers directly?)
6- What other ways do you think multimedia is used within your group or the
organisation as a whole?
7- What difficulties have you encountered with these technologies?
8- What aid have you received in solving these problems? (internal aid or supplier
support)
9- Do you have any set guidelines or rules that you require these technologies to
conform to? Who sets these and decides when they have been met? Are outside
groups aware of these guidelines?
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Praxis User Survey
Communication* Main
How often do you use the information in Praxis?
No more than once a week.
Several times a week.
At least daily
Several times a day.
















With respect to the new section names (Know the Ropes etc), do you feel that...
§they are self explanatory and easy to use?they take a bit of getting used to but ifs no problem?they are cryptic and best dispensed with?





Not had any contact.
Do you feel that Praxis has made your job easier?
Q Not noticeably.
Q In small ways.
Q In a significant way.
O Dramatically.
If so how?
Do you think that Praxis..
Ofulfills (or is on course for fulfilling) the potential of a corporate intranet for business benefit?
25/02/98
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has some way to go but will probably get there?
is ill-conceived and needs a rethink?
is a complete waste of Bank resources?
Any comments on this...
Have you conributed content to Praxis?
QYes.
On°-




What is your department?




Suggestions for the future and how Praxis can be improved in the immediate term..
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Praxis Survey
The Praxis system is the Technology Intranet which has been functional for X months. This survey is
designed to gather your opinions on the system as it stands and regarding future developments. The
results from this survey will feed into the future development of the system, and will influence the
development of a corporate Intranet
(All comments are completely confidential and cannot be traced back to individual users.)
YOUR BACKGROUND
This section is concerned with the facilities you possess for accessing Praxis.
|Your Department j j
Your Location
Operating System Used:
(Click on relevant answer, single response only.)
Does your PC allow you to use Praxis effectively ?
(Click on relevant answer, single response only.)
8YesNo
If your system has not allowed effective use, what problems have occurred?
(Click on relevant answers, multiple responses accepted.)
TThe Praxis pages are slow to respond
I can't run Praxis along with other applications (such asWord, Excel, etc)
My PC crashes when I try to use Praxis
le pages do not update themselves on a daily basis.
Other (Please specify in text box below)
Had you encountered Web technology (Internet, Web Browsers, etc) prior to Praxis ?
(Click on relevant answer, single response only.)
8YesNo
If so, in what context ?
(Click on relevant answers, multiple responses accepted.)
Internet access at home
Project work with Bank
Project work with prior employer
YOUR USE OF PRAXIS
This section deals with how often you use Praxis and what sections are of particular relevance to
you.
How frequently do you use Praxis ?
(Click on relevant answer, single response only.)
04/03/98
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) Daily




What sections do you use on Praxis?
(Rank them in order of value to your work.)
RankingWebsite
1 Click to Select
2 Click to Select
3 Click to Select
4 Click to Select
5 Cfick to Select
6 CBck to Select
7 Click to Select
8 Click to Select
9 Click to Select
10 Click to Select
How useful is the content of Praxis for your everyday work?




OOf no use at all
Do you have any other comments regarding the content on Praxis ?
(Please enter these comments in the text box provided below.)
YOUR OPINIONS ON PRAXIS SYSTEM USABILITY
The questions in this section are concerned with the user appeal of the Praxis system with
regard to the graphic design, content provided and ease of navigation.
Thinking about the Praxis system, how would you rate the following factors?
(Click on relevant answer, single response for each column.)
Colour Content Layout Navigation
Very good O O O O
Fairly good O O O O
Poor O O O O
Very poor O O O O
Do you feel the graphic design of Praxis is...












Do you have any other comments regarding the graphic
(Please enter these comments in the text box provided below.)
in of Praxis?
Do you feel the labelling of the sections (e.g. Know the Ropes, Running Systems, etc) on the
Praxis front page is....






This section is interested in the sources and channels of communication through which
information about Praxis has been communicated and how effective they have been.
How well do you feel you have been informed about Praxis with regard to features available, new
content, etc?





What is your main source of Information about Praxis?






Other (Please specify in text box below)
THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF PRAXIS
The questions within this section are concerned with your views on the direction In which Praxis
should develop In order to meet business needs and your work requirements effectively.
What enhancements would you like to see on Praxis ?
(Please choose appropriate terms from list below, multiple selections are acceptable.)
An on- line phone book
An improved information searching facility
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BE-mail facilityQuicker turnaround of material to be published
Other (Please specify in text box below)
What concerns do you have regarding the present state and future development of the Praxis
system?
(Please choose appropriate terms from list below, multiple selections are acceptable.)
Levels of support provided for maintaining and updating content
Updating of material




The need to share information with business centres
~
Viewed as a pilot and not sure if it is here to stay
Other (Please specify in text box below)
What would encourage you to use Praxis more ?
(Please specify within text box provided below.)
04/03/98
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